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Abstract 
The social construction of gender-as-binary plays an increasingly central role 
within gender equality research and activism. Despite its importance, however, there 
remain few empirical tools for assessing binarist beliefs, practices, or behaviours at 
the individual level. This thesis sought to address this gap by, first, proposing a new 
way to operationalize the gender binary, second, introducing the Implicit Relational 
Assessment Procedure (IRAP) as a potentially valid and reliable psychometric 
measure of automatic binarist beliefs. The current work had three broad aims: First, 
it aimed to conduct a comprehensive survey of self-reported and automatic binary 
beliefs in a sample of young Irish adults. Nine separate studies were conducted in the 
service of this (N = 602), which together provided clear evidence that gender is 
indeed structured in a binary, oppositional way (i.e., women are feminine but not 
masculine and men are masculine but not feminine). They also provided novel 
insights into the relational structure of gender roles, and the asymmetrical way in 
which we “gender” men relative to women. A second aim of this work was to 
examine the role of the binary in inequality. To this end, studies examined the 
relationship between IRAP effects and responses on three different measures of 
gender discrimination and prejudice: gendered hiring preferences (Chapter Three), 
androcentric bias (Chapter Four), and sexual harassment proclivity (Chapter Five). 
While studies in Chapter Three provided strong evidence that the binarisation of 
gender underpins discrimination in occupational contexts, effects in the remaining 
chapters were comparably weaker. Lastly, this thesis took the novel step of gathering 
a sufficiently large IRAP dataset for a set of pooled analyses. These analyses 
(Chapter Six) strengthened the conclusions drawn around the strength of the biases 
on the binary IRAP, provided novel insights into the magnitude and nature of gender 
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differences on this measure, and shed light on some of its psychometric 
properties. Overall, these findings have a number of broad implications: First, they 
add to the growing empirical literature around binarist ideologies and their role in 
gender inequality. Second, they inform our understanding of how gender is 
structured, and elucidate the oppositional, relational, and asymmetrical way in which 
gender categories are framed. Third, they reveal the IRAP to be an adequately 
reliable and valid tool for quantifying gender binary biases. Fourth, and last, they 
attest to the automaticity of binary beliefs and thus the centrality of the binary within 
gender cognition more broadly.    
 1 
Chapter 1 
 
General Introduction 
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1.1 Introduction 
The social construction of gender-as-binary is the centre of considerable 
feminist debate, research and activism. To date, however, the field of psychology has 
struggled with the operationalization and assessment of binarist ideologies. The 
current work aims to address this by, first, introducing a new psychometric tool for 
quantifying gender binary beliefs and, second, investigating the potential role of 
these biases in gender-based discrimination and prejudice. Before introducing the 
specific studies planned for this thesis, a comprehensive overview of the gender 
binary and its measurement will be provided. First, this literature review will very 
briefly outline modern gender theory and the paradigmatic shift towards systematic 
rather than essentialist models of gender. Binary gender systems will then be 
introduced and described, and the link between binarist frameworks, social 
behaviour, and widespread inequality clearly outlined. This review will then turn its 
focus to measurement, looking at the various different fields, sub-disciplines, and 
theoretical perspectives that have analysed the binary at various levels of analysis. 
Finally, a novel way to conceptualise and measure binary biases will be put forward.    
1.1.1 Epistemological Statement 
Before reviewing the literature relevant to the current thesis, it is important to 
first clarify my own epistemological position. I am a cisgender, White woman and 
have lived in Ireland my whole life. I consider myself a feminist and would 
particularly align myself with the philosophy of Radical Feminism. While it can be 
difficult to find a unifying definition of any strand of feminism in the literature, 
Radical Feminism can be described as the effort to “challenge, change and ultimately 
end patriarchy” (Hooks, 2004, p.108). One of the guiding goals of radical feminist 
research in recent decades has been to expose gender structures and understand the 
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ways in which they relate to gender-based violence and inequality (see Mackay, 
2015). This work was conducted to analyse one particular aspect of Western gender 
structures identified in the literature: the gender binary. As it is the focus of the 
current work, it should be clear that I am adopting a radical feminist interpretation of 
the gender binary as a meaningful, socio-historically constructed and malleable 
system for organising behaviour (e.g. Butler, 1990).  
1.2 Gender: From Essentialist to Systemic Models  
For a long time, gender was conceptualised as a natural and essential reality. 
From as far back as Ancient Greece to the advent of Christianity, differences 
between women and men have been attributed in varying degrees to innate, 
immutable, divine, or predetermined factors (Butler, 1988; Gelman, 2003). The 
introduction of Darwinian theory in the late 19th century and the extension of the 
sexual dimorphism framework to human behaviour provided a new biological 
backing to historical arguments, moving the immutable origins of sexual difference 
away from the divine and onto the genetic (Dar-Nimrod & Heine, 2011; DeLamater 
& Hyde, 1998). Or, as argued by Bem (1993), away from “God’s grand creation [and 
on] to its scientific equivalent: Evolution’s grand creation” (p. 68). Even the earlier 
waves of feminist activism assumed – and indeed endorsed – essential differences 
between the sexes. During feminism’s first wave, for instance, prominent 
Suffragettes such as Elizabeth Cady Stanton and Emmeline Pankhurst based their 
platforms on traditional notions of women’s moral and spiritual superiority over men 
(see Heilmann, 2011). Similarly, many strands of liberal or “different-but-equal” 
feminism (most popular during the second wave) largely sought to achieve equality 
through the celebration of women and men’s distinct, natural, and complementary 
strengths (e.g., Daly, 1985; Friedan, 1963; Gilligan, 1982).   
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Towards the beginning of the early 1980s, however, the emerging schools of 
post-structuralist, phenomenological, postmodern, and social constructionist 
philosophy began to influence those working within the context of gender and 
women’s activism. Judith Butler’s highly influential theory of gender performativity, 
for instance, challenged the taken-for-granted assumption of gender as innate, 
instead reframing it as something which is continually performed, constructed, and 
reproduced in daily interaction (1990, 2002). Candace West and Don Zimmerman 
(1987) introduced the similar concept of doing gender to describe the myriad ways 
in which historical roles and norms are enacted (or “done”) at both individual and 
social levels. Dorothy E. Smith (1987) and Patricia Collins (1990) further 
interrogated the origins and validity of essentialism by introducing feminist 
standpoint theory, or the broad argument that all knowledge (including gender 
knowledge) should be considered socially informed, situated, and governed. Of 
particular significance to the current work, however, was the emergence of power-
based models, or those which examined the relationship of gender to structures of 
oppression. R.W. Connell’s Gender Order Theory (1982, 1985), for instance, 
proposed that gender is essentially a hierarchical system that governs the differential 
distribution of rights and social resources to men (particularly traditionally masculine 
men) over women. According to Connell, the categories “man”, “woman”, 
“masculinity” and “femininity” are thus not biological truths, but rather different 
positions within a gender order.    
Together, these models and frameworks brought about significant change 
within feminist scholarship and marked the beginning of what is now generally 
considered the third wave. With the rise of radical feminism (and the goal “to 
question everything”: Baer, 2011), gender itself gradually became the subject of 
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analysis and the centre of a new standalone discipline: Gender Studies. Essentialism 
was slowly replaced by the social and power-based accounts, and many historic 
concepts were either abandoned, reinterpreted, or radically reconceptualised. For 
example, the construct of biological sex was now seen as separable from culturally 
constructed gender roles (De Beauvoir, 1979; Daly & Wilson. 1983), while 
ideologies around “natural” sexualities, roles or relationship structures were 
reframed as tools for enforcing women’s subordination (Rich, 1980). Importantly, 
the concept of patriarchy was introduced during this time to broadly challenge and 
dismantle the assumption of a natural gender order, and to acknowledge socio-
historically constructed systems of male dominance (Firestone, 1970; Dworkin & 
MacKinnon, 1988; Lorde, 1986).  
Around this same period, empirical research from the biological, 
psychological and social sciences began to cast further doubt on naturalistic 
explanations of sex/gender difference. Findings from anthropology and history, for 
instance, provided evidence of both temporal and cross-cultural variation in gender 
roles, thereby challenging the assumption of a universal gender (Mead, 1935, 1963). 
More recently, meta-analytic reviews from psychology and biology have found 
considerable variation in the strength, reliability, and replicability of gender 
differences across disciplines, often finding more variation within gender groups 
than between (Fausto-Sterling, 2000; Fine, 2010; Richardson, 2013). These findings 
are of course further complicated when different moderators, mediators, or 
explanatory frameworks are applied to the data and/or taken into account (e.g., 
neuroplasticity, epigenetics, socialisation, etc.: see Hyde, Bigler, Joel, Tate & Van 
Anders, 2019). Even the validity of the more basic anatomical or genetic categories 
(i.e., male or female, XX or XY) has been called into question in recent years by 
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statistics showing that approximately 1.7% of individuals are born intersex or with a 
disorder of sexual development (i.e., with ambiguous genitalia or an atypical sex-
chromosome configuration: see Richards, Bouman & Barker, 2018). According to 
Oakley (2016), sexual difference should be considered more apparent than real, 
given that men and women ultimately “have the same body ground-plan… neither 
the phallus nor the womb are organs of one sex only: the female phallus (the clitoris) 
is the biological equivalent of the male organ, and men possess a vestigial womb, 
whose existence they may well ignore until it causes enlargement of the prostate 
gland in old age.” (p. 26). While it is important to note these combined bodies of 
work do not (and are not intended to) discredit the role of biology in gender 
difference, they do demonstrate the complexity inherent in these categories and thus 
the shortcomings of an entirely radical essentialist framework (Dreger, 1999; 
Gelman, 2003).  
1.3 The Gender Binary 
Within mainstream gender studies, it is thus now increasingly common to 
view gender an ideological system rather than a biological fact (Ferree, Lorber, and 
Hess 1999; Lorber 1994; Nakano Glenn 1999; Ridgeway 1997; Ridgeway and 
Smith-Lovin 1999; Risman 1998). Though there are and have been many systems for 
organising gender throughout history (see Fausto-Sterling, 2000 and Vasey & 
Bartlett, 2007 for reviews of gender systems across cultures and time periods), in the 
context of the modern West, gender is now generally described using one broad and 
collective term: the gender binary. The binary (also referred to as binarism) 
encompasses and unites the myriad social, historic, ideological, epistemological, and 
institutional practices that categorise individuals into different groups (i.e., women 
and men), as well as those which organise systems of social relations, discrimination, 
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and inequality on the basis of that difference (Ridgeway & Correll, 2004). Research 
into the binary is therefore vast and includes multiple different bodies of work from a 
wide range of disciplines (e.g., anthropology, history, sociology, psychology, and so 
on: Hyde et al., 2019; Ridgeway, 2011). For brevity, and because this work is 
concerned with the measurement of the binary and its role in social discrimination 
and inequality, the below review will organise and structure material in the following 
way: First, a review of binary gender roles will be provided, along with a summary 
of the various different responsibilities, attributes, skills, and abilities that have 
become associated with different groups under the binary. Next, the myriad ways in 
which these roles underpin (and are shaped by) social behaviour will be outlined. 
Finally, the systems of power organised on the basis of real and complete gender 
difference will be reviewed.  
1.3.1 Gender Roles 
To look first at how individuals are categorised in a binary system, gender in 
the West has been summarized as a “two and only two” system (Garfinkel, 1967; 
Kessler & McKenna, 1978). Within the binary, there are two genders (female and 
male) that are divided on the basis of primary and secondary sexual characteristics 
(i.e., sex chromosomes, gonads, genitalia, and typical pubertal development: 
Richards et al., 2015). Each gender is associated with distinct sets of attributes, 
skills, traits and abilities, which together are generally referred to as masculine and 
feminine gender roles (Eagly, 1987; Risman, 2004). Decades of research suggests 
that masculinity tends to be associated more readily with agentic attributes (e.g., 
independence, dominance, aggression, ambition, logic, self-sufficiency, or leadership 
potential), while femininity is defined more by communal attributes (e.g., sensitivity, 
kindness, affection, interdependence, submission, and interpersonal care: 
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Broverman, Vogel, Broverman, Clarkson, & Rosenkrantz, 1994; Eagly & Karau, 
2002; Newport, 2001; Gaucher, Friesen, & Kay, 2011; Madera, Hebl, & Martin, 
2009; Moscatelli, Ellemers, Menegatti, & Rubini, 2016; Rudman, Moss-Racusin, 
Phelan, & Nauts, 2012; Spence & Buckner, 2000; Williams & Best, 1990).  
There is thus an inherent “complementarity” to Western gender roles, with 
masculine strengths corresponding to feminine weaknesses and vice versa (Jost & 
Kay, 2005; Eagly & Karau, 2002). As described by Butler (1990), “one is only one’s 
gender to the extent that one is not the other gender” (p. 22), and indeed a large body 
of evidence suggests that gender categories are relationally defined. That is, that 
which is feminine is also not-masculine, and that which is masculine is also not-
feminine. For instance, numerous empirical studies show that attributes rated as 
typical or desirable in one gender are often considered atypical or undesirable in the 
other (Diekman & Eagly, 2000; Glick & Fiske, 1996; Hall & Carter, 1999; Spence & 
Helmreich, 1978; Williams & Best, 1990; Wood, Christensen, Hebi & Rothberger, 
1997). Moreover, people generally prefer and expect men and women to behave in a 
manner consistent with their gender role (Carli, 2001; Rudman & Glick, 2001), and a 
large body of research documents the negative social consequences associated with 
role deviations (e.g., McCreary, 1994; O’Neil, Helms, Gable, David, & Wrightsman, 
1986; Pleck, 1981; Smiler, 2004). In this way, binarised gender roles are not merely 
shared cultural beliefs about men and women, but rather the normative, prescriptive 
and proscriptive scripts for acceptable male and female behaviour (Keonig, 2018).  
Eagly’s widely-cited Social Role Theory (SRT: Eagly, 1987; Eagly & Karau, 
2002) provides a useful explanatory framework for the ways in which gender roles 
underpin broader social structures and responsibilities. According to the SRT, 
society’s expectation and preference that men and women do not behave like the 
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“opposite sex” explains societal gender stereotyping, segregation, and differentiation 
across numerous spheres. Specifically, Eagly and her colleagues propose that the 
socialization of men (but not women) as agentic and women (but not men) as 
communal explains why men are evaluated as more naturally suited for some roles 
(e.g., leadership, STEM careers, politics, or roles involving money or economic 
oversight) and women for others (e.g., teaching, care work, or assistant roles). 
Because gender is oppositionally structured, there is also an inherent incongruity 
between women and agentic roles and men and communal roles, potentially 
explaining why women and men are often negatively evaluated when they occupy 
positions deemed incongruous with their gender (male nurses or female CEOs; Eagly 
& Mladinic, 1989; Heilman, 1983, 2012).  
The SRT also proposes that the observation of men and women in these 
different roles leads to the naturalisation of gender stereotypes within a culture over 
time (i.e., the belief that gender differences arise because of natural and immutable 
differences between women and men). While most contemporary feminist and 
gender theorists reject purely naturalistic explanations of gender roles or the 
argument that biology necessitates women’s subordination (e.g., Butler, 2002), 
essentialist beliefs, models and practices remain widespread (Prentice & Miller, 
2006; Smiler & Gelman, 2008). Studies suggest, for example, that people tend 
towards essentialist explanations of gender differences even when presented with 
additional information (e.g., about socialization or inequality-related factors: 
Brescoll, Uhlmann & Newman, 2013; Brescoll & LaFrance, 2004; Haslam, 
Rothschild & Ersnt, 2000, 2002; Yoder, Fischer, Kahn & Groden, 2007). Moreover, 
these effects seem to be strongest for domains or behaviours that have historically 
been very gender-differentiated (e.g., aggression or helping: Brescoll, Uhlman & 
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Newman, 2013; Eagly & Wood, 1991), thus supporting the SRT argument that roles 
and stereotypes tend to become naturalized over time. Essentialism is also evident at 
a societal level. Within contemporary medical and psychological research, for 
example, it is still common practice to use “sex” and “gender” interchangeably, and 
indeed to collect and analyse gender information in a binary way (i.e., using only 
male/female response options: Bouchel et al., 2018; Fine, 2010; Fraser, 2018). Sex 
and gender can be similarly conflated in the legal system, with many laws and public 
policies defining gender on a biological rather than socio-cultural basis (if at all: see 
Van Anders, Schudson, Abed, Beischel, Dibble, Gunther et al., 2017).  
The fusion of biological sex with sociocultural gender under the binary (i.e., 
the assumed concordance between genetic makeup, anatomy, and social roles) has a 
range of significant consequences for women and men, some of which will be 
explored later in this thesis. However, the “two and only two” assumption also has 
considerable consequences for individuals who fall outside of the binary; that is, 
those who cannot be meaningfully accounted for within a binary framework of 
knowledge (Murjan & Bouman, 2015; Young, 1994). These include, but are not 
limited to, individuals who are transgender (those who have a different gender 
identity than what was assigned at birth), gender-fluid (those with multiple or 
flexible gender identities, or an identity that may change over time), non-
binary/genderqueer (those whose identity does not align reliably with either gender 
category), and intersex individuals or those born with a Disorder of Sexual 
Development (DSD; i.e., people with ambiguous sexual characteristics or with a 
condition affecting the development or expression of sexual characteristics: Hyde et 
al., 2018 and Hegarty et al., 2018 for comprehensive reviews of the above). Though 
the estimated combined prevalence of these phenomena is between 2-8% (depending 
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on the criteria applied: Bouchel et al., 2018; Olyslager & Conway, 2007) individuals 
who do not fit a binary definition of gender still experience significant legal and 
medical difficulties (see Richards & Barker, 2015). It remains near impossible to live 
legally without a binary gender identity, for example, with nearly all societies 
requiring either a male or female gender to be assigned at birth (Fraser, 2018). 
Furthermore, it is still mainstream practice to surgically normalize those who present 
as ambiguous, including intersex individuals or people born with DSD (Roen, 2015). 
While some societies have provided legal recognition for “third gender” groups (e.g., 
the Hijra of Pakistan or Fa’fafine of Samoa: Lorber, 1997; Vasey & Bartlett, 2007) 
or legal/medical avenues for changing gender (e.g., gender reassignment surgery), 
feminists and activists remain conflicted about whether these practices serve to 
reinforce or dismantle rigid systems of gender categorization (Fine, 2010; Hird, 
2000; Richards & Barker, 2015).  
1.3.2 Gender Relations 
The above review clearly outlines the impact of the binary on individuals, 
and the many different rights, roles, and responsibilities associated with different 
gender groups under the binary. In addition to prescribing gender norms, however, 
the binarisation of gender is also considered highly significant for social and 
interpersonal behaviour (Butler, 1988; Sedgwick, 1991). According to Ridgeway and 
Correll (2004), the binary acts as a sort of axiomatic, omni-relevant and primary 
frame for organising social relations, both within and between gender groups. Lorber 
(2011) similarly argues for the relevance of gender to our daily interactions, 
comparing it to that of water to a fish: highly significant and yet so deeply ingrained 
in our consciousness that it is almost invisible. While gender is similar to (and 
indeed interacts with) many other systems of social categorization such as race, 
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class, ability, or age, gender is considered an especially powerful system for 
organizing behaviour with particularly well-established patterns of interaction (Eagly 
& Steffen, 1984). This is primarily because of the frequency with which men and 
women interact, as well as the centrality of gender to social identity and 
categorization (Kachel, Steffens & Niedlich, 2016).  
A wealth of social psychological research demonstrates the significance of 
gender to social and identity processes. Studies of interpersonal recognition and 
categorization, for instance, show that gender information tends to be processed 
significantly faster than information pertaining to age, race, or ethnicity (see Young 
& Burton, 2018). Analyses suggest gender has similar primacy in identity 
development and construction, with studies reliably identifying gender as the most 
central or highly ranked identity dimension (i.e., people tend to identify as a man or 
women before they identify as a Black person, or Irish person, and so on: Aboud, 
1984; Jones & McEwan, 2000: Haim & Ruble, 2010). Developmental research 
indicates these abilities emerge very early in life and before the capacity to 
categorize or identify according to other dimensions (e.g., by race, language group, 
nationality, or religion; Bigler & Liben, 2007; Kinzler, Shutts & Correll, 2010; Levy 
& Killen, 2008). Rudimentary categorization abilities found have been found among 
infants as young as 6 months old, for instance, while identity processes are thought 
to begin around 2 years of age (see Baron, Schmader, Cvencek, & Meltzoff, 2014). 
Often described as “gender-typing” (Bem, 1981), these cognitive and behavioural 
processes are considered significant because they form the basis of gender 
stereotyping and identity processes, and thus gender knowledge more broadly 
(Bussey & Bandura, 1999; Martin et al., 2002; Richards & Barker, 2015; Turner, 
2000).  
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This interactive process of learning to adhere to or behave in accordance with 
gender norms is broadly referred to as gender socialization (Leaper & Friedman, 
2007). Gender role socialization is theorized to begin very early in social 
development, with children exposed to vastly different forms of play, parenting, 
activities, and educational instruction depending on their gender (e.g., Richards & 
Barker, 2015). While the specifics of gender socialisation will be discussed later in 
this chapter, broadly speaking, gender theorists note the ways in which boys are 
encouraged towards activities based on problem-solving, competition, and physical 
strength, and girls towards those involving aesthetics, beauty, cooperation, and 
domestic abilities (e.g., Bigler, 1995; Gelman, Taylor, & Nguyen; 2004; Leaper, 
1994; Leaper, Breed, Hoffman, & Perlman, 2002; Maccoby, 1998; Marsh & 
Kleitman, 2003; Thompson & Zerbinos, 1995).  
The enforcement and enactment of norms is believed to continue across the 
lifespan through the “social-relational context” of daily interactions (Ridgeway, 
2011). According to Butler (2002), there are clear and historic rules for all gender 
relations under the binary, which are both predicated on and reproduce traditional 
gender roles. Between women and men, for example, a large body of work suggests 
these interactions remain largely heteronormative in nature; that is, consistent with 
the traditional belief that masculine men and feminine women form a natural 
heterosexual dyad (Warner, 1991). Heteronormativity was a concept that was 
developed to describe the societal expectation and normalization of heterosexuality 
(Herek, 2004, Rubin, 1993; Rich, 1980), as well as the more general conflation of 
sex, gender roles, gender identity and sexual orientation under the binary (e.g., 
Habarth et al., 2019). This conflation, which has been referred to as the sex/gender 
system (Rubin, 1993) or the sex-gender-sexuality complex (Segal, 2006), is argued to 
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create an overarching “script” for gender relations, where the dominant male is 
expected to pursue, manage, control, or provide for the passive or subordinate female 
(Habarth, 2015; Jackson, 2006; Kitzinger, 2005; Massey, 2009). While outside of the 
scope of this thesis, evidence abounds that men and women adhere to and endorse 
this script in a variety of contexts, including romantic and sexual relationships 
(Byers, 1995; Masters et al., 2013), the workplace (Losert, 2008), educational 
settings (Ward & Schneider, 2009), and platonic friendships (Cronin, 2015).   
The binary also sets out clear rules for intra-gender relations, or relations 
between men and between women. Several typologies and frameworks have been 
developed to describe the different gender dynamics which may operate within 
gender groups (e.g., Kimmel, 1993, 1996; Lorber, 1998), including the previously 
mentioned Gender Order Theory (GOT; Connell 1987). In brief, the GOT proposes 
that gender in the West is hierarchically structured, with traditional dominant 
masculinity at the top, followed by minority or non-traditional masculinity (e.g., gay 
men, non-White men, effeminate men, etc.) and lastly by traditional and non-
traditional femininity. Similar to theories of gender performativity, Connell argues 
that masculinity is something which is perceptually achieved and reconstructed 
through male-male social interactions. Citing evidence from discursive, cognitive, 
behavioural and sociological studies, proponents of this model note the many ways 
in which men are socialized to perform their masculinity (e.g., through displays of 
aggression, control and dominance towards those lower down in the hierarchy: 
Connell & Messerschmidt, 2005; Connell et al., 1982; Donaldson, 1993; Hunt, 1981; 
Kessler et al., 1992; Willis, 1977). This “hegemonic masculinity” framework has 
been used to explain why male friendships can be characterized by competition, 
emotional detachment, or the shared objectification and/or sexualisation of women 
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(Bird, 1996), and to account for the relatively severe social backlash experienced by 
men when they violate prescribed gender norms (e.g., engage in same-sex behaviour 
or pursue a stereotypically feminine interest or occupation: Gelman et al., 2004; 
McCreary, 1994; Smiler, 2006). At a societal level, sociologists have extended this 
framework to a range of gendered social phenomena, including sexual and gender-
based violence, gender disparities in health and help-seeking behaviour, and the 
disproportionately high rates of suicide in men (see Jewkes et al., 2015 for a review).  
Gender relations between women are theorized to be somewhat different, 
although they function to reproduce and regulate gender norms in much the same 
way (Harding, 1983). According to Coates (2015), female relations both reflect and 
shape the communal feminine role, and the ways in which women are socialised 
towards emotional awareness, verbal ability and interpersonal skills. Studies of 
female peer groups, for instance, show they are characterized by significantly more 
emotional intimacy, self-disclosure, reciprocal support, frequency of contact, and 
longevity than their male equivalents (Fischer & Oliker, 1983; Hey, 1996; Johnson 
& Aries, 1983; O’Connor, 1992; Wright, 1988; Wright & Scanlon, 1991). Moreover, 
when compared to men, studies show that women experience low rates of gender 
role stress (i.e., reduced pressure to adhere to traditional feminine gender roles; 
Eisler, Skidmore & Ward, 1988; Levant, 2011) and experience weaker social 
punishment for gender role transgressions (McCreary, 1994; Smiler, 2004). Women 
do still encounter intra-gender backlash and conflict when they violate gender norms, 
however, particularly those related to compliance, submission, and sexual purity. For 
instance, studies show that women are equally (and sometimes more) likely than 
men to negatively evaluate women who are sexually promiscuous, agentic, 
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overweight, or choose not to have children (Acker, 2009; Campbell, 2004; Mavin, 
2006; Mavin, Williams & Grandy, 2014).  
1.3.3 Gender-Power Dynamics  
While the research reviewed thus far clearly outlines how the binary 
separates the genders and underpins social relations, it is important to now connect 
these literatures to the more pressing question of gender inequality. As mentioned 
previously, many feminists root women’s oppression within our broader gender 
ideology and frameworks of knowledge (Brownmiller, 1975; Butler, 2002; Connell 
& Messerschmidt, 2005; Dworkin, 1975; Rich, 1980). While the micro and macro 
social processes that enact equality are likely numerous, according to Bem (1996), 
separating the genders lays the groundwork for inequality in two main ways: First, it 
allows for the establishment of gender orders or hierarchies over time (i.e., through 
the “gendering” of various socially-valued traits, roles, and abilities). Second, it 
leads to the relegation of certain experiences, viewpoints, and knowledge over 
others, and thus to the gradual normalisation of one gender over the other. Within the 
specific spatio-temporal context of the modern West, the binary thus enables two 
main types of male privilege: (1) male supremacy, and (2) male centrality.   
To look first at male supremacy, there is a wealth of evidence to show that 
the current gender order prioritizes men.  The most recent statistics by the World 
Health Organization, United Nations, and the World Economic Forum shows that 
women fare worse than men in nearly every nation in the world on nearly all metrics 
of gender parity (UN, 2018; WEF, 2018; WHO, 2007). These include reduced access 
to education, underrepresentation in political or decision-making spheres, and lower 
economic participation and success. These results hold true for Europe, with the 
most recent Gender Equality Index Report finding superior outcomes for men across 
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work, money, knowledge, time, power, health, violence, and “intersecting 
inequality” domains (European Institute for Gender Equality, 2017). Ireland ranks 
slightly higher than the EU average overall (69.5 out of a possible 100) but is 
notably lower in the domains of economic/political power (48.6) and gender-based 
violence (25.6) (see also the Women and Men in Ireland Report: Central Statistics 
Office, 2016).  
According to Ridgeway (2011), men also have ideological supremacy under 
patriarchy, in that they tend to be more readily associated with culturally-valued 
traits, abilities, and characteristics. Studies generally show that higher status groups 
tend to be viewed as possessing more socially valued attributes (Berger, Rosenholtz 
& Zelditch, 1980; Cheng, Tracy & Henrich, 2010; Eagly & Wood, 1982), and a large 
body of research suggests an alignment between cultural values and masculine 
stereotypes. Leadership stereotypes, for example, are defined by many of the same 
agentic traits associated with traditional masculinity (e.g., independence, 
assertiveness, etc.: see Koenig, Eagly, Mitchell & Ristikari, 2011 for a meta-
analysis). Studies have found an overlap between masculine stereotypes and those 
for other lucrative or high-status roles, including a successful scientist, politician, 
doctor, athlete, or financial manager (Burton, Barr, Fink & Bruening, 2009; Carli, 
2016; Himmelstein, 2016; Schneider & Bos, 2014). By contrast, feminine 
stereotypes have been shown to overlap with roles associated with lower status 
and/or income (e.g., nursing, teaching, care work, full-time parenting, or assistant 
roles: Conway, Pizzamiglio & Mount, 1996; Eagly & Steffen, 1984; Glick, Wilk & 
Perreault, 1995).   
Further evidence for ideological male supremacy comes from the fact that 
gender inequality is remarkably resistant to outside intervention. To look at the 
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example of occupational inequality, for instance, research shows that it has persisted 
in spite of significant socioeconomic transformations, including women’s entry into 
the workforce, improved educational attainment, and the introduction of many forms 
of antidiscrimination legislation (Ridgeway, 2011; Verniers & Vala, 2018). In 
Ireland alone, for instance, considerable gender imbalances remain among socially 
valued and senior employment categories, with women comprising just 22.2% of 
Teachtaí Dála (CSO, 2016) and 16% of Chief Executives positions in Irish financial 
institutions (Central Bank, 2018). This is despite the fact that roughly comparable 
percentages of women and men now enter the workforce (59.5% and 69.9% 
respectively: CSO, 2016), and indeed a higher percentage of women now complete 
third-level education (55.1% relative to 42.9%). Given that the historic argument that 
women are inherently ill-suited to or disinterested in senior management roles does 
not tend to be supported by empirical research (see Eagly & Karau, 2002), the above 
gender barriers would appear to be ideological.   
Gender-power dynamics have been further examined in the context of non-
binary identities. As mentioned previously, there are several groups of people who 
fall outside of the binary system, including transgender, non-binary, gender-fluid, 
and intersex individuals (Hyde et al., 2018; Richards & Barker, 2015). In addition to 
the aforementioned legal exclusion that can be encountered by non-binary 
individuals (i.e., not being able to legally work, marry, or access medical and social 
resources without a male or female identity), research suggests these groups are 
subject to profound social discrimination and inequality. For instance, when 
compared to their “cisgender” counterparts (i.e., those whose gender identity aligns 
with the gender assigned to them at birth), studies show these individuals experience 
disproportionally high occupational prejudice, sexual violence and harassment, 
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physical or verbal violence or threats, and psychological and physical health issues, 
as well as significant underrepresentation in spheres of power or influence (e.g., 
politics and media: see Grant et al., 2010; Richards, Bouman & Barker, 2017 for 
reviews of the above evidence). According to Butler (2004), this intolerance is not 
merely a reaction to deviance or perceived difference; it is a powerful regulatory tool 
for reinforcing the binary. She notes, “this violence emerges from a profound desire 
to keep the order of binary gender natural or necessary; to make of it a structure, 
either natural or cultural, or both, that no human can oppose, and still remain human” 
(p. 35).  
The above review demonstrates how the gender binary may underpin a broad 
system of male or masculine supremacy. As mentioned, however, another body of 
work examines a separate yet important manifestation of male privilege under 
patriarchy: male centrality (Bem, 1996). Centrality in this case refers to the societal 
tendency to normalize maleness or masculinity, or to place a masculine point of view 
at the centre of society (Hegarty & Pratto, 2006). Feminist theory has long 
acknowledged the andro (i.e., male) centric nature of Western society and cultural 
practices (Gillman, 1911; De Beauvoir, 1979). As argued by Monique Wittig, “only 
one gender exists: the feminine… The masculine is not the masculine, but the 
general” (1985, p. 8), and indeed the literature does suggest we tend to normalise 
men relative to women. Within the English language, for instance, it is still 
conventional to use masculine universals (e.g., man, mankind, guys, etc.) and 
generics (i.e., he/his/him in place of she/they; Silveira, 1980), add a feminine suffix 
to distinguish a female role or occupation (e.g., actor vs actress; see Bodine, 1975; 
Hyde, 1984), or default to a masculine gender in gender-neutral or ambiguous 
contexts (Lambdin et al., 2003). Similarly, in Western cultures at least, default 
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symbols for “human” and “man” are generally interchangeable (e.g., those used for 
social media avatars or safety/healthcare signs; see Bailey & LaFrance, 2016), and 
studies indicate that men remain the prototypical exemplar for several social 
categories (Eagly & Kite, 1987; Stroessner, 1996; Ng, 2007; Zárate & Smith, 1990). 
More broadly, feminists have critiqued the dominance of the male standpoint or 
“epistemological stance” across social systems of knowledge and representation 
(Harding, 1986; Mackinnon, 1982; Smith, 1988). This extends to the overreliance of 
male narrators, experiences or terminology in historical records, literature, law and 
media (Bem, 1993; Hegarty, 2006; Smith & Choueit, 2010). Equally, it includes 
modern scientific and academic practices (e.g., generalizing findings from male-only 
research studies to women, or explaining gender differences in terms of female 
attributes, differences, or deficits: see Bruckmuller et al., 2012; Hegarty & Buechel, 
2006; Pratto et al., 2007).  
While seemingly benevolent, analyses suggest these practices have 
significant consequences for women’s equality. As argued by both Bem (1996) and 
Lucal (1999), women’s demarcation as the “other” under patriarchy means their 
experiences, contributions, and needs tend to be relegated relative to men’s. Studies 
show that the conventional use of masculine generics, symbols and gender-blind 
terms significantly increases the likelihood of a male bias and/or male-centric 
imagery or behaviours (e.g., attributing a male gender to an ambiguous person or 
piece of text, drawing or selecting an image of a man, writing stories about a man: 
etc.; for a review, see Braun, Sczesny, & Stahlberg, 2005). This practice of viewing 
women as “gender-specific” and men as “gender-neutral” (also referred to as the 
default male hypothesis: Smith & Zaraté, 1992) is evidenced across numerous 
contemporary social practices. Accessible examples can be found in sport, where 
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women’s sports are generally framed as a niche or subtype that is in some way 
separate from mainstream sporting activity (Pilcher & Whelehan, 2004) and indeed 
female athletes and teams have been shown to receive significantly less state 
funding, media coverage, and corporate sponsorships than their male counterparts 
(Kian & Hardin, 2009). Analyses of political or scientific funding practices highlight 
a similar tendency to under-fund work conducted by women or into women’s 
experiences (see Ceci & Williams, 2011 for a comprehensive review), or indeed 
work concerning issues of particular relevance to women (e.g., maternal healthcare 
or sexual violence: Fisk & Atun, 2009; Waechter & Van Ma, 2015).  
It is important to note at this stage that the gender-power dynamics reviewed 
above do not preclude the existence of positive female stereotypes. Stereotype theory 
and research shows there are positive and negative attributes associated with both 
femininity and masculinity (e.g., nurturing but nagging, independent but aggressive, 
and so on), and indeed studies show that femininity may in fact be more positively 
valenced in the abstract (Glick & Fiske, 2001). Often dubbed the “women-are-
wonderful” effect, studies of stereotype and trait ratings reliably show a pro-feminine 
bias, for both male and female participants (Eagly & Mladinic, 1989; Eagly, 
Mladinic & Otto, 1991; Hosoda & Stone, 2000). While seemingly paradoxical, many 
radical and third-wave feminists consider this entirely coherent within a patriarchal 
value system, and similar to the recent rise in popularity of neoliberal (i.e., 
“different-but-equal”) feminism among conservative groups (see Babar, 2017). 
According to Rudman (2001), women are not devalued in all spheres under 
patriarchy, just those related to status or power (i.e., lucrative or decision-making 
roles in society).  
1.3.4 The Gender Binary: A Summary    
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Gender under the binary may be summarized as follows: with regards to the 
categorical make up, there are two genders (males and females) who are 
characterized by distinct sets of attributes, skills, and abilities (masculine and 
feminine gender roles). Gender is relationally and oppositionally structured, such 
that men (but not women) are expected to be agentic, and women (but not men) are 
expected to be communal. Role violations are generally undesirable, and behaviour 
or identities which fall outside of the binary are typically met with an array of 
negative social and legal consequences. The social-relational context plays an 
important role in the gender binary, for both the construction and maintenance of 
gender roles. Referred to broadly as gender role socialization, gender normativity 
appears to be regulated through a variety of inter and intra-gender relations across 
the lifespan (e.g., early childhood experiences, familial relationships, peer groups, 
educational settings, romantic relationships, the workplace, and so on). The binary is 
considered significant not only for the limits or boundaries it places on individuals 
and their behaviour, but for the role it plays in shaping and maintaining inequality. 
Specifically, given that (a) men and women are framed as completed opposites, and 
(b) men have historically been associated more socially valued attributes, then the 
binarization of gender essentially lays the groundwork for a patriarchal and 
androcentric social order.  
1.4 Measuring the Gender Binary: Traditional Methods  
Despite the centrality of the binary within contemporary gender theorizing, 
the measurement of binarist ideologies, practices, and beliefs remains somewhat 
abstract. While there are many different tools for measuring components of the 
gender system (e.g., stereotypes, identity, socialization practices, etc.), there are few 
direct measures of binarism that could be used in an experimental or individual-level 
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analysis. In order to give some background to the experimental methodology 
proposed in this thesis, an overview will be provided of the existing approaches for 
studying the social construction of gender-as-binary. This includes methodologies or 
approaches that assess or focus on how gender categories are related or framed; the 
accepted roles for men and women; how ambiguous or non-binary identities are 
interpreted and dealt with in society; the direct or indirect fusion between sex, 
gender, and sexuality; and the relationship of the binary to male dominance. For 
ease, these various bodies of research will be reviewed under the following analytic 
category headings: (1) culture; (2) history; (3) development; (4) language; and (5) 
beliefs. 
1.4.1 Analysing Culture 
Cultural analysis broadly refers to the study of a culture’s beliefs, practices, 
values, symbols, or assumptions (see King, 2016, for an introduction). Among 
gender theorists, such analyses are frequently used to examine the current or historic 
influences of society on gender role maintenance and socialization, as well as the 
binarization of society in accordance with traditional gender roles. Though there are 
many methodological and data sources that may be used for a cultural analysis of the 
binary, national or global statistics have been especially useful in exposing the 
gendered divisions in society. In the context of labour, for example, research reliably 
shows that the majority of unpaid or low-income care roles are occupied by women 
(i.e., child-rearing or acting as a full-time carer to a family member or partner) while 
most high-risk and physically dangerous jobs are held by men (e.g., forestry, mining 
and fishing: UN, 2018). Similar gender divisions have been found in the context of 
health, with socio-policy analyses noting the significant impact of gender on life 
expectancy, disease prevalence and outcomes, mental health diagnoses, and health-
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related behaviours (WHO, 2007). Societal crime and violence are also highly 
gendered, with Irish and global statistics revealing a significant percentage of crimes 
are perpetrated by men and against men (CSO, 2016; UNODC, 2018). This is with 
the exception of sexual or intimate partner violence, which is predominantly 
perpetrated by men against women.  
Cultural analyses have also shed light on the socio-political systems which 
may contribute to or reinforce these divisions, such as the law. Since the 1950s, 
feminist scholars have argued that the law plays an important practical role in 
inequality, both in subordinating women and maintaining the binary (Brown, 1990; 
Harris, 1990; MacKinnon, 2005). Across the world, the vast majority of lawmakers 
and law enforcers are men (see Baer, 2011), and many feminists argue this has 
resulted in an inherently gender-biased, heteronormative, and male-dominated legal 
system (Fineman, 2010; 2013). Feminist analyses of the law have examined, for 
instance, the comparably low conviction rates for crimes disproportionately affecting 
women (e.g., rape and domestic abuse: Anderson, 2003; Burgess-Jackson, 1996; 
Dowrkin, 1997), or the legal frameworks around contraception, abortion or maternal 
healthcare (Barnett, 1998; Smart, 2002). Feminists have also analysed how the law 
may reinforce traditional binary gender roles for both women and men. In many 
jurisdictions, for instance, it remains common to have laws or provisions that are 
gender-specific (i.e., afford special privileges or punishments depending on the 
gender of the perpetrator or victim: see Baer, 2011). Some examples from Irish law 
would be the constitutional protections afforded to families or women in the home 
(Bunreacht na hÉireann, 1937), or that incest only carries a maximum sentence of 
life imprisonment only when the perpetrator is male (Sexual Offences Act, 2017).  
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The media has been subject to similar scrutiny for its role in both shaping and 
maintaining gender ideologies. Analyses have identified several common media 
practices which reify traditional gender norms, including the reliance on 
conventional gender tropes (e.g., women’s domestication or the conflation of abuse 
and romance: Byerly & Ross, 2006), underrepresentation or misrepresentation of 
women in leading, powerful or desirable roles (e.g., heroes, scientists, presidents: 
Leaper, Breed, Hoffman, & Perlman, 2002; Thompson & Zerbinos, 1995), or the 
tendency to use women (or their suffering) as a plot device to further a male 
character’s development (Thornham, 2007). Within feminist media analysis, scholars 
have been particularly critical of the tendency to objectify and sexualise women, or 
to depict their lives and bodies through the perspective of the “male gaze” (Carilli & 
Campbell, 2005). According to Laura Mulvey (1975, 2004), the widespread practice 
of exposing idealized, sexualised versions of women’s bodies contributes 
significantly to women’s subordinated status in society, primarily through 
reinforcing the idea that women exist as sexual objects for male consumption. 
Gender norms may also be reproduced through advertising (e.g., targeting cleaning, 
beauty or dieting adverts to women only, etc.: Gallagher, 2013; Signorielli, 2001), 
and in the reporting of news and current events. A recent report demonstrated that 
just 10% of news stories focus on women or women’s issues, and that women 
comprise just 20% of the spokespeople or experts interviewed (UNESCO, 2018). 
Gender stereotypes or norms can also be subtly reinforced through storytelling 
“templates” in media. In the context of domestic and sexual violence, for instance, a 
recent analysis by Berns (2017) explored how male aggression and violence is often 
normalized in the news through (a) shifting the focus onto the victim; (b) reframing 
the violence as a display of over-eager or misconstrued romance/sexual arousal; or 
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(c) describing the behaviour as aberrant rather than normative. Other media analyses 
have focused on the gender divides in the industry, such as the unequal 
representation of female actors, directors and executives, or the widely discussed 
gender pay gap (Hollinger, 2012; Leavy, 2007). 
More recently, feminists have critiqued scientific culture, particularly for its 
role in reifying the “ideology of difference” (Richards, Bouman & Barker, 2017). 
Harding (2003) argues that science and academia have contributed significantly to 
the social construction of gender-as-binary and the extension of sexual dimorphism 
explanations to nearly all aspects of social life. These include critiques of early 
biological, psychiatric, and evolutionary explanations of gender and sexual 
behaviour (e.g., associated with Darwin and Galton), as well as early and modern 
theories within the field of sexology (from Havelock Ellis’ work in the 19th century 
up to modern neuroscience explanations of gender difference: see Fausto-Sterling, 
1992 and Schmitz & Höppner, 2014 for critiques). Scientific theories have also come 
under scrutiny within feminist circles for naturalising male violence and sexual 
aggression as a normal mating behaviour (as opposed to a form of abuse: see 
McPhail, 2016 for a comprehensive review). Contemporary scientific practices have 
also been argued play a role in upholding the binary, and more generally 
androcentric systems of knowledge. As mentioned previously, these include (but are 
not limited to) the tendencies to analyse by gender without a rationale, attribute 
gender differences to women rather than men, explain gender differences in terms of 
biology rather than bio-psycho-social causes, and collect gender information in a 
binarized way; see Hegarty & Pratto, 2006; Fraser, 2018; Seal, 2017).  
In addition to demonstrating how the roles of women and men are shaped and 
reproduced through social practice, cultural research has demonstrated how the 
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binary may be enforced through widespread social intolerance of gender ambiguity. 
These include ethnomethodological analyses conducted by non-binary individuals 
(e.g., Garfinkel, 1967; Lucal, 1999), as well as the large-scale surveys documenting 
the violence, discrimination, and prejudice these groups experience (e.g., Budge, 
Adelson, & Howard, 2013).  While there has been a significant increase in efforts to 
challenge the binary in recent years (e.g., through raising awareness of different 
gender identity categories, or introducing gender-neutral pronouns such as 
they/ze/zhe, etc.: see Darr & Tyler, 2016), research suggests linguistic and societal 
change is quite slow. For example, a recent analysis of Facebook’s practices found 
that, although users can choose from over 50 gender identification categories (as of 
2017), non-binary users are re-classified as male or female in the deep code of the 
database (Bivens, 2017). 
1.4.2 Analysing History 
As argued by Butler (1988), gender should always be considered a historical 
situation rather than a natural fact, and indeed historical analyses have provided 
valuable insights into how gender systems may be established or maintained over 
time. Within the West, for example, analyses of historical records suggest that 
women’s oppression as we currently understand it is a relatively new phenomenon 
(Bennett, 1989). Before the emergence of class-based social systems around the 14th 
Century, for example, some historians posit that gender divisions in labour, care 
work, and power were present but significantly less pronounced than they are now 
(Brenner, 1989; Thane, 1992). The separation of labour and childcare roles after the 
industrial revolution is considered another important precipitating factor to modern 
inequality, given that it increased the child-rearing burden on women and laid the 
foundations for their exclusion from the workplace (Sharpe, 2002). An additional 
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significant historical event is the institutionalization of marriage. While records show 
that marital-style practices have ancient roots in many cultures (Pederson, 1999), the 
transition from marriage as a ceremonial practice to a patriarchal legal system that 
regulated property ownership and reproduction had significant consequences for 
women’s equality (see Feldstein, 2002 for a detailed analysis).   
Historical analysis has also informed our understanding of how gender roles 
and power dynamics may be constructed over time. For instance, re-analyses of 
historical records and texts show how the masculine stereotype evolved over time to 
fit changing social roles and power structures. Kimmel (2005), for instance, notes 
how in many ancient texts and epics, masculinity was associated with sexual virility, 
strength and heroism, while Victorian ideals of manhood largely encompassed 
Christian purity and chivalry. Records show that at the beginning of the 20th century, 
masculinity underwent another significant transformation, coming to be defined 
largely by participation and success in the paid labour force, as well as the capacity 
to provide for a family (Connell, 2005). Masculine sexual norms have also changed 
considerably over time, particularly with regards to same-sex behaviour. For 
example, while heterosexuality is now considered a defining feature of masculinity 
in many cultures, there have been numerous instances of normative homosexual or 
homo-erotic behaviour across history (see Foucault, 1986).  
The related fields of Women’s History and Feminist History have been 
similarly important for understanding how women have been oppressed in both 
history and historical records (Smith, 2008). Scholars from these fields often analyse 
(or re-analyse) texts through a feminist lens, seeking to better understand the 
contextual factors moderating women’s subordination or the “mechanisms of 
separation” (e.g., changes in the labour market, famine, urbanisation, etc.), the social 
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roles held by women across history, or cross-cultural comparisons of inequality 
through the ages (see Bennett, 1989). Feminist historiographers have also made 
visible androcentric practices within history, including the tendencies of male 
historians to focus on men’s achievements or indeed attribute success to men over 
women (Sutherland, 2002; Frank, 2017). A notable example includes the 
paleontological and anthropological interpretations of cave drawings from the 
Palaeolithic age. While initially, these early examples of art were attributed to men, 
recent re-analyses of the hand size and digit length indicates these drawings were 
likely done by women (Gelder & Sharpe, 2009). Other re-analyses have explored the 
minimization of women’s contributions in science or the arts (e.g., Lady Mary 
Wortley Montagu who brought inoculation to Britain in 1822, or Rosalind Franklin’s 
contribution to the discovery of DNA: Grundy, 2000; Maddox, 2002). According to 
Pederson (2004), these assumptions and related tendency to overemphasise the 
contributions of men relative to women has significantly shaped modern conceptions 
of men as natural leaders (see also feminist critiques of the “Great Man Theory” in 
earlier historical research: e.g., Vetter, 2010).  
1.4.3 Analysing Development  
As mentioned, gender and feminist theorists place considerable importance 
on gender role socialization, and developmental research has been useful in 
elucidating how women and men “learn to gender” in a range of contexts. 
Observational, naturalistic and longitudinal studies have demonstrated, for example, 
that children are exposed to vastly different toys and activities depending on their 
gender, with parents more likely to give action-based or problem-solving toys to 
boys (e.g., toy trucks, puzzles, or action figures) and nurture or beauty-based toys to 
girls (e.g., dolls, toy kitchens, or beauty sets: see Steffens & Viladot, 2015 for a 
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recent review of this literature). The familial context has also been analysed, with 
studies demonstrating how norms may be passed from parent to child through direct 
gender-stereotyped feedback and information (e.g., hearing statements like “dresses 
are only for girls”, or “boys don’t play with dolls”, and so on: Blaise, 2005; Leaper 
& Friedman, 2007), as well as through more covert observation and inference (e.g., 
modelling, being spoken to or parented differently depending on their gender, or 
seeing their parents engage in gender-stereotyped behaviour and activities: Bandura, 
1977; Epstein & Ward, 2011; Leaper, 2014; Witt, 1997). Early education settings are 
another important context for socialization, with a wealth of empirical and 
longitudinal studies exploring the origins of gender-stereotyped subjects and 
interests (e.g., through differentiated feedback from teachers and peers, or the 
segregation of different school-based or extracurricular activities: see Bigler, Hayes 
& Hamilton, 2013 and Goodwin and Kyratzis, 1997 for comprehensive reviews). 
Gender differences have also been observed in the context of moral development 
(see Jaffee & Hyde, 2000 for a meta-analysis of this literature). According to a now-
seminal analysis by Carol Gilligan (1982), the two gender groups are socialised in 
culture to have vastly different codes of ethics, with women encouraged to develop 
and “ethics of care” (focused on responsibilities and relationships), and men and 
“ethics of personal responsibility” (focused on individual rights and justice).  
Research has also measured and modelled the consequences of gender 
socialization, for both the individual and society (Yoder, 1995). To look first at 
women, communal socialisation practices have been argued to explain women’s 
enhanced emotional and interpersonal skills or increased life expectancy, but equally 
their socioeconomic disadvantage, low or subordinate social status and assumed 
responsibility for the care of others. For men, socialisation is believed to account for 
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their increased license to develop and display socially valued traits (e.g., wit, 
scientific ability, and leadership) but then their proclivity towards violence and 
crime, impaired emotional awareness, and increased risk of suicide or social 
isolation (Eagly & Karau, 2002; Kimmel, 2004; Pleck, 1981; Levant & Pollack, 
1995; Moss-Racusin et al., 2010: see also the recent literature on “toxic 
masculinity”, e.g., Haider, 2016). These outcomes have been measured at multiple 
levels of analysis using a variety of methods. At the societal level, as mentioned 
earlier, national and global reports are often used to measure societal gender 
divisions (e.g., around health, labour, caregiving, and crime). They have also been 
used to estimate the economic costs associated with gendered practices (e.g., of 
domestic violence or suicide: Shepard, Gurewich, Lwin, Reed & Silvrman, 2015; 
Walby, 2009). At the level of the individual, large bodies of qualitative and 
quantitative research from psychology, sociology, applied social studies and the 
health sciences demonstrates the effects of communal and agentic socialisation. 
While outside the scope of this review, these include the well-established gender 
differences in verbal, emotional, and spatial reasoning abilities, personality, 
aggression, help-seeking behaviours, and sexual behaviour (see Richardson, 2013 for 
a comprehensive review). Neuroscience and neuroendocrinology have more recently 
examined how gender socialisation may literally become embodied (e.g., by looking 
at the hormonal or neural changes which may occur in response to gender-typical 
learning: see Fine, 2010 and Van Anders et al., 2015 for summaries).  
In addition to the empirical and cultural research, feminists have critiqued 
traditional developmental theory for its role in maintaining the binary. According to 
Miller (2015), traditional theories played a significant role in scientific and lay 
conceptualisations of gender, largely by popularising the notion of healthy or 
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“successful” gender development. Early psychometric measures of gender identity 
such as Terman’s Masculinity-Femininity (M-F) scale (1936) and later androgyny 
measures (e.g., Bem’s Sex Role Inventory, 1974) were heavily critiqued for 
assuming homogenous and natural gender categories and then measuring an 
individual’s scores against them (see Fraser, 2018). Similarly, models proposed by 
Freud (1905) and Parsons (1955) assumed essential or natural gender identities, 
which boys and girls attain or “master” as they develop. Kimmel (2012) proposes 
that, over time, these models shaped cultural norms around gender-appropriate 
behaviour and influenced how psychologists, medics, educators, and parents 
interpret and respond to children’s development. This extends to the gender-
normative socialisation practices discussed above, but also the broader societal 
pathologization of “deviant” or non-binary behaviours (e.g., the diagnosis of gender 
dysphoria or criminalisation of same-sex behaviours, etc.: see Harper, 2007; 
Richards & Barker, 2013).  
1.4.4 Analysing Language  
Language plays a central role within feminist and gender theory, and 
thematic, content, conversation, and phenomenological analysis methods remain 
popular in modern gender studies (Cheshire & Trudgill, 1998; Holmes & Meyeroff, 
2003; Lakoff, 1975; Tannen, 1994). Because discourse is often conceptualised as the 
medium through which the social world is created and reproduced (e.g., Foucault, 
1978; Butler, 1990), gender theorists frequently turn to language and discourse to 
understand the social construction of gender. Within linguistics, for instance, a large 
body of work has explored gendered speech patterns (or “genderlects”: see Tannen, 
1994), and the ways in which they may reflect communal and agentic gender roles. 
Studies show that, relative to men, women’s speech tends to be characterised by 
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more emotionality (i.e., reliant on emotional topics or inclusive of more emotional 
intensifiers), self-disclosure, active listening and minimal responses (e.g., “mm” or 
“yeah” when another person is speaking), the use of tag questions or mitigating 
words/sounds (e.g., “isn’t it?” or “you know?” after a question or between topics), 
frequent questions, and indirect phrasing (Coates, 2015; Holmes, 1992; Lakoff, 
1975; Menegatti & Rubini, 2017; Tannen, 1990, 1993; West & Zimmerman, 1975). 
By contrast, these studies found men’s speech tends to be more direct, fact-based, 
focused on external rather than personal information, low in emotional content, and 
characterised by fewer questions, linking statements or mitigating words.  
In addition to the differences in speech, feminist linguists have explored how 
heteronormative power dynamics may play out in conversation and social 
interaction. These include naturalistic analyses of gendered verbal practices like 
street remarks (Gardner 1980; Kissling 1991; Kramarae, 1992), sexist slang 
(Grossman & Tucker, 1997), sexual or harassing language in the workplace 
(Holmes, 2005; Ragan et al. 1996), coaxing or coercion prior to sexual activity 
(Muehlenhard et al., 1991), and online abuse (Herring 1999; Herring & Stoerger, 
2017), as well as male acts of “conversational dominance” (e.g., talking over 
women, denigrating or making jokes about women’s issues, or a low level of uptake 
of women’s topics: Fishman 1983; Ochs and Taylor 1995; Spender 1985). Other 
laboratory studies have examined how gender expectations may bias listeners or 
evaluators. For example, studies show that although men are significantly more 
likely than women to interrupt in a dyadic or group context, women are often 
perceived as having interrupted more frequently and less appropriately than men 
(Anderson & Leaper, 1998; Robinson & Reis, 1989). Similar results have been 
found for volubility (or “talkativeness”) whereby women are often perceived as 
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having spoken more than men in mixed groups, even when they are described as 
having contributed an identical amount (Brescoll, 2001, 2011; Cutler & Scott, 1990). 
The structure of a conversation has also been shown to be influenced by the gender 
of the participants, and these patterns again seem to reflect broader socialisation 
practices. For example, men are significantly less likely than women to engage in 
conversational turn-taking or simultaneous speech, particularly in mixed gender 
dyads or groups (Coates, 2015).  
Other feminist analyses have focused on the formal properties of language, 
exploring how the binary may be embedded in a language’s grammatical or 
syntactical rules (Menegatti & Rubini, 2017). While English does not grammatically 
mark gender in the same way as some other languages (i.e., ascribe a gender to 
nouns or their dependent linguistic forms, as is done in French, Italian or German: 
see Braun, Irmen, & Sczesny, 2007), linguists suggest the binary is still constructed 
or reproduced through various grammatical norms. For example, linguistic 
convention dictates that we both designate and qualify individuals according to their 
gender (i.e., he or she: see Wittig, 1985), and it remains rare in the English language 
to use the gender neutral “they” despite increased activism in this area (see Richards 
& Barker, 2015). Theorists have also identified other grammatical norms that may 
reify gender roles, including objectification language (e.g., women-object 
associations in language: Kissling, 1991) and the previously discussed androcentric 
linguistic practices (see Bailey & LaFrance, 2018). More broadly, linguists and 
cultural critics have critiqued the Western tendency to frame social concepts around 
“binary oppositions”; that is, pair social categories together in language or thought as 
related, oppositional concepts (Cameron, 1997). While not a grammatical rule as 
such, evidence suggests people readily dichotomize and polarise many social 
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categories (e.g., male-female, gay-straight, mind-body, good-evil, etc.: Bing & 
Victoria, 1996; Utaker, 1974; Westen, 2001).  
Another popular analytic method within gender studies is discourse analysis 
(Zimmen & Hall, 2016). Discourse may be broadly defined as language in context, 
and its study encompasses the analysis of discursive practices (e.g., text or 
conversations) as well as the many contextual, historical, personal, or situational 
factors that may influence them (Fairclough, 1992; Wetherell & Potter, 1992). With 
regards to the construction of gender-as-binary, analyses have explored how 
sex/gender categories may be framed in language (i.e., as relational opposites: see 
Ehrlich, Meyeroff & Holmes, 2014), as well as the extent to which gender, sex, and 
sexual orientation may become fused in popular discourse (e.g., “a man needs the 
love of a woman”: Livia & Hall, 1997). Discourse analyses have also been used to 
examine the construction of gender self-concept or identities. For example, studies 
have looked at the verbal construction of gender identities in early life (e.g., “I am a 
boy, and boys have short hair and like cars”: e.g., Leaper & Friedman, 2007; 
Litosseliti & Sunderland, 2002), and also how prevailing cultural norms about 
gender may spill over into individual gender self-concepts (e.g., “Like most women, 
I don’t have an aptitude for science”; Bacchi, 1999).  
The role of the social-relational context in gender construction has also been 
elucidated using discourse analyses. Analyses of conversations between male peer 
groups, for instance, have shown how traditional markers of masculinity (e.g., 
heterosexuality, sexual dominance, violence, financial success, and a rejection of 
emotionality) may be frequently regulated through verbal practice (Benwell, 2017; 
Blaise, 2005; Gilmore, 1995; Kiesling, 1997; Woodward, 2000). Similarly, studies 
of female conversations show that they can similarly reflect and enforce patriarchal 
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ideas of femininity (e.g., through frequent discussions of weight or body image, 
romantic relationships, and child-rearing: Cameron, 1997; Heilburn, 1988; Wilton, 
1992), though they may also provide a space for consolation, intimacy, and 
subversive discourse and resistance (Coates, 2015; Green, 1998). Others have 
examined the role of the specific social context on gendered discourse, or how 
gender norms and expectations may interact with other social or power structures 
(e.g., by comparing discourses of masculinity across racial, class, or ethnicity 
groups: Bucholtz, 1999; Eckert and McConnell-Ginet 1992; Lave and Wenger 
1991).  
1.4.5 Analysing Beliefs 
The final analytic category of relevance to the current thesis is beliefs. 
Research into gender-related beliefs is vast and encompasses the study of attitudes, 
stereotypes, biases, norms, and identities (Waylen, Celis, Kantla & Weldon, 2013). 
Each of these constructs may be defined in numerous ways depending on the 
discipline, or even specific text or article, but generally speaking they may be 
defined as follows: attitudes typically refer to valenced evaluations or associations 
about a specific social group (e.g., women are bad); stereotypes are beliefs or 
assumptions about a group’s typical, natural, or essential behaviour (e.g., women are 
nurturing; men should be strong); social bias describes the cognitive, perceptual or 
behavioural tendency to favour or be prejudiced against one group over another (e.g., 
hiring a man over a woman); and norms are the broad beliefs about what is normal, 
normative, or appropriate for a particular social group (or system) (Greenwald, 
Rudman, Nosek, Banaji, Farnham & Mellott, 2002; Paluck & Ball, 2010). Gender 
identity then refers to the broad set of associations or beliefs that make up a person’s 
gender self-concept, as well as the specific labels a person may use to refer to 
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themselves within a particular culture (Richards & Barker, 2015). As the bodies of 
research for each construct are broad, the following review will focus on the areas 
most relevant to a discussion of the binary: essentialist and/or gender-as-binary 
beliefs; anti-women or pro-male bias; gender stereotypes and/or the endorsement of 
traditional gender roles; and gender identity/self-concept. Moreover, while beliefs 
may be assessed using any number of qualitative or quantitative methods, this review 
will limit itself to literature relying on explicit self-report measures (e.g., scales and 
questionnaires). This is because self-reports are by far the most widely used 
measurement tool for analysing beliefs (see Deaux & Snyder, 2012), and also 
because this review has already covered other analytic paradigms and techniques for 
measuring the binary (e.g., cultural criticism, discourse analysis, etc.).      
To look first at essentialism, research has measured different aspects of 
essentialist beliefs in various ways. Some studies have focused on biological 
determinism, examining, for example, how strongly people endorse biological 
explanations of gender (Keller, 2005), encourage essentialist research or ideas 
(Morton et al., 2009), or believe that biology necessitates women and men’s roles in 
society (Tinsley et al., 2015). Others have focused on the immutability of gender 
differences. Brescoll, Uhlmann and Newman (2013), for example, measured how 
strongly participants endorsed biological/natural explanations of gender difference 
and also the extent to which they believed these differences could be changed by 
environmental influence. A small number of questionnaires specifically intended to 
measure essentialism and/or binarism have been developed in recently years, 
including the Heteronormativity Attitudes and Beliefs Scale (HABS: Habarth, 2015). 
The HABS assesses both gender and sexuality-related beliefs but includes a specific 
subscale for measuring the binary structure and composition of gender (with items 
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such as “There are only two genders”). Skewes, Fine and Haslam (2018) recently 
developed the Gender Essentialism Scale (GES) as a way to measure the various 
different components of essentialist or binarist thinking. Specifically, this scale is 
intended to capture the beliefs that gender differences are discrete, biologically 
based, immutable, inherent, historically invariant, and highly informative.  
With regards to anti-women sentiment, a range of measures have been 
developed over the past 50 years to assess sexism in its various forms. These include 
classic misogyny questionnaires, such as the Attitudes towards Women Scale (AWS: 
Spence & Heilmrich, 1972). The AWS was initially developed as a way to measure 
hateful or negative views about women relative to men, including items such as 
“Swearing and obscenity are more repulsive in the speech of a woman than of a 
man.” Since the 1970s, measures have evolved to assess more contemporary sexist 
beliefs as well as the more explicit prejudice. The Modern Sexism Scale (MS: Swim 
et al., 1995), for example, includes separate subscales for “old-fashioned” sexism 
(with items similar to the AWS) and modern sexism, characterised more by a 
rejection of women’s rights movements (e.g., “Discrimination against women is no 
longer a problem in the United States”). The Ambivalent Sexism Inventory (ASI: 
Glick & Fiske, 2000) similarly attempts to capture different types of sexist attitudes, 
measuring both hostile (e.g., “Women are too easily offended”) and benevolent (but 
still harmful) beliefs about women (e.g., “Women should be cherished and protected 
by men”). More recently, researchers have sought to measure more nuanced or subtle 
forms of anti-women prejudice, such as an individual’s level of endorsement with 
various structural inequalities. For example, studies have recently examined 
individual differences in “choice” explanations of workplace inequality that is, the 
extent to which they believe inequality results from women’s own life choices 
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(Skewes, Fine & Haslam, 2018). Other studies have focused on how women are 
evaluated or punished when they deviate the prescribed communal gender role (i.e., 
opt not to have children, behave in an agentic manner, or occupy a traditionally 
masculine social role). As discussed previously, these “backlash effects” are well-
documented, particularly in the context of women in leadership (Eagly & Karau, 
2002; Rudman, 2012).  
Stereotypes are another widely measured construct within gender studies and 
social psychology. As reviewed at length above, numerous studies have shown that 
women and men are associated with vastly different attributes, abilities, traits, skills 
and interests, with women more readily associated with subordinate or care roles and 
men with dominant or leadership roles (e.g., Keonig et al., 2010). These stereotypes 
are both pervasive and broad, with stereotyping found across virtually all 
demographic groups (i.e., age, gender, ethnicity, etc.) and most societal spheres and 
domains (e.g., play, education, work, politics, and so on: see Waylen et al., 2013). In 
addition to understanding the content of these gendered associations, research has 
examined the dimensions or structure of the stereotypes themselves. For instance, 
theorists have assessed the extent to which female and male stereotypes respectively 
map onto established stereotype dimensions of communion and agency (discussed 
previously: Eagly & Karau, 2002), warmth and competency (Cuddy, Fiske & Glick, 
2008), or expressivity and instrumentality (Kachel et al., 2016). Other research has 
focused on the functions of gender stereotypes, and the ways in which they set out 
rules for appropriate gender behaviour (Ridgeway, 2011). Evidence suggests, for 
example, that gender stereotypes are not merely descriptions of men and women’s 
typical behaviour; rather, they are comprehensive, prescriptive, and proscriptive 
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norms about appropriate male and female behaviour (e.g., men shouldn’t cry, women 
should be nice, etc.: Keonig, 2018; Prentice & Carranaza, 2002).  
As with gender beliefs, individual variation in gender identity or self-concept 
has historically been measured using self-report techniques. These include the early 
masculinity-femininity and androgyny scales discussed previously (e.g., Terman, 
1936: Bem, 1974) as well as more recent assessments of self-gender trait 
associations (Kachel et al., 2016). Gender identity may also be assessed in clinical 
settings using both observational and clinical assessment measures. These 
assessments would normally take place within the context of a gender dysphoria 
diagnosis (defined in the DSM-V as the distress associated when a person’s gender 
identity does not align with their assigned sex at birth), and thus tend to focus as 
much on the person’s well-being as their gender concordance (see Schneider et al., 
2016). Popular assessments include the Utrecht Gender Dysphoria Scale (Cohen-
Kettenis & van Goozen, 1997) and the Gender Identity/Gender Dysphoria 
Questionnaire for Adolescents and Adults (Deogracias et al., 2007), as well as sub-
clinical assessments of distress like the Masculine Gender Role Stress scale (MGRS: 
Eisler, 1987). While many of these measures assess gender identity along masculine-
feminine lines (e.g., as a position on a unipolar masculine-feminine dimension, or as 
scores on two separate intersecting dimensions: see Kachel et al., 2016), theorists 
have begun to acknowledge the complexity of identification process, as well as the 
degree to which gender intersects with other forms of identity. The recently 
developed Sexual Configurations Theory (SCT: Van Anders, 2015), for example, 
proposes gender identity intersects with various other dimensions within a person’s 
sex/gender self-concept (including sexual attractions, desires, preferences within 
partnered and solo sexuality, and so on). According to Van Anders, the failure of 
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traditional theory to acknowledge the diversity and complexity of these intersecting 
dimensions (or indeed their contextual variation) has led to a reductionist, 
heteronormative gender identity framework (i.e., that can only meaningfully explain 
traditional gender/sex dyadic pairings).  
While gender attitude, stereotype, and identity processes are viewed as 
distinct psychological constructs and have their own bodies of literature and 
evidence (Richards & Barker, 2015), it is important at this stage to review how they 
relate to one another, and indeed other forms of social prejudice and discrimination. 
A key assumption made within the feminist literature is that a binarist, patriarchal 
ideology has consequences for gender equality (e.g., Ridgeway, 2011), and indeed a 
review of the research suggests many of the above beliefs inter-correlate or overlap. 
Essentialism, for instance, has been shown to predict negative evaluations or beliefs 
about women (Keller, 2005; Skewes et al., 2018), endorsement of traditional 
breadwinner/provider gender roles (Gaunt, 2006; Tinsley et al., 2016) and broader 
gender stereotyping (Meyer & Gelman, 2016). Similarly, sexism is associated with a 
range of other discriminatory attitudes (e.g., racism, ageism, ableism: see Baldwin, 
2017) and prejudicial gender behaviours, such as hiring discrimination (Fiske & lee, 
2008), androcentric bias (Bailey & LaFrance, 2018), and sexual harassment 
proclivity (Rudman & Mescher, 2012). A number of studies have also examined the 
relationship between gender beliefs and the broader endorsement of conservative 
worldviews. Skewes et al. (2018), for example, found a relationship between 
essentialism and an endorsement of structural gender inequalities, while Christopher 
and Mull (2006) showed that ambivalent sexism predicted participants’ alignment 
with a conservative ideology. Traditional gender views have similarly been found to 
correlate with right wing authoritarianism (Sibley, Wilson & Duckitt, 2007), as well 
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as system-justification or status-quo explanations of gender inequality (Keller, 2005; 
Morton et al., 2016).  
In addition to research showing how these beliefs may coalesce to form and 
reflect a patriarchal value system, it would also be useful at this stage to review how 
a person’s own gender may influence their gender world view. Generally speaking, 
research suggests that men have more conservative, sexist, and androcentric gender 
beliefs than women. Men are also more likely to use sexist language, discriminate 
based on gender, disregard or downplay feminist efforts, and more generally endorse 
a politically conservative worldview (see Cameron, 1998 and Weatherall, 2005 for 
reviews). While these effects are generally robust, it should be noted that the 
reliability and magnitude of gender differences varies considerably across studies 
and contexts. For example, essentialist beliefs do not always differ across gender 
groups (e.g., Skewes et al., 2018), and both women and men have been shown to 
endorse gender-normative expectations (e.g., by negatively evaluating those who 
deviate from prescribed gender norms: Acker, 2009; Campbell, 2004; McCreary, 
1994; Smiler, 2004). Similarly, though the strength of stereotypes can vary across 
genders, studies show the content tends to be broadly similar (Deaux et al., 1985; 
Fiske, 2010; Koenig, 2018). According to Glick and Fiske (2000), this is largely 
because women and men have access to the same pervasive, dominant ideological 
information. Moreover, studies suggest that women are often rewarded for 
expressing traditional gender views, rejecting feminist/egalitarian perspectives, or 
engaging in sexist “banter” and behaviour (e.g., Bearman, Korobov & Thorne, 2009; 
Ficher, 2006). Gaunt (2013) therefore argues against treating gender as a simple 
moderator of discriminatory attitudes and behaviour. Rather, it should be 
conceptualised as a mediating or participating variable, which influences a person’s 
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gendered experiences and exposures over the lifespan, and thus their core beliefs and 
assumptions about gender.  
1.5 Measuring the Gender Binary: A Novel Approach 
Taken together, this large body of research highlights the binary construction 
of gender and the relationship of binarization to gender inequality. It also 
demonstrates the many different paradigms, data sources, and theoretical 
perspectives that can be adopted when studying these practices at varying levels of 
analysis (i.e., cultural, contextual, or individual). To summarise, at the cultural level, 
analyses have been useful in demonstrating the pervasiveness of binarist practices 
and beliefs across different social spheres. They have also highlighted how binarism 
may underpin many systems of knowledge, influence, and power. Developmental 
research has shown how these systems may spill over and shape a person’s gender 
knowledge, both for themselves and others, and how the cultural context may 
reinforce the binary in subtle and direct ways. At the individual level of analysis, a 
large body of work has explored how the binary may be reproduced through, or 
reflected in, various linguistic, behavioural and cognitive processes.  
In outlining this variety of existing approaches, the previous section 
highlighted that there are, however, few direct measures of gender binarism that can 
be used in experimental or individual-level analysis. The current section therefore 
introduces a broad class of measures that may serve to fill this gap. Broadly referred 
to as implicit measures, this diverse set of paradigms was developed as a way to 
study various cognitive processes or biases that may be difficult to capture using 
conventional methods (Gawronski & De Houwer, 2014). These include those which 
a person might wish to conceal, alter, or suppress (e.g., due to social desirability 
concerns), in addition to those which could be outside of a person’s conscious 
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awareness or intentional control (Moors, 2011). Importantly, implicit measures are 
considered a useful way to analyse automatic social-cognitive processes, defined as 
those which are especially well-entrenched, basic, immediate, and efficient 
(Gawronski, 2015). Given that the binary is considered such a foundational and 
primary frame for organising gender information (e.g., Bem, 1996; Ridgeway, 2011), 
it is likely that binary biases would be highly automatic (or at least have an 
automatic component). However, to date, no research has been conducted that has 
either (a) conceptualised the binary in terms of automatic or implicit cognition, or (b) 
investigated whether binary biases are readily demonstrated on an implicit measure.  
The current thesis aims to address this gap in the literature by conducting the first in-
depth investigation into the automaticity of the gender binary. Using an implicit 
measure, this research will explore several important features of binary biases, and 
specifically the tendency to frame women and men as opposites with distinct and 
mutually exclusive traits and abilities.  
1.5.1 Implicit Measures  
Before outlining how implicit measures will be used in the current thesis, it is 
necessary to first give a brief procedural overview of these paradigms and their 
evidence base. Implicit measures were first introduced in the mid-1980s, when 
researchers extended and modified sequential priming tasks for the study of 
automatic social cognitions and behaviours (Fazio & Olsen, 2003; Gawronski & De 
Houwer, 2014). One of the earliest measures developed for this purpose was the 
Implicit Association Task (IAT: Greenwald, McGhee & Schwartz, 1998), which, in 
brief, provides an index of a person’s automatic attitudes or biases by comparing 
their performance on two opposing tasks. In one task, participants are required to 
pair or relate sets of stimuli assumed to be consistent with a particular cultural 
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stereotype (e.g., women as submissive and men as dominant), and in the other, sets 
of stimuli that are deemed to be inconsistent (e.g., men as submissive and women as 
dominant). Participants usually relate these stimuli together by pressing one of two 
response keys on a keyboard (e.g., the letter z for “men” and “good”, or m for 
“women” and “bad”). Any differences in performance across the two tasks (e.g., in 
terms of speed or accuracy) are taken as a metric of the automaticity, strength, or 
coherence of one task relative to the other, and thus as a broad metric of a cognitive 
bias (De Houwer, 2014). Other widely used paradigms include the Affective 
Misattribution Procedure (Payne, 2014), which infers automatic bias from 
participants’ misattributions about the sources of their affect or cognitions, and the 
Go/No-go Association Task (Nosek & Banaji 2001), in which participants are 
required to either respond or not respond to different stimulus-valence pairings (e.g., 
black-bad versus black-good). Inferring psychological content from behavioural 
performances in this way (rather than self-reports) is what leads to many researchers 
referring to these measures as implicit or automatic (although see Gawronski & De 
Houwer, 2014 for a comprehensive review of the various terms in implicit measures 
research).  
Effects on implicit measures (i.e., the difference in performance across the 
two types of task) are typically produced using response latencies, or the length of 
time before a participant presses a key to categorise or relate the stimuli on-screen 
(Fazio & Olsen, 2003). Specific algorithms or scoring procedures vary within the 
literature, but generally speaking it is conventional to calculate the mean response 
latencies for each task (and occasionally means across multiple blocks for each task 
type) and produce a single score based on the effect size of that difference. The 
conventional IAT score, for example, for example, is the difference in mean reaction 
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times between two block types divided by the standard error of the pooled reaction 
times. This effect size is related to (but distinct from) Cohen’s d, and therefore 
referred to as the D score (Greenwald, Banaji, & Nosek, 2003). Other scoring 
algorithms have relied on accuracy differences (e.g., Payne, 2014) or some 
combination of speed and accuracy (also called fluency: see Gavin, Roche & Ruiz, 
2008). Research using implicit measures usually includes a period of practice or 
training before the test phase, intended to familiarise participants with the task and/or 
get them to a certain level of speed or accuracy (Nosek, Greenwald & Banaji, 2005). 
Generally, scores would only be based on latencies for the testing phase.  
It is worth noting at this stage that there has been considerable debate and 
variation in the literature regarding the interpretation of the effects on these tasks; 
that is, which psychological mechanism, process, or construct the effect is believed 
to represent (De Houwer & Moors, 2007). To give some background, implicit-style 
paradigms have been developed and used by a number of psychological sub-
disciplines, and this theoretical eclecticism means the effect is often interpreted in 
very different ways. Within social cognition, for example, they are generally 
conceptualized as measures of unconscious, automatic, indirect, or implicit 
associations (Nosek, Greenwald & Banaji, 2005). Contemporary learning 
psychologists have used these paradigms to measure various associative, 
propositional, analogical or evaluative processes (De Houwer, Teige-Mocigemba, 
Spruyt & Moors, 2009), while in behaviour analysis they may be used to examine 
individual histories of relating different classes of stimuli (Roche et al., 2008). 
Many, however, have simply suggested that paradigms are a useful way to measure 
socially-relevant behaviours under conditions of automaticity (Greenwald, 
Poehlman, Uhlmann & Banaji, 2009; Hughes, Barnes-Holmes & De Houwer, 2011). 
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The current thesis adopts a similar theoretical stance to these researchers and is 
broadly agnostic to the psychological processes involved. To expand, given that the 
aim of this work is to examine the automaticity of the binary and explore whether 
implicit measures can inform our understanding of how gender is framed or 
constructed, it is neither necessary nor relevant to connect effects to a specific 
cognitive process.  
To return to the potential relevance and utility of implicit measures, there is 
now a very large body of research that has examined their utility in a range of 
different contexts. Meta and systematic analyses of this literature have been 
conducted on the several million individuals who have participated in studies using 
implicit measures over the last two decades (Xu et al., 2014), in a variety of different 
socially relevant domains (e.g., race, religion, political identification, and sexuality: 
see Kurdi et al. 2018 for a recent meta-analysis). This includes the context of gender, 
where they have been used extensively to examine stereotypes around agency and 
communion (e.g., Rudman & Glick, 2001; Rudman & Kilianski, 2000), scientific 
ability (e.g., Smyth & Nosek, 2015), competency (e.g., Latu, Stewart, Myers, Lisco, 
Estes & Donohue, 2011) or objectification (e.g., Rudman & Mescher, 2012). They 
have also seen extensive use outside of social psychology, such as within clinical 
research, political science, or legal studies (see Roefs, Huijding, Smulders, et al, 
2011 a review and meta-analysis). A range of studies and meta-analyses have also 
analysed the psychometric properties of these paradigms (e.g., Golijani-Moghaddam, 
Hart, & Dawson, 2013; Nosek et al 2007; Vahey et al 2015). While outside the scope 
of this review, the above-cited review generally suggest they have adequate validity, 
internal consistency, and predictive utility, although often lower than traditional self-
reports measures.  
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1.5.1.1 The Implicit Relational Assessment Procedure  
Given the number of implicit measures that have been developed in recent 
years, it was important to ensure one was selected which best suited the needs of the 
current thesis. Following a review of the literature, the Implicit Relational 
Assessment Procedure (IRAP: Barnes-Holmes, Barnes-Holmes, Stewart & Boles, 
2010) was considered the most appropriate for an assessment of binary biases. To 
give a brief overview of this paradigm, the IRAP shares many procedural properties 
with other mainstream implicit measures. As in the IAT and other measures, a 
typical IRAP examines a participant’s ability to relate two different stimulus 
categories (e.g., men and women) with two other stimulus categories (e.g., 
stereotypically masculine or feminine traits). It has a two-block structure, with 
participants required to relate the categories in different ways in different blocks, 
usually under one of two response “rules”. To continue with the example of the 
above categories, participants in an IRAP would relate stimuli in one block 
according to the rule “Respond as if men have stereotypically masculine traits and 
women have stereotypically feminine traits”, and the other to the rule “Respond as if 
women have stereotypically masculine traits and men have stereotypically feminine 
traits”. Blocks are made up of multiple trials, in which participants relate a specific 
pair of stimuli from each category. Stimuli may be presented on-screen as a pair 
(e.g., “Men” and “Dominant”) or in the form of a statement (e.g., “Men are 
dominant”). Participants then respond using a set of relational terms (corresponding 
to different response keys) such as “Similar/Different” or “True/False”.  
It is this trial structure and format which makes the IRAP particularly well-
suited to an assessment of the binary. Most implicit measures require participants to 
categorise or pair stimuli together using a common key press. In the IAT, for 
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example, the evaluation or attribute categories are at the top right and left of the 
screen and participants categorise a particular stimulus (e.g., “Men”) as one or the 
other (e.g., masculine or feminine). As such, the measure can only produce a 
relativistic, either/or assessment of bias (e.g., men are more masculine than feminine 
/ women are more feminine than masculine: Greenwald et al., 1998; Nosek & Banaji 
2001). In the IRAP, however, the target and evaluation/attribute stimuli are presented 
on-screen at the same time and thus can be scored to produce four different effects 
for each trial type (i.e., men-masculine, men-feminine, women-masculine, women-
feminine). As the IRAP is scored in a similar way to other measures (i.e., the effect 
size of the response latency differential across task types), the individual trial-type 
scores would be as follows: men are/are not masculine, men are/are not feminine, 
women are/are not masculine, and women are/are not feminine.  
The IRAP thus allows for an assessment of several theoretically interesting 
features of gender binarism. First, it provides an index of how both sex and gender 
categories are related to one another; that is, whether they constitute distinct or 
oppositional categories. This would be demonstrated by the magnitude and 
significance of the IRAP effect, as there would be no notable difference across 
block/task types if the categories were not meaningful opposites (see Rothermund & 
Wentura, 2004 for a review of the evidence of IATs using non-distinct social 
categories). Second, it provides a unique way to examine the structure and make up 
of these sex/gender relations. Because the IRAP can be scored to produce individual 
trial-type effects, it is able to index the strength of both role-congruity (i.e., men-
masculine and women-feminine) and role-incongruity effects (i.e., men-feminine 
and women-masculine). This means it can assess whether the strength and magnitude 
of biases are comparable across gender categories (i.e., if the significance of the 
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men-masculine effects are symmetrical to the women-feminine effects), and also if 
there is a comparable amount of resistance to forming role-incongruent relations 
(i.e., if the significance of the men-not-feminine effects are symmetrical with the 
women-not-masculine effects). Put simply, the IRAP allows for a novel, quantitative 
and individual-level metric of an important feature of the gender binary: that men are 
masculine and not feminine, and women are feminine and not masculine.  
In addition to its procedural advantages, the IRAP was considered an 
appropriate measure given its substantial evidence base. To date, the IRAP has been 
used to examine biases towards racial and ethnic minorities (Barnes-Holmes et al., 
2010; Barnes-Holmes, Murphy, Barnes-Holmes & Stewart, 2010; Drake et al., 
2010), people who are overweight (Nolan, Murphy & Barnes-Holmes, 2013; 
Jurascio et al., 2010), and gay or bisexual individuals (Cullen & Barnes-Holmes, 
2008). It has also been used to examine sexual attraction (Timmins, Barnes-Holmes 
& Cullen, 2016) and has employed extensively in clinical settings to explore self-
concept (Timko et al., 2010; Vahey et al., 2009), perspective-taking abilities 
(Barbero-Rubio; López-López; Luciano Eisenbeck, 2016; Kavanagh, Barnes-
Holmes, Barnes-Holmes, McEnteggart & Finn, 2018), and behavioural avoidance 
and disgust (Nicholson et al., 2013, 2014). While it has not been applied as 
frequently in the context of gender, a small number of studies have used the IRAP to 
assess sexist or anti-women bias (e.g., Farrell & McHugh, 2017; Scanlon, 
McEnteggart, Barnes-Holmes & Barnes-Holmes, 2014). To date, however, no IRAP 
has examined core gender binary biases (i.e., the extent to which participants can 
fluently relate or juxtapose feminine and masculine attributes to both women and 
men).  
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1.6 Current Thesis  
The current thesis an investigation of the automaticity of the gender binary. It 
has three broad aims: first, to use the IRAP to carry out a technical, quantitative 
analysis of binary biases, and specifically biases towards associating men (but not 
women) with stereotypically masculine attributes, and women (but not men) with 
stereotypically feminine attributes. In so doing, it is hoped this analysis will build on 
and inform feminist theorising in this area, and also add to the growing empirical 
literature on binarist beliefs. A second aim of this research is to assess the 
relationship between binary biases and other forms of gender-based discrimination 
and prejudice. As reviewed at length previously, a key assumption made in the 
feminist and gender literature is that conceptualising gender in terms of binaries is 
problematic. Therefore, throughout this thesis, IRAP scores will be correlated and/or 
compared with other assessments of gender bias. A final aim is to gather a large 
enough IRAP data set to be able to conduct an in-depth analysis of the effects 
produced. IRAP studies have, on average, a sample size of 30-50 (Vahey et al., 
2013). While effect sizes are sufficiently large enough to have confidence in the 
effects produced and to use them for bivariate or correlational analyses (again see 
Vahey e al., 2013), the IRAP literature would benefit from a larger data set. For the 
purposes of the current thesis, a large dataset would be particularly beneficial for 
analysing the strength and significance of trial type effects (and a comparison across 
role-congruent and incongruent biases), as well as for conducting a deeper analysis 
of gender differences in these biases (if any).  
1.6.1 Overview of Studies 
The first empirical chapter in this thesis will primarily focus on stimulus 
selection for the core gender binary IRAP. Once stimuli have been selected and the 
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gender binary IRAP compiled, the remaining chapters will focus on its application 
and replication. Specifically, these chapters will assess how readily participants 
associate women and men with stereotypically feminine and masculine attributes, in 
addition to whether these biases are associated with some of the harmful behaviours 
reviewed previously: sexism, gender-based hiring discrimination, androcentric bias, 
and a proclivity towards gender-based violence. In some of these studies, 
participants will complete another IRAPs assessing gender biases around 
competency, humanity, and scientific ability. One study will additionally include a 
measure of gender identity. All studies will be conducted on samples of young Irish 
adults, who will predominantly be recruited from the Maynooth University student 
population. The final empirical chapter in this thesis will involve a pooled analysis 
of the binary IRAP and its effects, and a more detailed analysis of gender 
differences. The final chapter will be a general discussion and review of the findings 
and broader implications.  
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Chapter 2 
 
Stimulus Selection and Preliminary Analyses 
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2.1 Introduction 
The primary aim of the current chapter is to identify appropriate stimuli for 
use in the gender binary IRAP. Representative stimuli for the categories 
“masculinity” and “femininity” will be selected from a set of 60 personality traits, 
which participants will rate in terms of their gender and desirability. Preliminary 
categories will be selected in a pilot study and then validated using a larger sample. 
A secondary aim of this chapter is to develop an occupational gender preference task 
for use in Chapter Three. This task will be created using the same gender stimulus 
categories identified in the pilot study and will be tested using the larger sample. The 
final aim of this chapter is to generate a dataset of explicit trait ratings for later 
comparison with the pooled binary IRAP data. As the IRAP is a relatively novel way 
to examine how gender categories are related to one another, it will be useful to have 
a dataset of explicit (i.e., self-reported) ratings from a comparable sample of young 
Irish adults.   
Stimulus Selection 
Stimulus selection is an important stage in the development or adaptation of 
any psychological measure or task. Selection procedures and criteria vary across 
paradigms but generally this process involves a stage-like process of stimulus 
selection and validation. In questionnaire development, for example, a range of 
techniques may be used to ensure the stimuli or items are appropriately 
representative of the construct/s under investigation. According to Gilham (2000), 
best practice would typically involve an initial stage of stimulus/item generation 
based either on focus groups or existing literature or theory, followed by some 
psychometric (e.g., factor or measurement invariance analysis) and/or participant-led 
validation (e.g., further focus groups or interviews). Given the number of studies that 
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have been conducted using implicit measures in recent years (see Gawronski & De 
Houwer, 2014) and indeed the acknowledged impact of individual exemplars on the 
produced effects (see Gast & Rothermund, 2010 and Wosiefer, Westfall & Judd, 
2017 for reviews), it is somewhat surprising that there are currently no universal or 
gold-standard protocols for stimulus selection. Instead, stimuli tend to be selected 
using a variety of methods, such as theory-led selection or selection from databases 
of normed images or words (De Houwer, 2001; Mitchell, Nosek & Banaji, 2003). 
The vast majority, however, do not report on the procedures or criteria used and 
instead select stimuli based on their familiarity and unambiguous “classifiability” 
with the overarching category (see Steffens et al., 2008). Before selecting stimuli for 
the current thesis, it would thus be useful to provide a review of the current 
conventions around stimulus selection, as well as some of the research into 
confounding factors.  
To look first at the research around the number or type of exemplars that 
should be selected for stimulus categories, there are currently no established criteria 
within the broader literature. For the number, a methodological review conducted by 
Nosek (2007) recommends using as many as would be needed to represent the 
overarching category without compromising on relevance. As a rule of thumb, 
Nosek suggests using more than one (in case participants inadvertently respond to 
the formal properties of the individual exemplar and not the overarching category), 
but not so many that each stimulus would only be presented a very small number of 
times. Previous studies have varied in the number used, however the average number 
would be between 3-6 (see Xu, Nosek & Greenwald, 2014). With regards to the type, 
pictorial and word stimuli have both been widely used in previous studies (Bluemke 
& Friese, 2004). Again, there are no established criteria around when to use pictures 
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or words, but Foroni and Bel-Bahar (2010) recommend using whichever most clearly 
evokes the broader category. Previous implicit measures of gender-related issues 
have tended to use words, particularly when relying on stereotypical gender 
attributes or competencies (see Carnes et al., 2015; Rudman & Mescher, 2012; 
Rudman & Kilianski, 2000; Reuben, Sapienza & Zingales, 2014 for some reviews of 
this literature). Images and symbols have been used in this context before (e.g., 
images of male and female faces, Venus or Mars symbols, or images of different 
professions: e.g., Brochu & Morrison, 2010; Parker, Larker & Cockburn, 2018), but 
generally speaking words appear to be more routinely used in this context.   
When selecting stimuli, it is also important to be conscious of any confounds. 
Stimulus clarity, familiarity and valence have all been shown to influence effects and 
outcomes on implicit measures (Govan & Williams, 2004; Steffens & Plewe, 2001), 
and should thus be factored into the selection process for the gender stimuli. As 
gender is now acknowledged to be a multi-faceted construct encompassing various 
different roles, attributes, skills and interests, for clarity purposes it would be 
important to restrict the focus to a specific aspect of gender. Many different aspects 
of gender have been examined using implicit measures before, including career 
stereotypes (e.g., science versus art, etc.: Nosek et al., 2009), competence-warmth 
stereotypes (e.g., Rudman & Kilianski, 2000) and objectification biases (e.g., 
Rudman et al. 2001). However, for assessments of more general 
masculinity/femininity gender roles – as in the current thesis – it has been most 
common to use familiar personality traits (i.e., dominant or nurturing: examples of 
communality/agency IATs).  
With regards to valence, a number of studies suggest effects can change 
depending on the social desirability of the exemplars employed (e.g. De Houwer, 
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2003; Eder & Rothermund, 2008; Stahl et al., 2009). These effects seem to be 
particularly pronounced for evaluative or attitudinal implicit measures, which require 
participants to associate the target categories with positive and negative attributes 
(see Steffans et al., 2006). However, valence may also influence effects in indirect 
ways. Rudman, Greenwald and McGhee (2001), for example, found that female 
participants were less likely to associate women with stereotypical traits if those 
traits were negatively valenced (e.g., “weak”) than when they were positively 
valenced (e.g., “delicate”). Similar results have been found in the context of race 
(e.g., Amodio & Devine, 2006), suggesting that desirability may confound 
evaluations by activating own-group biases or defences. In a more general sense, it is 
theoretically important to control for valence in the context of gender given that a 
key feature of the binary is the differential distribution of power across gender 
categories (e.g., Ridgeway, 2011).  
The above review highlights several factors to consider when selecting 
stimuli for use in the gender binary IRAP. First, despite the absence of any 
standardized selection procedures in the existing literature, researchers should be 
transparent about the processes and criteria employed. Doing so should strengthen 
the validity of the measure and possible conclusions regarding its effects, and also 
allow the selection procedures to be critiqued or replicated by other researchers. 
Second, it is necessary to ensure the stimulus categories are clear and that they 
represent a coherent, well-defined construct. Because gender is multifaceted and 
broad, this means restricting the focus to one distinct component (e.g., traits). 
Finally, to ensure the effects are as clean as possible, it is important to properly 
control for the influence of potentially confounding variables such as stimulus 
valence and familiarity.   
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Hiring Task Development  
The second aim of this Chapter is to develop and pilot a measure of 
occupational gender preference. As mentioned in the introduction, one of the core 
goals of this thesis is to examine the implicit societal relationship between men, 
masculinity and power. Chapter Three will explore this in detail by using the IRAP 
to measure sex-gender role relations and then assess whether participants express a 
preference for the masculine traits on a separate hiring simulation task. This hiring 
task will need to have the same masculinity/femininity categories as the IRAP and so 
will also need to be developed and piloted in advance. The rationale for focusing on 
occupational preference (as opposed to any other context) will be expanded on in the 
next chapter, but in brief it is because gender-power relations are known to be 
context-specific, and the workplace is argued to be one of the primary contexts 
where these relations play out in contemporary society (Eagly & Karau, 2002; 
Ferguson, 2003; Koenig, 2018).  
The task developed here will be based on existing designs used to explore the 
impact of gender on hiring choices. Typically, these designs simulate hiring practices 
by presenting an application, personal description, or CV to a panel of participants or 
HR managers. The sex of the applicant would usually be manipulated (with some 
receiving an application from a male applicant and others from a female) and the 
hirability/suitability ratings of hirability for the male or female candidate compared 
across groups. Overwhelmingly, these men are more likely to be hired, promoted, 
and progressed for interview relative to women (Biernat & Fuegen, 2001; Brescoll & 
Uhlmann, 2008; Cann et al., 1981; Fuegen et al., 2004; Glick et al., 1988; Heilman 
& Okimoto, 2008; Kawakami et al., 2007; Rudman, 1998; Rudman & Glick, 2001; 
Smith et al., 2005). A meta-analysis of this literature by Isaac, Lee and Cames (2009) 
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showed these hiring biases are influenced by a range of factors (e.g., the applicant’s 
physical attractiveness or marital status, the number of women in the application 
pool, awareness of equality initiatives, etc.), but one of the most significant 
moderators of bias is the type of position, with men more likely to be hired for 
stereotypically male roles (e.g., physician, CEO, or engineer) and women for 
stereotypically female roles (e.g., nurse, teacher, or assistant). As with other 
measures of gender-related beliefs or practices, preferences also tend to be affected 
by the gender of the participant or rater, with men more likely to hire men and 
women to hire women (see Isaac et al., 2009).  
While most of the above studies explored preferences for men relative to 
women, comparably few have directly examined preferences for gendered traits (i.e., 
for masculine or feminine traits). The small number that have tended to examine the 
influence of gender attributes on perceptions of a candidate’s hirability or suitability, 
and specifically the influence of gender-typical or atypical behaviour (e.g., Glick, 
Zion & Nelson, 1988; Rudman & Glick, 2001; Heilman, 1984; Futoran & Wyers, 
1986; Twenge & Campbell, 2008). Together, these studies suggest that gender traits 
can influence hiring preferences, although not always symmetrically across gender 
or occupational categories. Generally, stereotypically masculine men are evaluated 
more positively than stereotypically feminine women, across a range of roles and 
levels (see Isaac et al., 2009). However, while gender-incongruent traits have been 
shown to increase men’s suitability for female-typical jobs (e.g., a teacher or a nurse: 
Moss-Racusin, Phelan & Rudman, 2010), the same does not appear to be true for 
women. Several experimental and real-world studies demonstrate that while agentic 
and/or masculine women tend to be evaluated as more competent than feminine 
women but less socially capable, and thus less hireable or promotable (e.g., Phelan, 
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Moss-Racusin & Rudman, 2008; Rosette & Tost, 2010; Rudman & Glick, 2001). 
Again, these effects will be discussed in more detail in the next chapter, but given 
that these tasks seem to elicit a complex array of context and role-specific 
evaluations, the current task will not assess how gender traits increase or decrease 
men and women’s likelihood of being hired for specific jobs. Rather, it will directly 
assess preferences for socially desirable masculine or feminine traits for a relatively 
gender-neutral occupation and then separately assess preference for sex (men or 
women). It will also include an exploratory item around who participants would 
prefer to let go from an office job between undesirable masculine and feminine 
candidates. No similar measures could be identified from existing research, but it is 
possible “firing” preference could be another useful indicator of gender bias.    
Explicit Gender Trait Ratings 
The final aim of this chapter is to preliminarily analyse how young Irish 
adults “gender” personality traits on a self-report measure. That is, the extent to 
which they explicitly evaluate traits as masculine or feminine, or as differentially 
desirable in women and men. Doing so would allow for a comparison of explicit and 
implicit effects towards the end of this thesis, and thus provide some insight into the 
utility of the IRAP methodology relative to more traditional methods. A number of 
gender norm or role measures exist in the literature already, including the Bem Sex 
Role Inventory (Bem, 1974), the Sex Role Questionnaire (Broverman, Vogel, 
Broverman, Clarkson & Rosenkrantz, 1972) and the more recent Traditional 
Masculinity-Femininity Scale (Kachel, Steffens & Niedlich, 2016). However, with 
the exception of the Traditional Masculinity-Femininity Scale, the majority of 
gender role or norm studies were conducted in the 1970s, and none could be found 
which used Irish samples. Recent research into gender stereotypes more broadly 
 61 
would suggest that they remain prevalent in Ireland (see Fine-Davis, 2013, for a 
comprehensive longitudinal review), but it would be useful to examine trait ratings 
specifically among a similar demographic as the remainder of the studies in the 
current thesis (i.e., young Irish adults or University students aged between 18 and 
25).  
Overview of Studies   
In sum, the aim of this chapter is to select stimuli for the IRAP and hiring 
task using a transparent, stage-like process with agreed-upon evaluation criteria. The 
first stage of this process involves the selection of stimuli from existing gender role 
measures and theory. In order to ensure the categories are clear, familiar, and 
representative of a coherent construct, the focus will be restricted to well-known 
personality traits. Once the list of traits has been selected, a small sample of 
participants will rate them in terms of their gender (i.e., how masculine or feminine 
they are) and desirability in both men and women. Because it is important to control 
for stimulus valence (especially in the context of gender), stimuli will be selected for 
four distinct categories: “Desirable Feminine”; “Desirable Masculine”; “Undesirable 
Feminine”; and “Undesirable Masculine”. These will be selected by a small team of 
researchers based on combined gender and desirability ratings. The number of 
stimuli selected will depend on rating patterns, but it is expected that between 3-6 
will be chosen for each category. These stimuli will then be used to develop the 
occupational preference task, with the desirable categories used for a “hiring” 
preference item and the undesirable for a “firing” item. The final stage of this 
process involves administering the 60-item scale and hiring task to a larger sample of 
young Irish adults. The stimulus categories and hiring task will then be re-reviewed 
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by the same team of researchers and amended if needed (e.g., if ratings differ notably 
across the pilot and larger samples).  
2.2 Study One 
2.2.1 Method 
Participants 
Forty students recruited from the Maynooth University undergraduate 
population participated in the pilot study. A sample of convenience was used and 
participants were recruited through word-of-mouth. Inclusion criteria included being 
aged between 18-29, living in Ireland at the time of the study, and having fluent 
English. Nineteen self-identified as female and 21 as male and all participants were 
aged between 18 and 25 (M = 20.98). Participants were provided with an open-ended 
response format for gender but all participants identified as either female or male. 
Race and ethnicity information was not collected as part of this study; however, all 
participants were currently living in Ireland and enrolled on an undergraduate 
degree. Participation was voluntary and no remuneration was offered.  
Materials 
Trait Rating Scale 
Traits for the rating scales were selected from a series of existing androgyny 
and sex stereotype questionnaires: the Bem Sex Role Inventory (BSRI: Bem, 1974; 
1985), the Sex Role Questionnaire (SRQ: Broverman, Vogel, Broverman, Clarkson 
& Rosenkrantz, 1972), and the Personal Attributes Questionnaire (PAQ: Spence, 
Helmreich & Stapp, 1973), in addition to a few novel traits included by the 
researchers. A total of 60 traits (20 stereotypically feminine, 20 stereotypically 
masculine, and 20 comparatively gender neutral) were included in the final scale 
(Appendix 2). The gender-neutral traits were included to ensure the scale ranged 
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appropriately from masculine to feminine and to give participants a meaningful 
neutral point. Traits were pre-screened for familiarity and desirability by a team of 
three researchers (the author, research supervisor, and another PhD student), and also 
by the team of undergraduate final year project students who assisted with data 
collection. Three different rating dimensions were included in the scale: (1) Very 
feminine to very masculine (mid-point: neither masculine nor feminine), (2) Very 
desirable in men to very undesirable in men (mid-point: neither undesirable nor 
desirable), and (3) Very desirable in women to very undesirable in women. Ratings 
were done for each on a 5-point Likert scale.  
Procedure 
Participants completed the pencil-and-paper scale individually in the 
Maynooth University experimental cubicles. Informed consent was obtained prior to 
participation (see Appendix 1 for a copy of the consent form) and the entire scale 
took approximately 20 minutes to complete. Once the scale was finished, 
participants were debriefed and thanked for their time.  
Ethical Issues 
 This research was approved by the Maynooth University Ethics Committee 
and was in compliance with both the Psychological Society of Ireland’s Code of 
Professional Ethics (PSI, 2011) and the Maynooth University Policy on Research 
Ethics. Participants were informed of the study’s structure and broad aims before 
signing the consent form. The content and procedures posed no particular ethical 
risk, but participants were advised they could cease participation at any time. As no 
personal data were collected and responses were anonymous, they were informed 
they could not withdraw after completing the study.   
Data Analysis  
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 The goal of this analysis was to identify appropriate traits for the four 
categories of interest: (1) desirable feminine; (2) desirable masculine; (3) undesirable 
feminine; and (4) undesirable masculine. Traits were thus first ranked in terms of 
their mean rating on each dimension. To produce the desirable femininity categories, 
gender/desirability ratings were produced by adding the ‘masculinity-femininity’ and 
‘desirability in women’ scores and dividing them by two. For the masculinity 
categories, the same was done but the gender rating was first inverted (given that 
lower scores indicated a more masculine rating). For the undesirable categories, the 
same was done but this time the desirability scores were inverted.  
2.2.2 Results 
All analyses were conducted using JASP (version 0.7.5 Beta 2, University of 
Amsterdam, Netherlands). All tests were two-tailed with alpha set at .05. Unless 
otherwise specified, data were normally distributed. Parametric tests were used 
throughout.  
Trait Ratings 
 Gender Ratings 
Complete gender and desirability ratings for all 60 traits are in Appendix 3. 
For space constraints, only the top 10 most highly-ranked for each category are 
included in-text (Table 2.1). Ratings were not divided by participant gender at this 
stage due to the small sample size. Traits clustered generally as expected, with the 
pre-selected feminine traits being evaluated as feminine and the masculine traits as 
masculine. Three interesting trends emerged in terms of the ratings: first, there were 
more feminine than masculine traits in the data set (that is, more traits with a mean 
value between 4-5 than 1-2). Second, desirability ratings were gendered as expected, 
with stereotypically masculine traits being less desirable in women, and vice versa. 
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Third, an interaction emerged between trait gender and valence, such that the most 
feminine traits were generally more positively valenced than the most masculine 
traits. These trends will all be explored in more detail in Study Two.  
Table 2.1 
Top 10 most highly-ranked for the masculinity-femininity subscale 
 
Feminine Traits  Masculine Traits  
Trait  Mean rating  Trait  Mean rating 
Polite 3.65 Unemotional 1.88 
Bossy 3.75 Aggressive 2 
Compassionate 3.75 Competitive 2 
Empathetic 3.9 Dominant 2.05 
Affectionate 3.97 Athletic 2.08 
Sensitive 3.98 Arrogant 2.18 
Bitchy 4.08 Insensitive 2.2 
Gentle 4.13 Violent 2.2 
Emotional 4.17 Forceful 2.38 
Nurturing 4.25 Tactless 2.53 
Note. Traits were rated on a five-point Likert-Style scale from very masculine (1) to 
very feminine (5).  
 
Desirability Ratings  
Desirability ratings were generally gendered (Table 2.2) with traditionally 
feminine traits evaluated as more desirable in women and traditionally masculine 
traits more desirable in men.  
Table 2.2 
 
Top 10 most highly-ranked traits for the “desirability in women” and “desirability 
in men” subscales 
 
Traits Desirable in Women Traits Desirable in Men 
Trait  Mean rating  Trait  Mean rating 
Sincere 4.40 Loyal 4.48 
Loyal 4.35 Witty 4.30 
Nurturing 4.35 Driven 4.28 
Affectionate 4.25 Independent 4.25 
Communicative 4.25 Charismatic 4.23 
Compassionate 4.23 Sociable 4.18 
Optimistic 4.13 Communicative 4.13 
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Polite 4.13 Polite 4.13 
Sociable 4.13 Sincere 4.13 
Gentle 4.13 Helpful 4.10 
Note. Traits were rated on a five-point Likert-Style scale from very undesirable (1) to 
very desirable (5).  
 
Stimulus Selection 
Composite scores were generated for each trait, which combined the gender 
and desirability in women/men ratings. These scores were ranked from highest to 
lowest and the top eight of each were selected for a team review (Table 2.3). As 
mentioned, there was no pre-set criterion/score minimum for trait selection, given 
the lack of similar or comparable research in this area. Instead, the top eight were 
screened by three researchers for familiarity, representativeness, face validity and 
redundancy due to repetition. Four traits were selected for each category and are 
highlighted in the table in bold. 
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Table 2.3 
 
Composite gender-desirability scores for stimulus categories 
 
Desirable Feminine Desirable Masculine Undesirable Feminine Undesirable Masculine 
Trait Rating Trait Rating Trait Rating Trait Rating 
Nurturing 4.30 Athletic 3.91 Bitchy 4.21 Violent 4.24 
Affectionate 4.11 Witty 3.85 Insecure 3.94 Aggressive 4.10 
Gentle 4.11 Charismatic 3.81 Bossy 3.88 Arrogant 4.09 
Sensitive 4.03 Loyal 3.74 Jealous 3.84 Unemotional 4.09 
Compassionate 3.99 Competitive 3.70 Helpless 3.71 Insensitive 4.04 
Empathetic 3.95 Decisive 3.63 Secretive 3.71 Callous 3.95 
Communicative 3.90 Independent 3.63 Dishonest 3.70 Tactless 3.90 
Polite 3.89 Practical 3.63 Vain 3.68 Dishonest 3.90 
Note: For the desirable subscales, higher scores represent more desirable traits (in women and men). For the undesirable subscales, 
higher scores represent more undesirable traits. The final selected stimuli are in bold. 
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2.3 Study Two 
Study Two will build on the pilot study by validating the chosen stimulus 
categories. The same gender traits scale will be administered to a larger sample of 
young Irish adults, along with a new hiring preference task. Ratings will be 
compared across the two studies to ensure the categories are valid and represent the 
four constructs. Responses will also be compared across male and female 
participants, now that the sample is large enough for meaningful comparisons.   
2.3.1 Method  
Participants 
Completed questionnaires were gathered from a sample of 228 respondents 
recruited from the Irish undergraduate population. Participants were again recruited 
using convenience sampling and the same inclusion criteria as in the previous study 
were used here. All individuals were aged between 18 and 25 (M = 20.7, SD = 1.60). 
Participants were again provided with an open-ended response format for providing 
gender information, with 111 identifying as female and 117 as male. All participants 
were currently living in Ireland and enrolled on an undergraduate degree. 
Participation was voluntary and no remuneration was offered. 
Materials 
 Trait Rating Scale 
 The trait rating scale was identical to the pilot study.  
Hiring Task 
Hiring preference was assessed using a brief task in which participants were 
presented with two identical questions about their hiring preferences for an office job 
(Table 2.4). The generic title “office job” was selected due to its non-specific nature 
and absence of any salient gender connotations (see Reuben et al., 2014 for a recent 
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list of gender employment stereotypes). Using the traits selected in the pilot study, 
the first question in this task ascertained hiring preferences for a stereotypically 
masculine over a stereotypically feminine person, while the second item asked who 
they would prefer to let go again between a masculine or feminine person. The 
category labels (masculine or feminine) were not explicitly stated in the questions. 
The last item more explicitly asked for their preference for a man relative to a 
woman. For all items, participants were presented with a third response option: “I 
prefer not to answer.” This was employed as a catchall for non-responses that may 
be due to any number of preferences (e.g., neutral/neither/both/disagree with the 
premise of the question, etc.) and to eliminate the possibility of inaccurate data 
produced by forced-choice responding.  
Table 2.4 
 
Questions and response options in the hiring task 
 
If you were an employer hiring for an office job, which of the following two 
categories of people would you be more likely to hire? 
Someone who is nurturing, gentle, affectionate, and sensitive  
Someone who is witty, charismatic, competitive, and decisive 
I prefer not to answer 
If you were an employer cutting staff from an office job, which of the 
following two categories of people would you be more likely to let go? 
Someone who is aggressive, unemotional, insensitive, and arrogant 
Someone who is bitchy, insecure, bossy, and helpless 
I prefer not to answer 
If you were an employer hiring staff for an office job, which of the following 
two categories of people would you be more likely to hire? 
A man 
A woman 
I prefer not to answer 
 
Procedure 
All study sessions were conducted one-to-one in individual experimental 
cubicles. Participants were briefed on the general nature and structure of the study 
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and were given a short overview of the study’s subject matter (i.e., contemporary 
beliefs about gender) prior to participation. Written informed consent was provided 
by all individuals prior to participation. Participants completed the hiring task first, 
followed by the trait rating scales. Upon completion of the tasks, participants were 
fully debriefed and thanked for their time. 
Data Analysis 
 The same analytic approach will be used here as in the pilot study, with traits 
being ranked from highest to lowest for each rating dimension. Combined 
gender/desirability scores will be produced for each trait and the selected stimuli will 
again be screened by a team of researchers. Because of the larger sample size, ratings 
will also be split by participant gender. To test whether the chosen stimulus 
categories are representative of the four constructs (i.e., desirable/undesirable 
masculinity and femininity), single-sample t-tests will be run on each to assess 
whether they significantly skew to the left and right of the scale. A MANOVA will 
then be run to examine any gender differences in average ratings for the four 
categories. For the hiring task, the distribution of candidate preferences (i.e., for the 
stereotypically feminine or masculine person) will be presented, again split by 
participant gender.  
2.3.2 Results 
Gender Traits Scale 
Male and female participant ratings for each dimension are presented below. 
Again, due to space constraints, only the top 10 most highly-ranked traits for each 
category will be included in the tables. Complete data can be found in Appendix 4.   
 Masculinity-Femininity Ratings   
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 As evidenced by the data in Tables 2.5 and 2.6, very few traits were rated as 
highly masculine or feminine. Participants generally had more “extreme” (or more 
gendered) ratings for the traits pertaining to their own gender; that is, female 
participants had higher ratings for the more stereotypically feminine traits, while and 
male participants had lower ratings for the more stereotypically masculine traits. As 
in the pilot study, the feminine traits overall seem more positively valenced than the 
masculine traits. Of the top 10 feminine traits, only two are overtly negative 
(“bitchy” and “insecure”), in comparison to at least six of the masculine traits 
(“Arrogant”, “Violent”, “Forceful”, “Blunt” and “Aggressive”, “Insensitive”). 
“Unemotional”, “Competitive” and “Dominant” have more mixed social 
connotations and could be desirable or undesirable depending on the context (e.g., 
occupational versus social settings).  
Table 2.5 
 
Top 10 most highly-ranked masculine traits 
 
Trait  Mean rating  Women (n = 111) Men (n = 117)  
Aggressive 2.16 2.25 2.08 
Violent 2.21 2.31 2.12 
Arrogant 2.21 2.19 2.24 
Unemotional 2.21 2.22 2.21 
Forceful 2.29 2.35 2.24 
Dominant 2.32 2.42 2.21 
Insensitive 2.41 2.44 2.38 
Athletic 2.46 2.47 2.45 
Competitive 2.50 2.68 2.34 
Blunt 2.59 2.46 2.72 
Note. Traits were rated on a five-point Likert-Style scale from very masculine (1) to 
very feminine (5).  
 
Table 2.6 
 
Top 10 most highly-ranked feminine traits 
 
Trait  Mean rating Women (n = 111) Men (n = 117)  
Bitchy 4.02 4.02 4.03 
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Nurturing 4.02 4.01 4.04 
Emotional 3.89 3.90 3.89 
Gentle 3.86 3.86 3.86 
Sensitive 3.80 3.79 3.81 
Affectionate 3.75 3.75 3.75 
Compassionate 3.71 3.57 3.86 
Empathetic 3.65 3.52 3.78 
Communicative 3.61 3.54 3.68 
Insecure 3.57 3.55 3.59 
Note. Traits were rated on a five-point Likert-Style scale from very masculine (1) to 
very feminine (5).  
 
Desirability Ratings  
The same pattern as in the pilot dataset was observed here, with desirability 
ratings generally being quite gendered (see Tables 2.7 and 2.8). As with the 
masculinity-femininity ratings, male participants tended to give higher (i.e., more 
extreme) desirability ratings than female participants.  
Table 2.7 
Top 10 most highly-ranked traits for the “Desirability in Men” subscale  
 
Trait  Mean rating Women (n = 111) Men (n = 117)  
Loyal 4.65 4.58 4.73 
Witty 4.40 4.41 4.39 
Sociable 4.37 4.34 4.41 
Driven 4.33 4.27 4.40 
Capable 4.32 4.29 4.35 
Communicative 4.32 4.19 4.45 
Charismatic 4.32 4.20 4.44 
Sincere 4.30 4.17 4.44 
Helpful 4.29 4.21 4.36 
Polite 4.28 4.18 4.39 
Note. Traits were rated on a five-point Likert-Style scale from very undesirable (1) to 
very desirable (5).  
 
Table 2.8 
 
Top 10 most highly-ranked traits for the “Desirability in Women” subscale  
 
Trait  Mean rating Women (n = 111) Men (n = 117)  
Loyal 4.68 4.64 4.73 
Affectionate 4.49 4.42 4.56 
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Polite 4.46 4.39 4.53 
Compassionate 4.45 4.38 4.52 
Sincere 4.44 4.39 4.49 
Communicative 4.41 4.32 4.50 
Sociable 4.40 4.32 4.49 
Helpful 4.35 4.29 4.41 
Nurturing 4.32 4.20 4.44 
Optimistic 4.31 4.22 4.41 
Note. Traits were rated on a five-point Likert-Style scale from very undesirable (1) to 
very desirable (5).  
 
Stimulus Selection Review  
Ratings for the four stimulus categories are presented in Table 2.9. Overall, 
the Masculine and Feminine categories tended to be skewed in the expected direction 
(i.e., feminine traits fell to the right of neutral and masculine to the left). Ratings did 
not change considerably from Study One, with all the selected traits again in the top 
eight most highly-ranked in each category.  
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Table 2.9 
Composite gender-desirability scores for stimulus categories  
 
Desirable Feminine Desirable Masculine Undesirable Feminine Undesirable Masculine 
Trait Rating Trait Rating Trait Rating Trait Rating 
Nurturing 4.17 Witty 3.87 Bitchy 4.19 Violent 4.25 
Affectionate 4.12 Charismatic 3.82 Insecure 3.83 Aggressive 4.08 
Compassionate 4.08 Loyal 3.80 Dishonest 3.80 Arrogant 4.08 
Gentle 4.04 Athletic 3.73 Selfish 3.79 Unreliable 4.05 
Communicative 4.01 Competitive 3.68 Bossy 3.79 Unemotional 3.96 
Polite 3.93 Capable 3.65 Helpless 3.75 Forceful 3.94 
Empathetic 3.88 Decisive 3.63 Jealous 3.73 Insensitive 3.93 
Sensitive 3.87 Sociable 3.62 Secretive 3.70 Dishonest 3.91 
Note: For the desirable subscales, higher scores represent more desirable traits (in women and men). For the undesirable subscales, 
higher scores represent more undesirable traits. The stimuli that were selected for use in the measures are highlighted in bold. 
  
 
One-sample t-tests were conducted to explore whether the masculinity/femininity 
ratings for these categories were significantly skewed in the expected left/right 
direction. Average ratings were generated for each category for use in the analyses. 
Assuming a test value of 3 (a rating of “neither masculine nor feminine”), results 
revealed ratings for both the Masculine and Feminine categories were on average 
significantly to the left and right of neutral, for both male and female participants 
(see Table 2.10). Table 2.10 
One-sample t-test results for the average Masculine and Feminine category ratings.  
 Women (n = 111) Men (n = 117) 
 t df p t df p 
Desirable Fem 15.17 110 <.001*** 18.85 116 <.001*** 
Desirable Masc -6.20 110 <.001*** -10.30 116 <.001*** 
Undesirable Fem 11.37 110 <.001*** 13.97 116 <.001*** 
Undesirable Masc -14.73 110 <.001*** -15.99 116 <.001*** 
Note:*** denotes significance after a Bonferroni-correction (p < .00625).  
Gender Differences  
Masculinity-Femininity Ratings 
As the four stimulus categories (desirable/undesirable feminine/masculine 
traits) will be used in the IRAP for future experiments, it was important to analyse 
gender differences in how they were rated. A MANOVA comparing the average 
masculinity-femininity ratings for these categories revealed a significant main effect 
for gender, Wilks λ = .95, F (4, 223) = 2.77, p = .028. Follow-up univariate tests 
found significant differences on the Desirable Masculine category only, F (1, 226) = 
7.66, p = .006 (all other p-values > .5), with ratings lower (i.e. more masculine) for 
male relative to female participants.  
Table 2.11 
Mean Masculinity-Femininity ratings for the stimulus categories by gender.  
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 Group Mean  SD df F p 
Desirable Feminine Males 3.86 0.49 1 0.02 0.866 
 Females 3.86 0.6    
Desirable Masculine Males 2.57 0.45 1 7.66 0.006 
 Females 2.73 0.45    
Undesirable Feminine Males 3.57 0.44 1 0.35 0.552 
 Females 3.61 0.56    
Undesirable Masculine Males 2.23 0.52 1 0.45 0.504 
 Females 2.27 0.52    
Note. Traits were rated on a five-point Likert-Style scale from very masculine (1) to 
very feminine (5). Means were calculated for each stimulus categories by averaging 
the ratings for the four traits.    
 
 Desirability Ratings  
 Two additional MANOVAs were run to compare male and female 
participants’ desirability ratings. For the ‘Desirability in Men’ subscale, analyses 
found a significant main effect for gender, Wilks λ = .825, F (4, 223) = 11.827, p 
<.001. Univariate analyses found significant differences on all of the subscales 
except the ‘Undesirable Feminine’ scale (p = .438: see Table 2.12).  
Table 2.12 
Descriptive statistics and ANOVA results for ‘Desirability in Men’ ratings for the 
four stimulus categories by gender 
 Group Mean  SD df F p 
Desirable Feminine Males 3.64 0.66 1 19.11 <.001 
 Females 4.00 0.61    
Desirable Masculine Males 4.09 0.52 1 4.138 0.043 
 Females 3.95 0.51    
Undesirable Feminine Males 1.77 0.54 1 0.60 0.438 
 Females 1.71 0.49    
Undesirable Masculine Males 1.97 0.70 1 38.42 <.001 
 Females 1.46 0.55    
Note. Traits were rated on a five-point Likert-Style scale from very undesirable (1) to 
very desirable (5). Means were calculated for each stimulus categories by averaging 
the ratings for the four traits.    
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 A MANOVA run on the ‘Desirability in Women’ subscale found no 
significant main effect for gender, Wilks λ = .975, F(4,223) = 1.45, p =.218. 
Univariate analyses were therefore not run on these data, though descriptive statistics 
for male and female participants can be found in Table 2.13.   
Table 2.13 
Mean ‘Desirability in Women’ ratings for the four stimulus categories by gender.  
 Group Mean  SD 
Desirable Feminine Males 4.18 0.46 
 Females 4.23 0.53 
Desirable Masculine Males 3.93 0.59 
 Females 3.94 0.55 
Undesirable Feminine Males 1.84 0.62 
 Females 1.78 0.63 
Undesirable Masculine Males 1.69 0.61 
 Females 1.53 0.50 
Note. Traits were rated on a five-point Likert-Style scale from very undesirable (1) to 
very desirable (5). Means were calculated for each stimulus categories by averaging 
the ratings for the four traits.    
 
 Hiring Task  
Response distributions for the hiring task items varied across gender groups 
and questions. For the item ascertaining hiring preference for the “feminine” over the 
“masculine” individual, responses were heavily skewed in the stereotypically 
masculine direction (94% of the responses for men and 88% for women). Responses 
for the firing item were more evenly split, with approximately half of both samples 
selecting the “masculine” person and half the “feminine”. For the more explicit 
gender preference question, approximately two thirds of each group selected “I 
prefer not to answer”. For female participants, 33% elected to choose the woman and 
4% the man. Male responses on this item were more evenly divided between the two, 
with 14% selecting the woman and 15% the man.    
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Gender differences in responses were assessed using Chi-square tests for 
independence. Given that we were only interested in those who selected either the 
man/woman or the “masculine”/“feminine” person, analyses on each item excluded 
those who selected “I prefer not to answer”.  These analyses revealed no significant 
difference between male and female responses on the first two items (hiring and 
letting go of the “masculine” and “feminine” individuals), though a significant 
association was found between participant gender and hiring preference for the 
explicit gender question, χ² (1, 75) = 10.52, p < .001, phi = .4. These results should 
be interpreted somewhat tentatively, however, given that data from only a third of 
the sample was analysed for this item.  
2.2.3 Summary 
 In terms of trait ratings, there were a number of interesting trends in the data. 
First, traits were generally gendered as expected, with participants evaluating certain 
traits as masculine and others as feminine. Desirability ratings were similarly 
gendered, such that traditional femininity seems to be valued in women and 
masculinity in men. Second, participants generally rated their own gender categories 
more strongly, with women rating feminine traits as more feminine and men rating 
masculine traits as more masculine. Gender differences were found in how the four 
stimulus categories were rated, though follow up tests found this to be driven by 
differences on the “Desirable Masculine” stimulus category. Desirability ratings 
differed across male and female participants, though only on the “Desirability in 
Men” subscale. Third, a gender-valence interaction emerged across the two studies, 
with the most masculine traits generally being negatively valenced and the most 
feminine traits positively valenced. For the hiring task, responses were 
overwhelmingly skewed towards the stereotypically masculine individual, for both 
 
 
 79 
male and female participants. There were significant gender differences in terms of 
the masculinity ratings for these traits (with male participants evaluating them as 
more masculine than female participants), but single-sample t-tests found both 
groups evaluated the traits as significantly more masculine than feminine.   
2.4 Discussion 
Trait Ratings  
Across two studies, a total of 268 young Irish adults rated 60 personality 
traits in terms of their gender (i.e., masculinity-femininity), desirability in women, 
and desirability in men. Traits were generally evaluated as expected and clustered 
into three broad groups: traditionally masculine, gender-neutral, and traditionally 
feminine. Desirability scores were similarly gendered, with stereotypically feminine 
traits more valued in women than men and stereotypically masculine traits more 
valued in men than women. While ratings were not particularly “extreme” for either 
the masculine or feminine categories (that is, there were very few traits with mean 
ratings close to 1 or 5), the distinction suggests that gender trait stereotypes and 
biases remain prevalent among young Irish adults.  
The masculine and feminine categories identified here map largely onto the 
communality-agency distinction noted in previous research (Eagly & Steffen, 1982; 
Conway, Pizzamiglio & Mount, 1996; Ridgeway, 2001). Communality (or 
communion) broadly refers to traits related to interpersonal care (e.g., compassion, 
empathy, or selflessness) and agency to traits related to individual freedom and 
success (e.g., independence, competitiveness, decisiveness). The differential 
ascription of communal and agentic traits is considered problematic given the 
inherent differences in status across the two categories (Conway et al., 1996; Eagly 
& Karau, 2002; Glick & Fiske, 2002; Koenig, 2018). As argued by Ridgeway 
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(2001), social evaluations of status by and large rest on assumptions of competency, 
and research suggests a considerable overlap between agency and competency 
stereotypes (see Jost, Kivetz, Rubini, Guermandi, & Mosso, 2005 and Koenig et al., 
2010 for empirical reviews). As such, it is socially relevant that the current sample 
considered agentic traits to be more masculine than feminine.  
While agentic traits are considered to be more socially valuable (in terms of 
exerting social influence or accessing resources), it is important to note that the 
feminine traits were more positively valenced on average than the masculine traits. 
As mentioned in the introduction, research shows that femininity and womanhood 
are often evaluated positively, especially in the abstract. Occasionally referred to as 
the “women-are-wonderful” effect, studies suggest both men and women tend to 
hold more favourable feminine than masculine stereotypes (e.g., Eagly & Mladinic, 
1989; 1994; Eagly, Mladinic & Otto, 1991; Glick & Fiske, 2001), and that positive 
attributes may be more readily attributed to women over men (Rudman & Goodwin, 
2004). It is worth noting, however, that the positively valenced feminine traits 
identified here (and in previous research) are all consistent with the traditional 
feminine gender role. That is, they are contextually specific and cast women as the 
selfless, compassionate care-giver. These data therefore support arguments made 
elsewhere that the “women-are-wonderful” effect may be better described as the 
“women-are-wonderful-when” effect (Dovidio, Glick & Rudman, 2008; Rudman & 
Glick, 2014), with the “when” referring exclusively to contexts where women 
display role-appropriate behaviour. As discussed in the previous chapter, theorists 
argue that it is not necessarily true that femininity is generally negative and 
masculinity is generally positive under patriarchy; rather, it is that women are denied 
the agentic traits which are more readily associated with status and power. The IRAP 
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methodology will be a useful measure to investigate this sex-gender-valence-power 
relationship in more detail, as it provides an index of how readily both masculine and 
feminine traits are attributed and denied to men and women. As such, it will allow 
for an investigation of the above claims in more detail.  
The relative lack of desirable masculine traits in the data also supports 
theoretical arguments around the androcentric positioning of masculinity within the 
gender binary. As discussed previously, a key argument made in feminist literature is 
that masculinity is centralized and prioritized within binary systems, while 
femininity is cast as the “other” (e.g., Bem, 1993). From this perspective, it could be 
that the agentic traits – though still stereotypically masculine and considered 
desirable in men – are comparably less likely to be explicitly gendered, particularly 
among contemporary samples. A related explanation is that responses reflect a 
growing awareness of women’s changing roles in society. Identity research over the 
past two decades does suggest women are developing more agentic self-gender 
stereotypes (Diekman and Eagly, 2000; Ebert et al., 2014; Fine-Davis, 2013; Spence 
& Buckner, 2000; Twenge, 1997; Wilde and Diekman, 2005), potentially as a result 
of observing more women enter more traditionally masculine spheres (Eagly & 
Karau, 2002). The gender differences on this category support this assumption, as it 
would make sense that women in particular would be less inclined to evaluate these 
traits as masculine. Again, this speaks to the broader complex relationship between 
sex, gender and power, which will be explored in more detail in later chapters.  
Stimulus Selection 
Using a transparent and stage-like selection process, the author and a small 
team of researchers identified four exemplars for each of the four stimulus categories 
from the overall set of 60 traits. Exemplars were selected on the basis of their 
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composite gender-desirability rating, familiarity, and recognisability. Based on the 
recommendations from Nosek (2007), no more or less stimuli were chosen than were 
required to represent the overarching category on average. As the ratings did not 
change significantly across the pilot and main studies, the team of researchers 
decided to retain the same exemplars identified in the pilot study. Doing so will 
allow us to use an identical hiring task in the next Chapter, and therefore add to the 
dataset for that task. It will also allow for a direct comparison between 
implicit/explicit trait gendering and occupational gender preference towards the end 
of the thesis.  
The comparable weakness of the “Desirable Masculine” category should be 
noted at this stage as it may have relevance in later chapters. As mentioned above, 
this set of traits was not as strongly gendered as the other three categories, and 
particularly for female participants. Given that analyses still found these traits to be 
significantly more masculine than feminine for all participants, it does not cause 
immediate concern around the category’s potential effectiveness in the IRAP or 
hiring task. However, it is an important caveat that should be taken into account 
during the interpretation of results and investigated again towards the end of the 
thesis.  
Hiring Preferences  
Responses on the hiring task cohere with existing feminist theories of gender 
order and the idea that greater cultural value is placed on masculine traits. When 
asked which sort of person they would rather hire, participants expressed an 
overwhelming preference (91% overall) for the stereotypically masculine traits. 
While this question did not specify the sex of the candidate directly, analyses suggest 
that the hirable traits were considerably more male than female. These data therefore 
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support previous research identifying a link between masculine traits and 
occupational competency (Eagly & Carli, 2007; Koenig, Eagly, Mitchell, & 
Ristikari, 2011) and, again, the argument that Western societies continue to 
implicitly prioritize masculinity (Broverman, Vogel, Broverman, Clarkson, & 
Rosenkrantz, 1972; Johnson, 2005; Serano, 2009).  
Somewhat surprisingly, responses on the firing/letting go item did not differ 
significantly by either participant or target gender. These results are difficult to 
contextualize within existing literature, given that most to date have looked at 
evaluations of hirability or advancement potential. However, one possible 
explanation is that women (or stereotypically feminine individuals) are not actually 
more likely to be let go from an office job than male/masculine individuals. Theories 
of occupational gender discrimination often use the “glass ceiling” metaphor to 
describe the insidiousness of gender barriers in the workplace (Koenig et al., 2011). 
Rather than being at an increased risk of being let go from their jobs, such theories 
suggest that women may instead be less likely to be hired for valued positions or 
indeed put forward for leadership or more senior roles (see Eagly & Karau, 2002). 
This explanation would of course require further testing and substantiation; however, 
for the purposes of the current thesis, the firing item does not appear to be a useful 
measure of occupational gender bias and there is no strong theoretical rationale for 
its inclusion. It will thus be removed for future studies.   
It is interesting to note that, contrary to existing work on hiring bias (see 
Isaac et al. 2015 for a meta-analysis), responses on the direct gender-preference 
question (i.e., between a man and a woman) were not in a pro-male direction. A 
large proportion (two-thirds) of the current sample elected not to express an explicit 
preference between male and female candidates (i.e., they selected the option “I 
 
 
 84 
prefer not to answer”); of those who did, however, the majority selected the female 
in favor of the male. Though several factors may have contributed to this response 
pattern, the widespread unwillingness to express an explicit preference – at least a 
male one – is worth noting. For instance, it may reflect either self-presentational 
distortions (i.e., social desirability biases), which could attest to a growing awareness 
on behalf of participants of the issues women face in occupational contexts, or to a 
willingness to prioritize women, at least in theory.  
Conclusion 
This chapter identified stimuli for use in the gender binary IRAPs and 
occupational preference task. Four stimulus categories were selected, each 
containing four exemplars. Analyses suggested these categories were significantly 
gendered, with the masculine categories rated as more masculine than feminine and 
vice versa. The gender categories overlapped considerably with the agency-
communality divide within the stereotype literature; as such, these terms 
(masculinity/agency and femininity/communality) will be used interchangeably for 
the remained of the thesis. This chapter also added to the scant literature on gender 
trait stereotypes in Ireland, and provided preliminary evidence that Irish society 
continues to implicitly associate men, masculinity and occupational success.   
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Chapter 3 
 
Binary Biases and Occupational Discrimination 
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3.1 Introduction 
Chapter Two investigated contemporary gender trait stereotypes in a young 
Irish sample. Data generated from two surveys provided preliminary evidence that, 
first, masculinity and femininity remain distinct social categories (with separate sets 
of attributes and traits) and, second, stereotypes are generally framed around 
traditional agency and communion. This Chapter will expand on these findings by 
using the IRAP to measure not only automatic role-congruent trait stereotypes (i.e., 
men-agentic and women-communal biases), but additionally participants’ resistance 
to ascribing role-incongruent traits to women and men (i.e., men-not-communal and 
women-not-agentic biases). Doing so will provide an experimental assessment of the 
relational and oppositional structure of gender, which is considered to be a key facet 
of gender binarist ideologies (e.g. Bem, 1993; Butler, 2002; Hegarty, Ansara & 
Barker, 2018).  
A secondary aim of this chapter is to further assess the feminist claim that 
masculinity is more socially valued than femininity. Across three separate 
experiments, participants’ will be required to express a preference for the masculine-
agentic and feminine-communal traits identified in Chapter Two (and used here in 
the IRAP). Because gender evaluations are known to be context-specific (Eagly & 
Karau, 2002; Ridgeway, 2011), we will examine preferences for sex and gender in 
an occupational context only. The workplace was selected as a useful starting point 
given that (a) there is a large body of existing theoretical and empirical research in 
this area to draw from (see Koenig et al., 2011 for a recent meta-analysis); (b) 
simulated hiring provides a relatively straightforward and uncontroversial way to 
directly assess gender preferences (Rudman & Glick, 2001); and (c) employment is 
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considered one of the primary processes through which gender dynamics play out in 
contemporary society (e.g., Ferguson, 2013).  
3.2 Study Three 
Gender Bias in the Workplace 
Before introducing how the IRAP may be used in this context, it would be 
useful to provide a brief review of the literature around workplace gender bias. As 
noted in the General Introduction, women continue to experience considerable 
discrimination and prejudice in occupational settings. This discrimination includes 
the well-researched gender pay gap (EIGI, 2018), significant under-representation in 
lucrative and traditionally male-dominated spheres (e.g., finance, politics, science 
and technology: see CSO, 2016 for national and UN, 2018 for global statistics), and 
a reduced likelihood of occupying or being considered for leadership roles 
(UNESCO, 2017). Women have also been found to experience many indirect forms 
of workplace discrimination, ranging from gender-biased or male-centric policies 
(e.g., around maternity or health coverage) to an increased risk of experiencing 
bullying, exclusion, and harassment (including sexual or gender-based harassment: 
see Stamarski & Son Hing, 2015 for a comprehensive review).  
Historically, gender discrimination in the workplace was understood as the 
consequence of sexism or misogyny. As with many forms of inequality, it was 
believed that women’s lower participation in the workforce resulted from negative 
attitudes about their inherent incompetence or ineffectiveness (Koenig et al., 2011). 
While explicit misogyny was indeed a significant barrier to women’s progress in 
previous decades, more recent attitude surveys would suggest sexism (or at least 
hostile or open forms of sexism) have lowered significantly across many Western 
societies (see Eagly & Mladinic, 1994; Haines et al., 2016; Langford & MacKinnon, 
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2000) including Ireland (Fine-Davis, 2013). As such, anti-women prejudice is 
unlikely to be an accurate or complete explanation of contemporary workplace 
inequality on the whole (Eagly & Karau, 2002; Heilman, 2001; Hogue & Lord, 
2007; Lyness & Heilman, 2006). Another historic explanation for the lack of women 
in lucrative roles was the so-called “pipeline problem”, believed to be created by the 
shortage of appropriately skilled, motivated, or experienced female candidates 
(Browne, 1999; Goldberg, 1993; Greenhaus & Parasuraman, 1999). As discussed in 
the introduction, however, this explanation is also unlikely to account for modern 
gender inequality given the broadly equal numbers of women and men who now 
graduate University and enter the skilled workforce (e.g., CSO, 2016), and express 
ambition to pursue more senior or lucrative roles (e.g., Diekman & Eagly, 2008; 
Gino, Wilmuth & Brooks, 2015).  
Social Role Theory and the Role Congruity Hypothesis  
Instead, workplace inequality is increasingly understood to be a feature of our 
broader gender role system. To return briefly to the Social Role Theory (SRT) 
discussed in Chapter One, Eagly and colleagues propose that all gender inequality 
results from society’s generalized preference and expectation that men and women 
adhere to their traditional gender role (SRT: Eagly, 1987; Eagly, Wood, & Diekman, 
2000; Eagly & Wood, 2016). Within the SRT, gender roles encompass the 
comprehensive set of both descriptive and injunctive norms around male and female 
behaviour, with descriptive norms referring to assumptions about men and women’s 
actual behaviour, and injunctive norms (also called prescriptive norms) the 
assumptions around what men and women ought to be (Eagly et al., 2000). Because 
people tend to infer a correspondence between a group’s ascribed social norms and 
their natural dispositions (see Eagly & Koenig, 2008), gender roles also include 
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beliefs around men and women’s inherent interests and competencies across a range 
of areas (e.g., caregiving, leadership, etc.). According to the SRT these assumptions 
underpin inequality because it means that, for example, it is not just that women are 
not typically agentic, but that they both cannot and ought not to be (Burgess & 
Borgida, 1999; Eagly & Mitchell, 2004; Fiske & Stevens, 1993; Gill, 2003; Prentice 
& Carranaza, 2002).  
Eagly and Karau’s Role Congruity Theory (RCT: 2002) is an extension of 
the SRT specifically to occupational settings. Relying on the same core principle that 
gender inequality arises because of the expectation and assumption of differentiated 
social roles, the RCH elaborates on the processes through which women are 
hypothesized to experience discrimination in the workplace. Similar to other 
systemic feminist accounts of prejudice, the RCH proposes women’s subordinate 
status in the workplace results from the implicit societal overlap between masculinity 
and leadership. Because gender is relationally structured (i.e., that which is male is 
importantly not-female, and vice-versa), there is thus a lack of fit between femininity 
and occupational success (Cejka & Eagly, 1999; Heilman, 2001). A range of classic 
studies support the “think manager-think male” assumption, suggesting masculine 
stereotypes overlap considerably with those required for a successful leader 
(Arkkelin & Simmons, 1985; Carli, LaFleur, & Loeber, 1995; Heilman, Block, 
Martell & Simon, 1989; Duehr & Bono, 2006; Jackson & Engstrom, 2007; Powell & 
Butterfield, 1989; Schein, 1975), and also that men are considered more naturally 
suitable for leadership roles (Dodge, Gilroy & Fenzel, 1995; Glick, Zion &Nelson, 
1988; Heilman et al., 1995). Feminine stereotypes on the other hand overlap as 
expected with traits considered desirable in more communal or supportive 
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occupational roles (e.g., nursing, working with the poor, peace efforts, etc.; Carnes et 
al., 2015; Mueller, 1986; Sapiro, 1983).  
In addition to the research into leadership stereotype overlaps (and 
mismatches), the RCH is further evidenced by research showing the social 
punishment experienced by women when they violate (or are perceived as violating) 
traditional feminine norms. Often referred to as the “backlash effect”, a large body of 
research suggests women are subject to a range of organisational and social penalties 
when they display agentic behaviour or leadership styles (Rudman, 1998; Phelan & 
Rudman, 2010). In the context of hiring, for example, studies show that although 
agentic women tend to be evaluated as competent, they are often less likely to be 
hired on the grounds of being socially incompetent, hostile, or abrasive (Phelan et 
al., 2008; Rudman, 1998; Rudman & Glick, 1999, 2001; Rudman et al., 2009; 
Uhlmann & Cohen, 2007). Similar effects have been found across studies simulating 
promotion potential (Heilman et al., 2004; Rudman et al., 2009), salary negotiation 
(Babcock & Laschever, 2003; Bowles et al., 2007), or leadership evaluations 
(Ayman, Korabik & Morris, 2009; Butler & Geis, 1990). A meta-analysis by Eagly, 
Karau and Makhijani (1995), for instance, showed that women who adopt more 
directive or assertive management styles are generally evaluated as less effective or 
competent than either similar men or indeed women with more inclusive or 
communal styles. Similarly, research suggests women are penalized significantly 
more harshly than men if they discipline or criticize subordinate members of staff 
(Atwater et al., 2001; Sinclair & Kunda, 2000). Other studies suggest women (but 
not men) are required to strike a balance between agentic and communal traits to be 
successful. Johnson, Murphy, Zewdie and Reichard (2008), for instance, found that 
female leaders were only evaluated as competent if they managed to display both 
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“strong” and “sensitive” traits; by contrast, for male leaders only needed to be rated 
highly on strength.  
Backlash for gender role deviations can also be experienced by women in 
subtler ways. Research into workplace “emotion politics”, for instance, revealed that 
while emotional displays of anger can significantly lower perceptions of a woman’s 
status or competence, they do not have any influence on a man’s (Brescoll & 
Uhlmann, 2008; Rudman, 1998). Studies suggest a similar gender bias in evaluations 
of men and women’s volubility, or the amount of time they spend talking or 
contributing in a group conversation. For example, two studies showed that when 
presented with written or audio-visual descriptions of a man and woman contributing 
equally to a group meeting, people rate the woman as having spoken more (Cutler & 
Scott, 1990; Brescoll, 2011). Interestingly, effects in both studies were strongest 
when the woman was talking in a group with both women and men (as opposed to 
just women), suggesting that women are especially expected to adopt a more role-
congruent, subordinate position when men are present. Taken together, it’s worth 
noting that the body of evidence challenges the neoliberal feminist argument that 
women simply need to better adhere to the agentic stereotype in order to be 
successful (c.f. Sandberg, 2015). Tangentially, these findings also cohere with 
Butler’s argument around discrimination being one of the processes through which 
the gender binary is maintained (Butler, 2002). In socially punishing women who 
behave in an agentic or traditionally masculine manner, women are discouraged 
and/or prevented from entering powerful male-dominated spaces, and thus the 
patriarchal order is maintained.  
Interestingly, research suggests that gender role violations are not dealt with 
in a symmetrical way across genders or occupational categories. As discussed 
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previously, studies show that overall feminine men may experience greater societal 
backlash than masculine women (Blashill & Powlishta, 2009; Cherry & Deaux, 
1978; Cahill & Adams, 1997; Kite & Deaux, 1987). They also report higher degrees 
of “gender role stress” around being perceived as non-masculine than women do 
about being non-feminine (Levant et al., 1992; 2003; Smiler, 2004, 2006). In work 
settings, however, role-incongruent behaviour in men does not seem to elicit the 
same negative social or career consequences for men as it does for women (Eagly & 
Koening, 2008; Eagly, Makhijani, & Klonsky, 1992; Rudman & Glick, 1999). Using 
a hypothetical hiring task, for example, one study found that while women with 
stereotypically masculine traits were less likely to get hired for a gender-atypical 
position (e.g., finance manager), the same was not true for men (e.g., for the position 
of a nurse). Communal men do experience degrees of backlash when they occupy 
leadership positions (Tepper et al., 1993; Moss-Racusin et al., 2010; Rudman & 
Fairchild, 2004); however, because agentic traits are generally more valued in the 
context of leadership, the career consequences are likely to be more severe for 
women than for men (e.g., through lower income and reduced advancement 
potential; Moss-Racusin et al., 2010).  
Explicit and Implicit Stereotyping and Workplace Discrimination  
In addition to research looking at the overlap between masculine/leadership 
stereotypes and the incongruity between femininity and competence, a number of 
studies have examined the relationship between gender stereotyping and workplace 
discrimination. As expected, participants who report higher levels of gender 
stereotyping or who more strongly endorse gender differences and/or traditional 
gender roles are less likely to positively evaluate, hire, or promote a female 
candidate (Davidson & Burke, 2000; Eagly & Carli, 2007; Levinson, 1982; 
 
 
 93 
Neumark, Bank, & Van Nort, 1996; Skewes et al., 2018). While the majority of 
these studies have used explicit or self-report questionnaires, some have used the 
IAT or other implicit measures. Rudman and Glick (2001), for example, found that 
communality-agency biases on an IAT predicted an increased likelihood of 
discriminating against an agentic female candidate on a hypothetical hiring task. 
Interestingly, the agentic female was less likely than an agentic male or androgynous 
female to be hired for either a masculinized or feminized managerial position, 
despite being evaluated as more competent. Rudman and Kilianski (2000) similarly 
found that communality-agency biases were associated with higher scores on a 
separate gender-authority IAT (wherein participants associated women and men with 
high and low-authority roles). Another study found that men were more readily 
associated with traits describing a successful manager (e.g., productive, 
knowledgeable, skilled) and women with an unsuccessful manager (e.g., lacklustre, 
boring) on an IAT, and that these scores predicted increased workplace rewards 
assigned to male managers (Latu, Stewart, Myers, Lisco, Estes & Donohue, 2011). 
Across all of the studies mentioned, men were found to both stereotype more, 
“essentialise” more, and exhibit more pro-male or pro-agentic hiring preferences.  
In sum, the above review highlights two important ideological barriers to 
gender equality in the workplace: (1) the implicit overlap between masculinity, 
agency, and occupational success; and (2) the denial of these same traits to women. 
While previous research (and indeed the previous chapter) provided evidence for the 
first barrier, the current research will expand by examining the role of both role-
congruent and incongruent biases in occupational inequality. Specifically, using the 
IRAP, these studies will quantify the extent to which both men and women are 
associated with both communal and agentic traits. While a range of explicit and 
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implicit attitude measures have been used to examine components of this 
relationship (i.e., agency-communion gender stereotypes, the impact of stereotypes 
on hirability, backlash effects, etc.), the IRAP methodology is presented as a unique 
way to assess both role-congruent and incongruent biases simultaneously. Moreover, 
given that the previous chapter already assessed the extent to which agentic and 
communal traits are gendered as masculine and feminine respectively, and also 
developed a measure of occupational preference that uses the same masculine-
agentic and feminine-communal categories as the IRAP, this Chapter outlines a 
direct assessment of the relationship between binarist beliefs and gender preference 
in an occupational context.  
Current Study 
Study Three will utilize the IRAP to assess binarist men-masculine and 
women-feminine biases; that is, the ascription of certain attributes to women and not 
men and others to men and not women. To control for and assess any effects based 
on stimulus valence, two separate IRAPs will be employed: one for socially 
desirable masculine and feminine traits and another for socially undesirable traits. To 
explore whether the traits related to the stimulus category “man/male” are indeed 
more occupationally valuable than those related to “woman/female” (i.e., to examine 
the relationship between sex, masculinity, agency and power), this study will also 
employ the hypothetical hiring task from Chapter Two. In this, participants will be 
asked to express their hiring preference for a gender-neutral occupation between a 
man and a woman in one item, and a stereotypically masculine or a stereotypically 
feminine person in another. The same traits that are employed in the IRAP will be 
used in this task. A small number of self-report measures will also be included to 
assess explicit anti-women and gender-normative beliefs. It is hypothesised that 
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participants will gender the stimulus categories on the IRAP in a binary-consistent 
manner and that there will be an overall pro-masculine preference on the hiring task. 
Based on the explicit ratings in Chapter Two and other published studies, it is 
expected that effects will be higher/more pronounced for male participants on all 
measures.   
3.2.1 Method 
Participants 
Forty-seven undergraduate students (26 self-identified as female, 21 as male) 
aged between 18 and 32 years participated in this study (Mage = 23.84, SD = 5.49). A 
sample of convenience was used. The sample comprised White Irish participants, 
with the exception of two White Western European individuals. Participation was 
voluntary and no remuneration was offered. Inclusion criteria included fluent 
English, normal or corrected-to-normal vision, and full use of both hands. 
Participants were provided with an open-ended response format for gender.  
Procedure 
All experimental sessions were conducted one-to-one in individual 
experimental cubicles. Participants were briefed on the general nature and structure 
of the study and were given a short overview of the study’s subject matter (i.e., 
contemporary beliefs about gender) prior to participation. Written informed consent 
was provided by the participant, followed by a verbal assessment by the researcher 
for all inclusion criteria. The general experimental sequence was as follows: hiring 
task, measures ascertaining self-reported beliefs towards women and gender, and two 
IRAPs. The IRAP was programmed and presented in JavaScript and the self-report 
tasks were presented in Google Forms. The order of the implicit measures and the 
presentation order of the blocks within them were both counterbalanced across 
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participants (see Appendix 4), in keeping with IRAP methodological convention (see 
Hussey et al., 2015). Upon completion of all tasks, participants were fully debriefed 
and thanked for their time.  
Materials 
Self-Report Measures 
Self-reported sexism was assessed using the Modern Sexism Scale (MS: 
Swim et al., 1995: Appendix 5) and more general gender-normative beliefs using the 
Heteronormativity Attitudes and Beliefs Scale (HABS: Habarth, 2015: Appendix 6).   
Modern Sexism Scale (MS). The MS is a 10-item scale, comprised of two 
five-item subscales, assesses beliefs about women and gender. The first subscale is 
intended to assess more traditional anti-women sentiments (e.g., “It is more 
important to encourage boys than to encourage girls to participate in athletics.”) and 
the second more subtle or contemporary sexist attitudes (e.g., “Over the past few 
years, the government and news media have been showing more concern about the 
treatment of women than is warranted by women's actual experiences.”). Items are 
scored on a Likert-scale from 1 (strongly disagree) to 5 (strongly agree), with 
possible scores ranging from 10-50 (for overall scores). Higher scores indicate 
greater sexism. Scoring information can be found in Appendix 5. The MS has been 
shown to be an acceptable measure of sexist attitudes, both in terms of its internal 
consistency (Cronbach’s alpha = .75 in Swim et al., 1995 and .82 in Swim & Cohen, 
1997) and ability to predict scores on other measures of gender bias (Campbell, 
Schellenberg & Senn, 1997).  
Heteronormativity Attitudes and Beliefs Scale (HABS). The HABS is a 16-
item questionnaire assessing heteronormative beliefs and assumptions. As mentioned 
in Chapter One, heteronormativity can be broadly defined as the belief that people 
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fall into one of two distinct gender categories (male and female), which form a 
natural heterosexual dyad. The HABS consists of two eight-item subscales assessing, 
first, gender-as-binary beliefs (e.g., “All people are either male or female”) and, 
second, attitudes around natural or normative sexual behaviour, such as the 
assumption of heterosexuality in men and women (e.g., “There are particular ways 
that men should act and particular ways that women should act in relationships”). 
Items are scored on a seven-point Likert scale from 1 (strongly disagree) to 7 
(strongly agree), allowing a scoring range for the entire scale of 16-112. Higher 
scores indicate more pronounced heteronormative beliefs. Scoring information can 
be found in Appendix 6. The HABS has been shown to have good internal 
consistency (Cronbach’s alpha = .85 in Habarth, 2015) and to correlate positively 
with other measures of gender bias (Habarth, 2015).  
IRAPs 
 Stimuli. Participants completed two gender binary IRAPs: the first contained 
positively valenced masculine and feminine traits, and the second contained 
negatively valenced traits. Stimuli categories (Table 3.1) were identical to the ones 
developed and used in the previous chapter.   
Table 3.1.  
Stimuli used in the IRAPs 
Desirable Traits IRAP 
Label 1: 
Men 
Label 2: 
Women 
Target 1: 
Masculine 
traits 
Target 2: 
Feminine 
traits 
Rule A Rule B 
Men  Women  Witty 
Charismatic 
Competitive 
Decisive 
Nurturing 
Gentle 
Affectionate 
Sensitive 
Please respond 
as if men have 
more 
stereotypically 
masculine traits 
and women 
more 
Please respond 
as if women 
have more 
stereotypically 
masculine traits 
and men more 
stereotypically 
feminine traits 
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stereotypically 
feminine traits 
Undesirable Traits IRAP 
Label 1: 
Men 
Label 2: 
Women 
Target 1: 
Masculine 
traits 
Target 2: 
Feminine 
traits 
Rule A Rule B 
Men Women Aggressive 
Unemotional 
Insensitive 
Arrogant 
Bitchy 
Insecure 
Bossy 
Helpless 
Please respond 
as if men have 
more 
stereotypically 
masculine traits 
and women 
more 
stereotypically 
feminine traits 
Please respond 
as if women 
have more 
stereotypically 
masculine traits 
and men more 
stereotypically 
feminine traits 
 
Task structure. Prior to commencing the task, participants were provided 
with verbal instructions on how to complete the IRAP. These instructions broadly 
outlined the task structure (i.e., that they would be presented with blocks consisting 
of multiple word pairings and they would need to respond in accordance with a 
response “rule” presented before each block). The instructions also emphasized the 
importance of maintaining speed and accuracy throughout the task. Once participants 
were comfortable with these instructions, they began the “practice” phase of the 
IRAP, which was designed to train participants to a certain level of response fluency 
(78% accuracy and a median response latency of >2000ms; see Hussey et al., 2015). 
In keeping with convention (Hussey et al., 2015; Vahey et al., 2015), participants 
were presented with up to four pairs of practice blocks (i.e., four iterations of paired 
Rule A and Rule B blocks) until they reached the desired level of fluency, after 
which point they moved to the “test” portion of the IRAP. Those who did not meet 
the practice criteria did not complete the test blocks.  
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The practice and test phases of the IRAP were identical in terms of their 
stimuli and block structure. Both involved the presentation of a pre-block rule 
screen, 32 individual trials and a post-block feedback screen outlining the 
participant’s accuracy and latency scores for that block. The pre-block rule screen 
presented Rule A or B (e.g., “Please respond as if men have more stereotypically 
masculine traits and women more stereotypically feminine traits”) and outlined the 
task instructions:  
This task will determine what makes “intuitive sense” to you by seeing what rules 
you find easy and hard to follow. You'll pair words or images according to a rule. 
You'll be told the rule and when it changes. If you make a mistake, you'll see a red 
“X.” Provide the correct response to continue. Learn to respond accurately 
according to the rule. When you've learned to be accurate you'll naturally speed up 
too. Going quickly without being accurate will not provide meaningful data. 
As is typical in an IRAP, two stimuli were presented together on the screen 
per trial (one label stimulus and one target stimulus, e.g., “women” and “nurturing”). 
The two response options (true and false) remained static across all trials at the 
bottom left and right of the screen. Each stimulus remained on the screen until the 
correct response was emitted. If participants responded incorrectly, corrective 
feedback in the form of a red “X” appeared in the centre of the screen. Each block 
pair consisted of one “Rule A” block and one “Rule B” block. In the “Rule A” block, 
response contingencies reinforced choices of the on-screen word true when men-
masculine and women-feminine stimulus pairings were present and false for men-
feminine and women-masculine word pairings. In the “Rule B” block, the inverse 
response options were reinforced. The order of the rule blocks was always 
counterbalanced between participants.  
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The category labels (masculine and feminine) were clearly specified to 
participants in the task. This was due to existing research suggesting category labels 
as well as features of the individual stimuli influence effects on implicit measures 
(Steffens & Plewe, 2001). Bluemke and Friese (2006) and Govan and Williams 
(2004), for instance, found that effects on an IAT were considerably decreased or 
even reversed when the category exemplars were inconsistent with the valence of the 
category labels. To ensure the categories were salient and coherent, the labels were 
therefore included and specified during the pre-block rule screen. It is important to 
note that this was not expected to confound effects (e.g., due to the conceptual 
overlap in society between sex and gender categories). Implicit measures are 
sensitive to category labels, but the individual exemplars still need to form a 
coherent class independent of the label (see De Houwer, 2001). 
Hiring task.  
Hiring preference was assessed using the same hiring task as Chapter Two.   
Ethical Issues 
Ethical issues and procedures were identical to previous studies. The content 
and procedures posed no particular ethical risk other than participant fatigue; to 
mitigate this, participants were advised they could take a break (between blocks or 
tasks) when needed and could cease participation at any time. As no personal data 
were collected and responses were anonymous, they were informed they could not 
withdraw after completing the study.   
Data Processing and Analysis 
Following routine practices, latency differentials across Rule A and Rule B 
blocks were quantified using the DIRAP scoring algorithm, a scoring metric based on 
an adaptation of Cohen’s d. As previously mentioned, IRAP scores are analysed at 
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the trial-type level so as to provide an assessment of effect size for each individual 
trial-type (i.e., men-masculine, men-feminine, women-masculine, women-feminine). 
Thus, four separate DIRAP scores were produced for each IRAP trial type, all of which 
have a potential range of +2 to -2. In keeping with convention, the scores for the 
third and fourth trial types were inverted after calculation (see Hussey et al., 2015). 
Inverting trial-type scores does not change the effect produced in any way, it merely 
makes it slightly easier to interpret effects on a graph. After inverting, a positive 
DIRAP score on any trial-type represents a “masculine” or “not-feminine” effect and a 
negative score a “feminine” or “not-masculine” effect. Overall DIRAP scores were 
also calculated and used for any analyses involving multiple comparisons (e.g., 
correlations between IRAPs and other measures). This is commonly done in IRAP 
research as a way to minimise the risk of a Type 1 error (i.e., because of multiple 
comparisons on trial type scores). Overall scores are calculated by simply averaging 
the four un-inverted trial-type scores.  
Practice-block data were not included in the analysis, and thus IRAP data 
were only collected from participants who progressed to the test phase. In this study, 
this was 45 participants for the positive traits IRAP and 44 for the negative traits 
IRAP. Using the exclusion method outlined in Nicholson and Barnes-Holmes 
(2012), IRAP data were removed for participants who failed to meet accuracy and/or 
latency criteria in more than one of the three test-block pairs. Three participants were 
removed from the negative traits IRAP on this basis. Participants were not excluded 
from the analysis if they failed to meet criteria in only one of their test-block pairs; 
however, the final DIRAP scores for these individuals were calculated by averaging 
the DIRAP scores across the remaining two (rather than three) pairs of test blocks. 
DIRAP scores for three participants were calculated in this manner.  
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3.2.2 Results 
 Analyses were again conducted using JASP (version Beta 2).  
Self-Report Measures 
  Scores on the Modern Sexism Scale (MSS) were higher in male participants 
than females (females: M = 24.42, SD = 5.87; males: M = 28.9, SD = 7.43). 
Heteronormativity was also higher in male participants (females: M = 41.88, SD = 
12.12; males: M = 50.4, SD = 18.11). Independent samples t-tests identified 
significant gender differences on both the HABS, t(46) = -1.9, p = .031, and the MS, 
t(46) = -2.26, p = .014.. Effect sizes for both were large (Cohen’s d > .8).  
IRAP Performance 
A visual inspection of the graph indicates that effects on all trial types 
reflected a binary-consistent pattern of responding (see Figure 3.1). That is, men 
were associated with masculine but not feminine traits, and women were associated 
with feminine but not masculine traits. Bias scores were typically larger for male 
participants, with the exception of the women-feminine trial-type. Larger resistance 
to forming role-incongruent relations was found for the men-feminine relative to the 
women-masculine trial type for both genders, with males demonstrating notably 
stronger “men-not-feminine” effects. Means and standard deviations are in Table 
3.2.  
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Figure 3.1. Trial Type Effects for Male and Female Participants for the Positive and 
Negative IRAPs 
 
Positive Traits IRAP    
 
 
Negative Traits IRAP 
 
Figure 3.2. Trial-type level DIRAP scores for the IRAPs. Note. DIRAP scores have a 
possible range of -2 to +2. A positive score can be interpreted as a “masculine” or 
“not-feminine” effect, and a negative score a “feminine” or “not-masculine” effect.  
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Table 3.2  
Trial-type means and standard deviations for the positive and negative IRAPs  
 
IRAP  Trial-Type  Gender  Mean  SD  N  
Positive IRAP   Men-masculine   Female   0.06  0.36  26  
        Male   0.49  0.37  18  
    Men-feminine   Female   -0.09  0.26  26  
        Male   0.23  0.33  18  
    Women-masculine   Female   0.01  0.41  26  
        Male   -0.04  0.36  18  
    Women-feminine   Female   -0.26  0.41  26  
        Male   -0.15  0.39  18  
Negative IRAP   Men-masculine   Female   0.18  0.28  23  
        Male   0.35  0.35  17  
    Men-feminine   Female   0.10  0.36  23  
        Male   0.14  0.37  17  
    Women-masculine   Female   -0.04  0.34  23  
        Male   -0.15  0.31  17  
    Women-feminine   Female   -0.22  0.36  23  
        Male   -0.23  0.42  17  
  
One-sample t-tests were run on the trial-type scores for the entire sample 
(i.e., male and female participants combined: Table 3.3). Analyses assumed a test 
value of 0. Scores were collapsed across genders for these analyses to minimize the 
number of comparisons, and a Bonferroni correction was applied to minimize the 
risk of Type I errors. Effects were broadly comparable across the two IRAPs, with 
significant men-masculine and women-feminine effects on both. The only notable 
difference is on the men-feminine trial-type; there is a stronger men-not-feminine 
effect on the negative but not the positive traits IRAP, though this was non-
significant after a Bonferroni correction. 
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Table 3.3  
Bonferroni-corrected one sample t-test results  
IRAP   Trial-Type t  df  p  
Positive IRAP Men-masculine  3.769 43  <.001***  
 Men-feminine 0.828 43  0.412  
 Women-masculine  -0.149 43  0.882  
 Women-feminine  -3.568 43  <.001***  
Negative IRAP Men-masculine  4.974 39  <.001***  
 Men-feminine 2.029 39  0.049*  
 Women-masculine  -1.636 39  0.110  
 Women-feminine  -3.736 39  <.001***  
Note:*** denotes significance after a Bonferroni-correction (p < .00625).  
 
Gender Differences 
A 2×2×4 repeated measures ANOVA was conducted to assess the impact of 
participant gender and IRAP type (i.e., positive or negative traits) on trial-type 
scores. Only participants with data from both IRAPs were included in this analysis 
(n = 39). While there was a significant two-way interaction between trial type and 
gender, F(3, 35) = 6.82, p = .047, !"# = .045, no significant three-way interaction was 
found between trial-type, gender, and IRAP type, F(3, 35) = 1.77, p = .820, !"# = 
.008. That is, although male and female participants performed significantly 
differently based on trial type within the IRAP, these effects were not related to the 
valence of the traits. There was a significant main effect for gender, with men 
showing more binary-consistent biases than women on both IRAPs, F(1, 37) = 6.4, p 
= .016, !"# = .148. There was also a significant interaction effect between gender and 
IRAP type, F(1, 37) = 6.8, p = .013, !"# = .155.  
 Follow-up Bonferroni-corrected independent-samples t-tests were conducted 
to explore the above two-way interaction effect between participant gender and 
IRAP trial-type (see Figure 3.2 for a graphical representation of trial-type scores). As 
performance on the IRAP did not differ according to trait valence, participant scores 
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for both IRAPs were collapsed (at the trial-type level) for these analyses. Thus, only 
participants with data for both IRAPs were included here (n = 40). Differences were 
found only on the men-masculine trial-type: male participants demonstrated more 
positive DIRAP scores (M = 0.50) than females (M = 0.05), t(37) = 3.71, p < 0.001. 
Men also demonstrated stronger men-not-feminine effects than women, though this 
was not signifiant (Mwomen =.018; Mmen =.159), t(37) = 1.95, p < 0.059. This suggests 
that, across both of the male trial-types, men demonstrated stronger gender binary-
consistent biases than women on the trial-types pertaining to their own gender. 
Hiring Preferences 
When asked about their preference for a particular gender (i.e., male or 
female), responses in the current sample were varied: 11% selected the man, 44% 
selected the woman, and 45% selected “I prefer not to answer”). A chi-square 
goodness-of-fit test revealed this distribution to be significantly unequal, χ² (2, n = 
47) = 11.40, p = 0.003. For the stereotypical feminine/masculine-preference item, 
however, participants again demonstrated an overwhelming preference for the 
masculine person (83% selected masculine traits, 13% selected feminine traits, and 
4% selected “I prefer not to answer”). A chi-square goodness-of-fit test again 
revealed this to be a significantly unequal distribution χ² (2, n = 47) = 52.64, p < 
0.001. Chi-square tests for independence revealed no significant differences between 
male and female responses for either item (all ps > .5).  
Measure Comparisons 
Pearson’s r correlations were conducted to explore the direction and 
significance of the relationship between explicit binarist or anti-women attitudes and 
IRAP performance. Overall DIRAP scores were used for these analyses as mentioned 
in the method section. For male and female participants, no significant correlations 
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were found between scores on the positive or negative IRAP and either the HABS or 
MS (ps > .15).  
3.2.3 Summary 
 This study revealed significant binarist gender biases in a young adult 
sample. Across two IRAPs, participants demonstrated effects in the expected role-
congruent direction (i.e., men are masculine and not feminine, women are feminine 
and not masculine). Gender differences were identified in IRAP performances, with 
males demonstrating larger response biases across both IRAPs. Follow-up tests 
revealed this to be driven predominantly by differential performance on the “men-
masculine” trial-type, with males demonstrating significantly stronger effects on this 
trial-type. Hiring preferences were in the expected direction, with a significant 
proportion of participants preferring the masculine over the feminine candidate. As 
in Chapter Two, when asked to express a preference for a male over a female 
candidate, nearly half of the participants responded that they would prefer not to 
answer, while the majority of the remaining sample elected the female. No 
significant correlations were found between scores on either IRAP and self-reported 
attitudes towards women and gender. Significant gender differences were found on 
the two self-report scales, with males demonstrating larger sexism and 
heteronormativity scores than females.    
3.3 Study Four 
Study Three evidenced the utility of the IRAP in assessing gender binary 
biases. It also demonstrated the indirect cultural association between men, 
masculinity, and occupational success. Study Four will now expand on these 
findings by first refining some procedural properties of the IRAP, and second 
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modifying the hiring task to assess a broader range of occupational gender biases and 
stereotypes.  
Changes to the IRAP 
The previous study assessed gender binary biases by presenting word pairs 
on screen (e.g. “men” and “dominant”) and having participants respond either true or 
false. One advantage of the IRAP, however, is that it allows for full statements to be 
included on screen (e.g., “Men are dominant”), and indeed some research suggests 
this may have certain procedural advantages. Two studies, for example, found that 
changing the presentation of stimuli on self-esteem IRAPs from pairs to statements 
(i.e.., from self/me-good to “I am good” or “I want to be good”) resulted in better 
predictive and discriminant validity in the context of depression (Remue, De 
Houwer, Barnes-Holmes, Vanderhasselt & De Raedt, 2013; Remue, Hughes, De 
Houwer & De Raedt, 2014). It is possible that similar results would be found in this 
context, given the way gender stereotypes are believed to be structured. As 
mentioned, a distinction is often drawn in the literature between the descriptive and 
prescriptive components of gender norms; that is, between assumptions around how 
men and women do behave versus how they should behave (see Eagly & Karau, 
2002; Prentice & Carranaza, 2002). This study will explore this distinction by 
including one IRAP for descriptive binary biases and another for prescriptive biases. 
It should be noted that Prentice and Carranaza (2002) and Ridgeway (2011) further 
suggest gender stereotypes have a significant proscriptive component, in that they 
also set out clear rules for how men and women should not behave. However, this 
aspect will not be directly assessed here because it would require to participants to 
respond in a potentially confusing manner (e.g., responding ‘false’ to “Men should 
not be sensitive”), which may confound results (see Hussey et al., 2015).  
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Study Four will also remove the negatively valenced IRAP. Both positive 
and negative IRAPs were originally included in order to control for and measure the 
effects of trait desirability. However, an IRAP takes a relatively long time to 
complete (between 10-30 minutes); it is thus advisable to restrict the number of 
IRAPs per study to two, in order to keep the total length of the study to under one 
hour and therefore minimise participant fatigue and complex order effects. 
Furthermore, as responses did not differ considerably across the two IRAPs, it is 
likely unnecessary to use both in future studies. The positive over the negative IRAP 
was retained primarily because the hiring task now only uses the positive traits (the 
“firing” item using the negative trait was dropped after Chapter One) and thus 
allowed for a direct comparison. In addition, previous research on implicit gender 
bias suggested valence was particularly likely to influence results when the traits 
were negative, possibly because men and women may resist pairing negative traits 
with their own gender (see Rudman, Greenwald & McGhee, 2001).  
Changes to the Hiring Task  
The original task ascertained preferences between a feminine and a masculine 
person for a single gender-neutral occupation (“office job”). Responses across the 
two previous studies skewed very heavily in the pro-masculine/agentic direction 
(approx. 90% of 290 participants overall) and demonstrated that masculinity-agency 
is considerably more socially valuable than communality. While this is a significant 
and meaningful finding, it is not generally recommended to do group comparisons 
with data this skewed (see Delucchi & Bostrom, 2004). The current study will 
therefore expand on the task and look at gender preferences for a broader range of 
occupations: some neutral, some stereotypically feminine and some stereotypically 
masculine. In so doing, we can examine not only gender preference for a range of 
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occupations (and thus the degree of overall pro-feminine/masculine bias) but also 
participants’ degree of occupational gender stereotyping, which may also be 
relevant.  
Additional Changes  
A small number of other procedural changes will also be made before Study 
Four. First, the age range moving forward will be restricted to 18-29 to ensure the 
samples could be meaningfully described as young adults. Second, the HABS 
measure will be removed from future studies. While this was a useful explicit 
measure of heteronormative and gender-as-binary beliefs, there was a lot of variance 
in responses and it also pushed the number of measures participants were asked to 
complete up to five. Some participants also verbally reported finding parts of the 
questionnaire confusing. The Modern Sexism Scale is a more stable and widely used 
measure of explicit gender beliefs so this will be retained for use in the remaining 
studies.  
Current Study 
 The current study (Study Four) will assess descriptive and prescriptive 
gender biases and explore their relationship to explicit hiring preferences. Based on 
the results of the previous study, it is hypothesised that participants will more readily 
attribute masculine traits to men (but not women) and feminine traits to women (but 
not men). Given the lack of research to date on the descriptive/prescriptive 
distinction on implicit measures, no specific hypotheses are put forward in terms of 
the relationship between the two IRAPs, or between the IRAPs and the hiring task. 
For the hiring task, it is expected that participants will hire in a stereotype-consistent 
manner (i.e., hire the masculine individual for the masculinized jobs and the 
feminine person for the feminized jobs). However, it is also expected that 
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participants will be more likely to hire the agentic individual for the more gender-
neutral positions, and thus that there will be an overall pro-masculine bias. As in the 
previous studies, it is expected that bias scores will be higher/more pronounced for 
male participants across all measures.  
3.3.1 Method 
Participants 
Sixty-one White Irish undergraduate students aged between 18 and 23 
participated in this study (Mage=20.7). Of the sample, 30 identified as female and 30 
as male. Participation was voluntary and no remuneration was offered. Inclusion 
criteria included fluent English, normal or corrected-to-normal vision, and full use of 
both hands. Participants were provided with an open-ended response format for 
gender.  
Procedure 
Experimental sequence. The experimental sequence and context were 
identical to Study Three.   
Materials 
Modern Sexism Scale. 
The version of the MS in this study was identical to Study Three.  
IRAPs. 
Two separate IRAPs were employed in this study: one for descriptive biases 
and another for prescriptive biases. Both contained the same stimulus categories but 
differed in the relational terms used (see Table 3.4).  
Task structure. The format and procedure of the IRAPs were identical to 
Study Three.  
  
 
Table 3.4  
Stimuli used in the descriptive and prescriptive IRAPs. 
Descriptive IRAP 
Label 1: 
Men 
Label 2: 
Women 
Target 1: 
Masculine traits 
Target 2:  
Feminine traits 
Rule A Rule B 
Men are Women are Witty 
Charismatic 
Competitive 
Decisive 
Nurturing 
Gentle 
Affectionate 
Sensitive 
Please respond as if 
men have more 
stereotypically 
masculine traits and 
women more 
stereotypically feminine 
traits 
Please respond as if 
women have more 
stereotypically masculine 
traits and men more 
stereotypically feminine 
traits 
Prescriptive IRAP 
Label 1: 
Men 
Label 2: 
Women 
Target 1: 
Masculine traits 
Target 2:  
Feminine traits 
Rule A Rule B 
Men should be Women should 
be 
Witty 
Charismatic 
Competitive 
Decisive 
Nurturing 
Gentle 
Affectionate 
Sensitive 
Please respond as if 
men should have more 
stereotypically 
masculine traits and 
women should have 
stereotypically feminine 
traits 
Please respond as if 
women should have more 
stereotypically masculine 
traits and men should have 
stereotypically feminine 
traits 
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Hiring task. Hiring preference was assessed using a modified version of the 
task from Chapter Two and Study Three of this Chapter. Similar to previous studies 
of occupational gender preference (e.g., Rudman & Glick, 2001; Rudman & 
Kilianski, 2000), participants were required to choose candidates for a range of 
“feminized”, “masculinized” and gender-neutral occupations (see Table 3.5). These 
occupations were extracted from a series of studies into occupational gender 
stereotypes (Beggs & Doolittle, 1993; Shinar, 1975; Elsaid & Elsaid, 2012). The task 
instructions were identical to the previous task, as were the traits ascribed to “Person 
A” and “Person B” (i.e., the desirable masculine-agentic and feminine-communal 
traits employed in the IRAP). The occupations were presented in a fixed randomized 
order.  
Table 3.5 
Occupations included in the hiring task. 
Feminine Occupations Masculine Occupations Gender-Neutral 
Occupations 
Secretary Electrician Salesperson 
Nurse Computer scientist Journalist 
Psychotherapist Financial advisor Pharmacist  
Hairdresser Police officer  
Primary school teacher Lawyer  
 
Ethical Issues  
 Ethical issues, approval, and procedures were identical to Study Three.  
Data Processing and Analysis 
IRAP 
Data were processed in an identical manner to the previous study and 
participants were excluded using the same criteria. One participant was removed 
 
 
 114 
from the descriptive IRAP (final n = 60) and three from the prescriptive on this basis 
(final n = 57). 
Hiring Task 
The hiring task was processed to produce separate gender preference and 
gender stereotype scores. That is, to produce indices of (i) participants’ overall 
preference for hiring the masculine relative to the feminine person, and (ii) 
participants’ tendency to hire the masculine individual for the stereotypically male 
positions and feminine for the stereotypically female positions. The gender 
preference score was calculated by recoding a masculine preference as +1 and a 
feminine preference as 0 and then totalling the responses. Possible scores range from 
0 to 13, with higher scores reflective of an overall pro-masculine bias.  
The gender stereotype score was calculated by recoding responses as either 
stereotypical or non-stereotypical, depending on whether the occupation was 
stereotypically male or female. Stereotypical responses (i.e., selecting the feminine 
person for the stereotypically feminine occupation) were coded as +1 and non-
stereotypical responses were coded as -1. The score was calculated from responses 
on the 5 masculine and 5 feminine occupations combined, so possible scores ranged 
from -10 (strongly non-stereotypical responses) to +10 (strongly stereotypical 
responses).  
3.3.2 Results 
Self-Report Measures 
 MS scores were lower again in the current sample (females: M = 19.41, SD = 
5.35; males: M = 19.67, SD = 4.75), potentially due to the restricted age range. An 
independent samples t-tests identified no significant gender differences, t(58) = -
0.393, p = .696.  
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IRAP Performance 
Effects across both IRAPs reflected a binary-consistent pattern of responding 
(see Figure 3.2 and Table 3.6). That is, men are/should be masculine and not-
feminine, and women are/should be feminine and not-masculine. An inspection of 
the data would suggest no notable differences in performance between the genders or 
across the two IRAPs (i.e., prescriptive or descriptive), however, a 2x2x4 repeated 
measures ANOVA was conducted to explore this in more detail. Again, only 
participants with data from both IRAPs were included in this analysis (n = 58). 
Analyses revealed no significant main effect for either gender, F(1, 55) = 1.89, p = 
.179, or IRAP type, F(1, 55) = .781, and no significant two- or three-way interaction 
effects (all ps > .15).   
Figure 3.2 Trial Type Effects for Male and Female Participants for the Descriptive 
and Prescriptive IRAPs 
 
Descriptive IRAP    
 
 
 
Prescriptive IRAP 
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-0.2
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0
0.1
0.2
0.3
0.4
Men-Masculine Men-Feminine Women-Masculine Women-Feminine
Descriptive Traits IRAP (n = 60)
Females Males
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Figure 3.2. Trial-type level DIRAP scores for the Descriptive and Prescriptive IRAPs. 
Note. DIRAP scores have a possible range of -2 to +2. A positive score can be 
interpreted as a “masculine” or “not-feminine” effect, and a negative score a 
“feminine” or “not-masculine” effect.  
 
Table 3.6 
 
Trial-type means and standard deviations for both IRAPs   
IRAP  Trial-Type  Gender  Mean  SD  N  
Descriptive IRAP  Men-masculine  Female   0.26  0.36   31 
        Male   0.34  0.43   29 
    Men-feminine   Female   0.12  0.39   31 
        Male   0.15  0.39   29 
    Women-masculine  Female   0.06  0.26   31 
        Male   -0.01  0.35   29 
    Women-feminine  Female   -0.31  0.34   31 
        Male   -0.13  0.36   29 
Prescriptive IRAP  Men-masculine  Female   0.30  0.34   29 
        Male   0.36  0.38   29 
    Men-feminine   Female   0.06  0.33   29 
        Male   0.23  0.42   29 
    Women-masculine  Female   0.11  0.31   29 
        Male   -0.04  0.38   29 
    Women-feminine  Female   -0.23  0.35   29 
        Male   -0.10  0.43   29 
 
-0.3
-0.2
-0.1
0
0.1
0.2
0.3
0.4
Men-Masculine Men-Feminine Women-Masculine Women-Feminine
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Though the ANOVA found no difference in responding based on gender or 
IRAP type, one-sample t-tests were run to assess the significance of the effects at the 
trial-type level for the sample overall, again assuming a test value of 0. As in Study 
Three, significant men-masculine and women-feminine effects were found across 
both IRAPs (see Table 3.7). It is interesting to again note the near-significant men-
not-feminine effects, suggesting resistance to ascribing feminine traits to men (i.e., 
participants were faster to select the response option “false” rather than “true”), in 
addition to the absence of comparable effects on the women-not-masculine trial-
types.  
Table 3.7 
Bonferroni-corrected one sample t-test results  
IRAP   Trial-Type t  df  p  
Descriptive IRAP Men-masculine  5.861  59   < .001   
 Men-feminine 2.725  59   0.008   
 Women-masculine  0.637  59   0.527   
 Women-feminine  -4.787  59   < .001   
Prescriptive IRAP Men-masculine  7.006  56   < .001   
 Men-feminine 2.793  56   0.007   
 Women-masculine  0.751  56   0.456   
 Women-feminine  -3.253  56   0.002   
Note:*** denotes significance after a Bonferroni-correction (p < .00625).  
 
Hiring Preferences 
Occupational gender preferences for female and male participants can be 
found in Figure 3.3. A visual inspection of the data surprisingly indicates that female 
participants had a stronger overall masculine preference than the males, in addition 
to more noticeable stereotyping (i.e., responses are more skewed for both the pro-
feminine and pro-masculine positions). Independent samples t-tests revealed these 
differences to be significant (Table 3.8).  
Table 3.8 
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Descriptive statistics and independent-samples t-test results for the hiring task 
 
 Females 
Mean (SD) 
Males 
Mean (SD) 
t df p 
Gender Preference  9.7 (8.5) 7.9 (1.5) 
 
5.46 57 <.001*** 
Gender Stereotyping 6.9 (2.7) 5 (3.6) 2.29 57 .026* 
Note. Gender preference scores range from 0-13 with higher scores indicating greater 
pro-male bias. Gender stereotype scores range from -10 to +10 with negative scores 
representing non-stereotypical responding and positive scores representing 
stereotypical responding.   
* p < .05 *** p < .001 
 
Figure 3.3. Hiring Task Responses  
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Figure 3.3.  Hiring preferences per occupation for male and female participants.. 
Note. Histograms were generated to examine levels of preference and stereotyping 
for the entire sample. In terms of overall gender preference, there was a strong pro-
masculine trend with nearly all preference scores falling over the halfway 6.5 mark. 
Stereotype scores were also skewed to the right, suggesting a general tendency 
toward more stereotype-consistent than inconsistent responding.  
 
Figure 3.4 Distribution Plots for Hiring Task Responses  
 
 
 
Figure 3.4. Frequency distributions for overall masculine and feminine preference 
and for levels of occupational stereotyping. Note: Gender preference scores range 
from 0-13 with higher scores indicating greater pro-male bias. Gender stereotype 
scores range from -10 to +10 with negative scores representing non-stereotypical 
responding and positive scores representing stereotypical responding.   
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In terms of other notable trends, it is interesting that the three “neutral” 
occupations – salesperson, journalist, and pharmacist – were not evaluated by the 
sample as gender-neutral. Approximately 90-95% of the sample had a masculine-
agentic preference for both the salesperson and the journalist, while 60-65% had a 
feminine-communal preference for the pharmacist. 
Measure Comparisons 
 Pearson’s r correlations were conducted to examine the relationships between 
IRAP performance, hiring preferences, and self-reported sexism (Table 3.8). There 
were significant correlations between the two hiring task scores and between the two 
IRAP scores, as would be expected. There was also a significant correlation between 
scores on the descriptive IRAP and the gender preference score. No other significant 
correlations were found.  
 
Table 3.8 
 
Measure comparisons.  
 
  Descriptive 
IRAP 
Prescriptive 
IRAP 
Stereotype 
score 
Preference 
score 
MS 
Descriptive 
IRAP 
Pearson’s 
r 
— 0.376***  0.167  0.321***  0.073  
 p  0.002  0.104  0.007  0.295  
 
Prescriptive 
IRAP 
Pearson’s 
r 
 — 0.029  0.262  0.132  
 p   0.583  0.974  0.169 
  
Stereotype 
score 
Pearson’s 
r 
  — 0.238*  0.004  
 p    0.035  0.489  
 
Preference 
score 
Pearson’s 
r 
   — 0.046  
 p     0.366  
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MS Pearson’s 
r 
    — 
 p      
 
3.3.3 Results Summary 
Similar to Study Three, significant binarist biases were found across both 
IRAPs. While effects were stronger for male participants, there was no significant 
main effect for gender in the current study. Response patters across both IRAPs did 
not differ significantly to one another, and the same asymmetrical response pattern 
on the role-incongruent trial-types was observed on both as in the previous study 
(i.e., a significant men-not-feminine effect but no comparable women-not-masculine 
effect). The absence of differences across the descriptive and prescriptive IRAPs 
could be interpreted in two ways: first, as is consistent with stereotype theory 
(Prentice & Carranaza, 2002), that gender stereotypes are simultaneously 
prescriptive and descriptive, or second, that the IRAP is not as sensitive as hoped to 
relational terms such as “should” and “are”, as has been suggested in other domains 
(Remue et al., 2013; 2014). The paucity of research in this area makes it difficult to 
contextualise these findings, but the absence of any difference is interesting 
nonetheless.  
While participant responses were not significantly different across the two 
IRAPs, they did differ in terms of their relationship to hiring preferences. A 
relationship was found between the descriptive IRAP and the overall gender-
preference score only. No relationship was found between gender preference and 
effects on the prescriptive IRAP, and neither measure predicted the gender 
stereotyping score. Results are thus consistent with mainstream feminist theories of 
binary gender order (e.g., Butler, 2002; Connell, 2005). However, the absence of a 
relationship between agency/communion biases and occupational stereotyping 
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contradicts previous questionnaire research (Eagly & Carli, 2007) and studies using 
implicit measures (Rudman & Glick, 2001; Rudman & Kilianski, 2000).  
For the hiring task, effects were generally in the expected direction: 
participants had an overall tendency towards hiring the masculine-agentic person and 
also to stereotype as expected for the masculinized and feminized roles. It is worth 
noting at this stage that gender stereotype and pro-masculine preferences were 
significantly higher for female relative to male participants. One explanation for this 
unexpected finding is that the women in the current sample are more sexist or 
gender-conservative than the previous study; however, their Modern Sexism Scale 
scores were not notably higher relative to the males or indeed the female participants 
in Study Three. A more likely explanation is that women do not consider the 
masculine-agentic traits to be uniquely masculine, as indicated by the explicit ratings 
in Chapter Two and supported by the absence of women-not-masculine biases on the 
IRAP. This will require expansion and replication in Study Five and future studies.  
3.4 Study Five 
The previous two studies demonstrated the utility of the IRAP in measuring 
binarist gender biases. They also indicated a relationship between these biases and 
explicit hiring preferences. The current study will now assess whether the IRAP is a 
useful methodology for assessing gender evaluations, and specifically evaluations of 
competency. As discussed in the introduction, there is a well-established overlap 
between masculine agency and occupational competency or success (see Eagly & 
Carli, 2008). The previous studies supported this assumption, revealing that (a) 
agentic traits are both more readily ascribed to men than women, and (b) more 
valued in an occupational context than communal traits. It is therefore possible that 
traits related to competency or occupational success will be gendered on an IRAP. 
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The current study will thus include two IRAPs: one assessing descriptive gender 
binary biases (as in the previous studies), and the other associations between gender 
roles (i.e., the masculine and feminine stimulus categories) and either competent or 
incompetent traits.  
For the gender binary IRAP, we expect a repeat of the same binary-consistent 
response pattern. No specific pattern of results is expected for the gender-
competency IRAP, as this will be the first study to examine competency evaluations 
of gender roles (as opposed to men and women). However, based on previous 
research showing the explicit overlap between masculinity and competency 
stereotypes (Koenig et al., 2011) and the implicit associations between competency 
and maleness (Rudman & Kilianski, 2000), it is generally expected that competent 
traits will be more readily attributed to masculinity over femininity. The same hiring 
task as in Study Four will be used here, so we again anticipate a relationship between 
binarist biases and occupational preferences. No specific hypothesis is proposed 
regarding the relationship between the gender-competency evaluations and hiring 
preferences however, as it is the first time it is being used. As gender differences in 
IRAP and hiring preference scores have varied across the previous two studies, no 
directional hypotheses are proposed here.  
Given that this study includes an additional IRAP for competency evaluation 
(and the maximum number of IRAPs it is feasible to include is two), the prescriptive 
stereotype IRAP will be dropped from this study. This was done because it was not 
sufficiently different to the descriptive/gender binary IRAP and also because it was 
not associated with hiring preferences.    
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3.4.1 Method 
Participants 
Forty White Irish undergraduate students aged between 18 and 23 
participated in this study (Mage=21.9). Of the sample, 20 identified as female and 20 
as male.  
Procedure 
Experimental sequence. The experimental sequence including instructions 
and debriefing information were identical to previous studies.   
Materials 
Modern Sexism Scale. 
The version of the MS in this study was identical to previous.  
IRAPs. 
Two separate IRAPs were employed in this study: one for binarist gender 
biases and one for gender-competency evaluations. Stimuli were the same as 
previous, though competent and incompetent traits were pulled from Rudman and 
Kilianksi (2000) for the competency IRAP (see Table 3.9).  
Task structure. The format and procedure of the IRAPs were identical to 
previous, with one exception. Because we wanted to stimulus categories to be salient 
for both IRAPs, we elected to provide participants with a reference sheet outlining 
the “masculine” and “feminine” stimulus categories (Appendix 7). Typical IRAPs 
use relatively simple label categories (e.g., “men”, “women”, “White faces”, “Black 
faces”, etc.) that pair with more complex target categories (e.g. positive and negative 
words: see Hussey et al. 2015 for a description of a typical IRAP). The reference 
sheet was used in this study as the masculine and feminine categories might not have 
formed strong categories outside of the context of the study, and may therefore have 
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made the practice phase of the IRAP more difficult than normal. They were asked to 
refrain from commencing the study until they were comfortable with the two 
categories.  
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Table 3.9. 
Stimuli used in the gender binary and gender competency IRAPs  
Gender binary IRAP 
Label 1: 
Men 
Label 2: 
Women 
Target 1: 
Masculine traits 
Target 2:  
Feminine traits 
Rule A Rule B 
Men are Women are Witty 
Charismatic 
Competitive 
Decisive 
Nurturing 
Gentle 
Affectionate 
Sensitive 
Please respond as if 
men have more 
stereotypically 
masculine traits and 
women more 
stereotypically feminine 
traits 
Please respond as if 
women have more 
stereotypically masculine 
traits and men more 
stereotypically feminine 
traits 
Gender-competency IRAP 
Label 1: 
Masculine traits 
Label 2: 
Feminine traits 
Target 1: 
Competent words 
Target 2:  
Incompetent words 
Rule A Rule B 
Witty 
Charismatic 
Competitive 
Decisive 
Nurturing 
Gentle 
Affectionate 
Sensitive 
Competent 
Efficient 
Capable 
Employable 
Incompetent 
Inefficient 
Incapable 
Unemployable 
Please respond as if 
masculine traits are 
competent and feminine 
traits are incompetent  
Please respond as if 
feminine traits are 
competent and masculine 
traits are incompetent 
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Hiring task. The hiring task was identical to the task used in Study Four.  
Ethical Issues  
 Ethical issues, approval, and procedures were identical to previous.  
Data processing and analysis 
 Data were processed in an identical manner to studies one and two and 
participants were excluded using the same criteria. Three participants were excluded 
from the binary IRAP (final n = 37) and five from the competency IRAP (final n = 
35) on this basis.  
3.4.2 Results 
Self-Report Measures  
 Sexism scores were again low (females: M = 18.82, SD = 3.9; males: M = 20, 
SD = 5.59). An independent samples t-test found no significant gender differences, 
t(38) = 0.453.  
IRAP Performance 
Gender Binary IRAP. A visual inspection of the graph indicates a binary-
consistent pattern of responding across all four trial-types (see Figure 3.5). That is, as 
in previous studies, men are masculine and not-feminine and women are feminine 
and not-masculine (Table 3.10 and Table 3.11). A 2x4 repeated measures ANOVA 
run on the eligible sample (n = 37) found a significant main effect for gender, F(1, 
35) = 7.58, p < .001 with effects typically larger for males relative to females, but no 
significant interaction effect between trial-type and gender F(3, 105) = .33. In other 
words, although effects on the IRAP were moderated by participant gender, these 
differences were not driven by performance on one or more specific trial-types.  
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Figure 3.5. Note: positive scores reflect a “masculine” or “not-feminine” response 
pattern and negative a “feminine” or “not-masculine” response pattern.  
 
Gender-Competency IRAP.  Effects on the gender-competency IRAP were 
not all in the expected direction (Table 3.10 and Table 3.11). Significant masculine-
competent and masculine-not-incompetent effects were found as anticipated; 
however, there was also a significant feminine-competent effect for both male or 
female participants, and significant feminine-not-competent effects were found. 
Though effects were slightly larger for the trial-types corresponding to the 
participant’s own gender (i.e., effects on the feminine trial-types were larger for 
females than males and vice versa), a 2x4 repeated measures ANOVA on the eligible 
sample (n = 35) found no significant gender differences, F(1, 33) = 1.02, p =.321 and 
no significant trial-type–gender interaction effect, F(3, 99) = 1.03.  
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Figure 3.5. Note: positive scores reflect a “competent” or “not-incompetent” 
response pattern and negative an “incompetent” or “not-competent” response pattern.  
 
Table 3.10 
Means and Standard Deviations for the Gender Binary and Gender-Competency 
IRAPs 
Table 3.6 
Means and standard deviations for the gender Binary and Competency IRAPs 
IRAP Trial-Type Gender Mean SD N 
Gender Binary IRAP Men-masculine Female 0.36 0.32 20 
   Male 0.45 0.35 17 
Men-feminine  Female 0.09 0.29 20 
   Male 0.16 0.36 17 
Women-masculine Female -0.07 0.34 20 
   Male 0.06 0.29 17 
Women-feminine Female -0.21 0.30 20 
   Male 0.00 0.25 17 
Gender-Competency 
IRAP 
Masculine-Competent Female 0.34 0.34 19 
  Male 0.37 0.44 16 
 Masculine-
Incompetent  
Female 0.17 0.26 19 
  Male 0.39 0.18 16 
 Feminine-Competent Female 0.34 0.31 19 
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  Male 0.29 0.35 16 
 Feminine-Incompetent Female 0.20 0.22 19 
  Male 0.18 0.49 16 
 
Table 3.11  
 
Bonferroni-corrected one sample t-test results.  
 
IRAP Trial Type t df p 
Gender Binary Men-Masculine 7.472  36  < .001***  
 Men-Feminine 2.299  36  0.027  
 Women-Masculine -0.233  36  0.817  
 Women-Feminine -2.381  36  0.023  
Gender-Competency Masculine-Competent 5.501  34  < .001***  
 Masculine-Incompetent 6.411  34  < .001***  
 Feminine-Competent 5.737  34  < .001***  
 Feminine-Incompetent 3.088  34  0.004  
Note. * p < .05. **p <.01*** p < .001. Acceptable p-values after Bonferroni 
correction </= .00625.  
 
Hiring Preferences 
Hiring preferences for female and male participants can be found in Figure 
3.6. A visual inspection of the data reveals no notable gender differences in terms of 
preferences for individual jobs or the overall level of occupational stereotyping. 
Independent samples t-tests revealed no significant differences between males and 
females on either score (see Table 3.12).  
Table 3.12 
 
Descriptive statistics and independent-samples t-test results for the hiring task 
 
 Females Males t df p 
Gender 
preference  
M = 7.4 
SD = 1.5 
M = 7.2 
SD = 1.4 
-.62 38 .541 
 
Gender 
stereotyping 
 
M = 5.7 
SD = 2.5 
 
M = 6.4 
SD = 4.1 
 
-.49 
 
38 
 
.631 
Note. * p < .05. **p <.01*** p < .001. Acceptable p-values after Bonferroni 
correction </= .01. Gender preference scores range from 0-13 with higher scores 
indicating greater pro-male bias. Gender stereotype scores range from -10 to +10 
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with negative scores representing non-stereotypical responding and positive scores 
representing stereotypical responding.   
 
 
 
 
Figure3.6. Masculine and feminine occupational preferences (expressed in percent) 
for female participants 
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Figure 3.6. Masculine and feminine occupational preferences (expressed in percent) 
for male participants.  
Histograms were again generated to examine levels of preference and 
stereotyping for the entire sample (Figure 3.7). There was a slight pro-masculine bias 
in the sample overall, with a larger proportion of preference scores falling over the 
halfway 6.5 mark. Stereotype scores were also skewed to the right, suggesting a 
general tendency toward more stereotype-consistent than inconsistent responding.  
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Figure 3.7. Frequency distributions for overall masculine and feminine preference 
and for levels of occupational stereotyping. Note: Scores range from 0-13 for the 
preference score (higher scores reflect pro-masculine bias) and -10 to +10 for the 
stereotype score (positive scores reflect stereotypical responses and negative scores 
non-stereotypical responses). Histograms were not split by gender given the 
relatively small sample size and that independent-samples t-tests identified no 
significant differences between male and female participants.  
 
Measure Comparisons 
 Bonferroni-corrected Pearson’s correlations were conducted to examine 
potential relationships between IRAP scores, self-reported sexism, and hiring 
preferences (Table 3.12). Significant positive correlations were found between 
scores on the gender binary IRAP and the overall hiring preference score, and 
between the two hiring task scores (though this is perhaps unsurprising). No other 
significant correlations were found but all relationships were in the expected positive 
direction.   
 
 
 
Table 3.12 
 
Measure Comparisons 
 
      Gender  
binary 
IRAP  
Gender-
competency  
IRAP 
Stereotype 
Score 
Preference 
Score  
MS  
Gender  
binary 
IRAP  
Pearson's 
r  
—  
 
0.220  0.160  0.414***  0.095  
p-value  —  
 
0.106  0.175  0.006  
 
0.288   
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Gender-
competency  
IRAP  
Pearson's 
r  
   
 
—  
 
0.128  
 
0.082  
 
0.193  
 
p-value     
 
—  
 
0.235  
 
0.323  
 
0.133  
 
Stereotype  
Score  
Pearson's 
r  
   
 
   
 
—  
 
0.421***   0.163  
 
p-value     
 
   
 
—  
 
0.004  
 
0.160 
  
 
Preference 
Score  
Pearson's 
r  
   
 
   
 
   
 
—  
 
0.199  
 
p-value     
 
   
 
   
 
—  
 
0.112   
 
MS  Pearson's 
r  
   
 
   
 
   
 
   
 
—  
 
p-value     
 
   
 
   
 
   
 
—  
 
 
Note. All tests one-tailed, for positive correlation. * p < .05, ** p < .01, *** p < .001, 
one tailed. Acceptable p-values after Bonferroni correction </= .01 
 
3.4.3 Results Summary 
Responses on the gender binary IRAP were broadly consistent with previous 
studies. There were significant gender differences (as in Study Three but not Study 
Four), with bias scores higher for males relative to females, but no significant 
gender–trial-type interaction effect. For the gender-competency IRAP, scores were 
in the expected direction on the masculine trial-types, with significant masculine-
competent and masculine-not-incompetent effects found for the overall sample. 
Contrary to what was expected, however, the data also showed a significant 
feminine-competent effect and no significant feminine-incompetent effect. 
Responses also did not differ by participant gender. While these data were somewhat 
surprising, the absence of anti-feminine bias on this IRAP does cohere with the 
hiring task responses in Chapter Two. One of the items in the earlier version of the 
task measured the extent to which participants would rather fire a stereotypically 
masculine or feminine person. Responses were equally split across the two options 
(i.e., there was no particular anti-feminine bias); this suggests, as proposed by the 
Role Congruity Hypothesis, that discrimination occurs because of the implicit men-
masculinity-agency overlap rather than anti-feminine beliefs or beliefs about 
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women’s incompetence. This will be explored further in the Chapter discussion 
below.  
A significant relationship was found between the binary IRAP and an overall 
pro-masculine preference, suggesting again that binary biases play a role in 
workplace discrimination. No significant correlation was found between the two 
IRAPs in this study. These effects therefore do not cohere with the Rudman and 
Kilianski (2000) study, which found a correlation between communality-agency 
biases and gender-competency evaluations on an IAT. Again, this will be expanded 
on below in the discussion.  
3.5 Discussion 
This chapter had three aims: first, to measure and quantify gender binary 
biases using the IRAP; second, to examine the relative extent to which masculine 
and feminine traits are considered hireable; and third, to explore the relationship 
between IRAP scores and occupational hiring preferences. Across three studies, 
gender binary IRAPs were completed by a total of 147 young Irish adults. The 
relative impact of trait valence (i.e. positive or negative traits) was assessed in Study 
Three, and prescriptive/descriptive relational terms (i.e., are relative to should be) in 
Study Four. Study Five included an additional IRAP to examine gender-competency 
evaluations, or the extent to which competency and incompetency were differentially 
attributed to masculine or feminine traits. Gender preferences were assessed using a 
simulated hiring task that required participants to hire either a stereotypically 
masculine or feminine individual. Study Three used the single-item preference task 
developed and used in Chapter 2, and Studies Four and Five used a modified version 
that assessed preferences for a range of occupations. Gender differences were 
assessed throughout the Chapter, as were explicit or self-reported sexist beliefs.  
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IRAP Effects  
In the current Chapter, effects on all binary IRAPs were consistent with a 
binarist gender ideology. That is, participants readily (i.e., speedily) coordinated men 
but not women with stereotypically masculine traits, and women but not men with 
stereotypically feminine traits. While the role-incongruent effects are relatively 
subtler than the strong “men-masculine” and “women-feminine” biases, both 
response patterns are theoretically important in suggesting that male and female 
traits may not merely be distinct, but also mutually exclusive. The ability to separate 
out specific biases (e.g., using the IRAP) therefore distinguishes the current work 
from previous studies (e.g., Rudman & Glick, 2001), and allows for stronger 
theoretical conclusions. For instance, the current study provides a starting point for 
investigating the potentially asymmetrical ways in which we “gender” men relative 
to women. Several researchers have argued that masculinity is potentially a more 
rigid social construct than femininity with more well-defined boundaries (Bem, 
1993; Leaper & Friedman, 2007; Thorne, 1993; Smiler, 2006), with studies showing 
that displays of gender-nonconforming behaviour tend to be more actively punished 
in men relative to women (Adams & Coltrane, 2004; Bem, 1993; Cherry & Deaux, 
1978; Cahill & Adams, 1997; Kimmel & Messner, 2009; Leaper, 2002). As 
discussed in Chapter One, the typical explanation for this effect is that many of our 
patriarchal or male-dominated social spheres (such as politics or business) place 
more value on masculine traits, meaning that gender-role deviations are more 
problematic for men than for women (see Coltrane & Adams, 2008). In this way, 
there may be more of a resistance to ascribing feminine traits to men than masculine 
traits to women, as observed here.   
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Another related explanation for the asymmetry is that patriarchal societies 
encourage and reward agentic behaviour in women, at least to a certain degree. 
Wetherell (1986) argued that because masculinity is positioned as the ideal norm 
within the binary, “progress” for women often manifests as them assuming or 
aspiring to more masculine roles. In contrast, because femininity is cast as the 
weaker, less desirable “other”, there is less of a tendency or expectation for men to 
assume these roles. Recent surveys suggest attitudes such as these are changing 
across Western society (e.g., Bolzendahl and Myers 2004; Brewster and Padavic 
2000; Cotter et al. 2011; Fine-Davis, 2013), potentially due to the increased exposure 
of women in more traditionally male-dominated spheres (Eagly & Carli, 2007; 
Miller et al., 2018). Responses on the gender-competency IRAP cohere with this, 
given that both masculine-competent and feminine-competent effects were observed. 
This could suggest the feminine gender role is changing, or at least that femininity is 
not as under-valued as it was historically. Indeed, the absence of anti-feminine bias 
on the “firing” preference item in Chapter Two further supports this explanation. The 
overlap between masculinity, agency and hirability is still significant and does point 
to the indirect way women may experience workplace discrimination; however, 
these effects overall suggest the feminine role is more flexible and potentially varied 
relative to masculinity. This will be assessed in more detail in the pooled analyses 
planned for the end of this thesis.   
The absence of significant differences based on either trait valence or 
relational terms is also interesting to note. As mentioned above, this pattern of results 
could be interpreted as evidence that gender stereotypes are broad constructs that 
encompass a range of positive, negative, descriptive, and proscriptive norms (Eagly 
& Karau, 2002; Prentice & Carranaza, 2002). This may explain why participant 
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responses did not change across different binary IRAPS, or why similarly strong 
biases were found on both. However, these results could also be due to the IRAP’s 
potential insensitivity to such subtle stimulus or procedural modifications. Aside 
from the Remue et al. papers in the context of depression (2013, 2014), no research 
to date has examined the impact of valence or relational qualifier changes on IRAP 
effects. It is therefore difficult to know whether responses should be expected to vary 
here or not. The IAT literature also cannot inform these findings, as the IAT is a 
categorization task and does not allow for the inclusion of relational terms (e.g., such 
as are or should). Some other more recent implicit measures of relational beliefs 
suggest effects do change depending on the relational terms used (e.g., Heider, 
Spruyt & De Houwer, 2018; Tobboel, De Houwer, Dirix & Spruyt, 2017); however, 
these measures are quite procedurally different to the IRAP. A full investigation of 
this explanation would require a more detailed (and indeed more basic) 
methodological research than is possible in the current thesis, but future research 
should consider exploring this.  
With regard to gender differences, effects were stronger for males on nearly 
all trial-types, as expected. Effects were also strongest for all participants on the 
trial-type that was congruent with their own gender (i.e., the men-masculine trial 
type for males and women-feminine trial type for females) in all studies. 
Interestingly, these effects were not symmetrical across males and females, with men 
demonstrating more pronounced men-masculine and men-not-feminine biases than 
women on the comparable women-feminine and women-masculine trial types. It is 
important to note at this stage that participant gender did not exert the same impact 
across all studies, and main effects were only found in Studies Three and Five. As 
gender differences will be examined in detail using a measurement invariance 
 
 
 139 
analysis on the pooled IRAP dataset, a detailed analysis of these differences will not 
be done until the General Discussion of the thesis.   
Hiring Preferences  
 Hiring preferences across all studies supported feminist theories of 
patriarchal, male-dominated gender order. As in Chapter Two, while most people 
elected not to express a direct gender preference (i.e., between a man and a woman), 
a significant percentage of participants in Study Three elected to hire the agentic 
over the communal individual. While the individuals were not explicitly described as 
masculine or feminine, the effects on the IRAP and trait rating scale suggest these 
categories are meaningful proxies for stereotypical masculinity and femininity. The 
findings in this Chapter thus cohere with existing research showing an overlap 
between stereotypes of masculinity and occupational success (Arkkelin & Simmons, 
1985; Carli, LaFleur, & Loeber, 1995; Heilman et al, 1989; Duehr & Bono, 2006; 
Jackson & Engstrom, 2007; Powell & Butterfield, 1979, 1984, 1989; Schein, 1973, 
1975), and demonstrate that traditional masculinity remains a more valued and 
desirable construct in workplace settings.  
As with the IRAP, the absence of consistent gender differences in hiring 
preferences is worth noting at this stage. Generally speaking, research suggests men 
tend to be more conservative and display more pro-male scores on measures of 
gender beliefs (see Russell & Trigg, 2004 for a review). However, significant 
differences were only found in one of the three studies (Study Four). This could be 
due to differences in the gender beliefs across participants in these studies, however 
explicit sexism scores did not vary in a similar way across them. A more likely 
explanation is the previously mentioned issue with the masculine-agentic stimulus 
category. If these traits are not considered by women to be strongly and uniquely 
 
 
 140 
male (at least relative to the men in these studies), then the effects overall may be 
weaker for women compared to men. Indeed, studies by Jackson and Engstrom 
(2007) and Duehr and Bono (2006) both found that while male participants were 
more likely to assume an agentic leader was a man than a woman, female 
participants were not. Moreover, a study of leadership style by Schein (2001) 
suggested women (but not men) are increasingly adopting androgynous styles in the 
workplace, while a review by Eagly (2004) suggests women’s self-concept has 
become considerably more agentic in recent decades. Again, these claims will be 
informed by the more detailed gender difference analyses planned for later in the 
thesis.  
 In addition to demonstrating an overall pro-masculine/agentic bias, Studies 
Four and Five found significant gender stereotyping in hiring preferences. Both male 
and female participants tended towards hiring the feminine-communal person for 
jobs traditionally associated with women and the masculine-agentic person for jobs 
traditionally associated with men. These data are consistent with previous research 
into the sex differentiation of different careers (i.e., the jobs considered typically 
female and male: e.g., Rueben et al., 2017); however, the current study is one of the 
first to examine gender role stereotypes in this context. That is, the extent to which 
agentic and communal traits are more hireable for different occupational roles. Very 
little research has examined occupational trait stereotypes in an Irish context, so 
these studies make a unique contribution to the contemporary literature on workplace 
gender discrimination in Ireland.  
 As the current set of studies focused exclusively on hiring potential, future 
research should explore whether binary biases are associated with other forms of 
occupational discrimination. For instance, experiments could examine biases towards 
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hiring role-congruent over incongruent individuals (i.e., agentic versus communal 
women, etc.), as has been done previously (see Isaac et al., 2009 for a meta-
analysis). Drawing from the research into leadership discrimination and the “glass 
ceiling”/“labyrinth” models of inequality (Eagly & Karau, 2002), research may also 
look at the relationship between binary biases and a willingness to promote or 
consider a woman for a leadership role. System justification in occupational settings 
could be another important area for future investigation, given that previous studies 
have found a relationship between sexist beliefs and a tendency to justify or 
naturalize systems of inequality (Glick & Fiske, 2001; Jost et al., 2005; Skewes et 
al., 2018). Organizational analyses suggest much of the prejudice experienced by 
women in the workplace is systemic and indirect (e.g., gender-biased policies, etc.: 
see Stamarski & Son Hing, 2015), so it is possible that binary biases predict the 
acceptance or endorsement of such practices.  
Relationship of IRAP Scores to Hiring Preferences 
 While the IRAP did not correlate with explicit sexism in any study, the 
descriptive gender binary IRAP was associated with a pro-masculine hiring 
preference in Studies Four and Five (note that measure comparisons could not be 
done in Study Three due to the skewed data). These results are similar to the small 
number of studies that have been conducted in this area (Rudman & Glick, 2001; 
Latu et al., 2011) and supports the mainstream feminist argument that the binary 
plays a role in discrimination (Butler, 2002; Hegarty et al., 2018). Interestingly, there 
was no relationship between gender-competency evaluations or indeed prescriptive 
IRAP scores; there was also no relationship between any IRAP scores and gender 
stereotyping biases. The paucity of research directly assessing the role of implicit 
bias in hiring discrimination makes it difficult to interpret either the significant or 
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insignificant effects, and these data would require substantiation in order to draw any 
conclusions. That said, however, there does appear to be some relationship between 
the extent to which gender categories are binarized on the IRAP and a tendency to 
value masculinity in occupational settings. The absence of any correlations between 
self-reported sexism and either hiring task or IRAP scores should be noted at this 
stage; however, this will be discussed in more detail after the pooled analysis at the 
end of the thesis.  
Conclusions  
These data provided preliminary evidence for the IRAP’s utility as a measure 
of binary biases. While the effects produced by the task are novel, they do cohere 
with existing social psychological, feminist, and social constructionist models of 
gender. Studies in this chapter also provided support for theories of patriarchal or 
male-dominated gender order, at least in occupational settings. Specifically, in 
demonstrating that agency is more both hireable and more readily ascribed to men, 
the data obtained here provides direct evidence of the implicit societal overlap 
between masculinity and occupational success. Future experiments will now assess 
the relationship of IRAP scores to other socially-relevant beliefs and behaviours. 
They will also explore in more detail the gender differences, which varied across 
studies here.  
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Chapter 4 
Binary Biases and Androcentrism 
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4.1 Introduction 
As noted in the General Introduction, male dominance under patriarchy 
generally manifests in two ways: male supremacy and male centrality (e.g., Butler, 
2002; Ridgeway, 2011). The previous two chapters focused primarily on male 
supremacy, demonstrating a link between participants’ tendencies to binarize gender 
and prioritize maleness/masculinity in a socially-valued setting (the workplace). The 
current chapter will expand on these findings by examining whether gender binary 
biases are also associated with a tendency to centralize and/or normalize maleness. 
That is, a tendency to assume that men are more prototypically human than women. 
Across two studies, samples of undergraduate students will complete IRAPs 
measuring gender binary and other human-as-male biases. In addition, participants in 
both studies will complete a measure of “androcentric bias”, which may broadly be 
defined as the practice of equating humanity with maleness (Bem, 1996).  
In this chapter, participants’ bias towards assuming or attributing greater 
humanity to men will be measured using both implicit and explicit measures. Study 
Four will assess the relationship between scores on the gender binary IRAP, 
participant gender, and androcentric bias. As no measure of androcentric bias existed 
that suited the needs of the current studies, a measure was developed that required 
participants to choose either “male” or “female” when presented with a gender-
ambiguous stimulus. Study Five will be identical except for the IRAPs; instead of 
gender binary biases, this study will examine the extent to which participants 
differentially relate men and women with complex or “uniquely human” 
characteristics. Two IRAPs will be used for this purpose, with the first measuring 
associations between gender and uniquely human emotions, and the second gender 
and scientific ability.  
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4.2 Study Six 
Measuring Androcentric Bias  
As mentioned in Chapter One, feminists have long acknowledged the male-
centric nature of Western societal practices (Gillman, 1911; De Beauvoir, 1979). 
These range from the androcentric biases in language (e.g., masculine generics or 
universals) to the various societal practices which normalize and centralize 
masculinity (e.g., the centrality of men or male stories in media, history, scientific 
practice, etc.: Bem, 1993: Hegarty, 2006). While there are several ways to analyse 
androcentric practices at the cultural level, androcentrism has received comparably 
little attention in the laboratory (Bailey, LaFrance & Dovidio, 2018). Of the research 
that has been conducted, most has explored how exposure to androcentric language 
or information (e.g., sex-biased terms or masculine generics) may influence gender 
cognition or behaviour. Hamilton (1991) and Ng (1990), for example, both revealed 
that presenting participants with masculine generic terms (e.g., mankind) resulted in 
significantly more male-biased mental imagery than gender-neutral terms (e.g., 
they). Other studies similarly found that masculine generics or sex-biased language 
increased the likelihood of attributing a male gender to a gender-neutral or 
ambiguous character (Bailey & LaFrance, 2016; DeLoache, Cassidy, & Carpenter, 
1987; Gastil, 1990; Miller, Taylor, & Buck, 1991; Moyer, 1997; van Berkel, Molina, 
& Mukherjee, 2017). Eagly and Kite (1987) used a different approach, instead 
assessing the relative extent to which men and women are considered typical 
humans. In their study, they asked participants to rate stereotypically male and 
female traits in terms of how typically human they are, revealing a significant effect 
between typically male and human traits. Two studies by Bailey and colleagues also 
found participants more readily paired gender-inclusive words (e.g., people) with 
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male faces than with female faces (Bailey & LaFrance, 2018), and selected more 
male faces when asked to identify the typical human (Bailey et al., 2018). 
Interestingly, the second Bailey et al. study also explored the relationship between 
“gender polarization” (defined as the extent to which participants believe men and 
women are opposites) and androcentric bias, though it found no significant effect. 
With regards to gender differences in androcentric behaviour or bias, results are 
varied; some suggest men are more likely to produce male imagery and women more 
likely to remain neutral (Gastil, 1990; Switzer, 1990). However, other studies have 
found no difference in androcentric behaviour between male and female participants 
(Eagly & Kite, 1987; Lambdin et al., 2003).  
While the above humanity-attribution or human-gender matching paradigms 
provide useful insights into androcentric thinking, no measure currently exists that 
assess participants’ likelihood of assuming maleness in the abstract; that is, their 
androcentric preference independently of specific cues (e.g., masculine generics). 
Such assumptions may be theoretically important as they could represent a 
generalized propensity to centralize men or maleness relative to women, which has 
not been examined to date. The current chapter will therefore employ a novel task 
developed by the researchers for the specific purposes of these studies. This task will 
require participants to attribute gender to a neutral stimulus, and will have a binary, 
forced-choice response format (e.g., male or female). Similar to other recent research 
in this area (Bailey & LaFrance, 2018; Bailey et al., 2018), the task will use facial 
stimuli and will require participants to attribute a gender to an ambiguous, composite 
facial stimulus. 
Current Study 
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Study Four will assess the relationship between gender binary and human-as-
male (i.e., androcentric) biases. The same gender binary IRAP as in Chapter Two 
will be used here, and androcentrism will be measured using a novel task in which 
participants will evaluate a gender-ambiguous stimulus as either male or female. 
Based on the theoretical and empirical literature in this area, it is hypothesised that a 
greater number of participants will rate the gender-ambiguous stimulus as “male” 
rather than “female”. Similarly, given the existing literature and the response pattern 
observed thus far in this thesis, it is expected that men may be more likely than 
women to select the male response option. As no research to date has looked at the 
relationship between implicit gender-binary biases and any form of androcentrism, 
no specific hypotheses are proposed around the relationship between IRAP scores 
and responses on the androcentrism task. However, it is tentatively expected based 
on feminist theorizing that more pronounced IRAP scores will be associated with a 
tendency to attribute a male gender to an ambiguous stimulus, and that this may 
interact with participant gender.  
4.2.1 Method 
Participants 
Forty-four White Irish undergraduate students aged between 18 and 27 
participated in this study (25 female, 19 male; Mage = 20.8). Sampling, recruitment 
methods and inclusion criteria were the same as the previous study. Procedure 
The experimental sequence including instructions and debriefing information 
were identical to previous studies. The order of the tasks was as follows: 
androcentrism task, IRAP, Modern Sexism Scale.  
Materials 
 The gender binary IRAP and MS scale were identical to previous studies.  
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Androcentrism Task 
While androcentrism is a broad ideological construct that can manifest in 
multiple ways (Bailey et al., 2018), it was operationalized here as a tendency to 
assume maleness when presented with gender ambiguity. As no validated measure of 
(abstract) androcentric bias existed in the literature, a brief empirical assessment was 
developed in which participants had to assign a gender to an image of a gender-
neutral face. In this task, participants were presented with a series of seven faces, one 
of which was the “target” composite gender-neutral image. The additional six faces 
ranged from very female to very male and were included both to provide a range and 
to conceal the purpose of the study from participants. The gender-neutral image was 
created using composite image software. All images were obtained from the 
following two datasets and permission was granted from the lead author for their 
reuse: Rhodes, Hickford and Jeffrey (2000) and Rhodes, Jacquet, Jeffrey, 
Evangelista, Keane and Calder (2011). Participants were required to select either 
“male” or “female” for all seven faces, which were presented one at a time and in a 
fixed random order (Appendix 8). The following instructions were provided prior to 
the task:  
“Below you will be presented with a series of faces. For each image, please select 
whether you think the person is male or female. There is no need to spend too long 
on each item, but do try and be as accurate as possible.” 
Response options were presented on-screen below each face and the order of the 
male/female responses was randomized across items. As we are only interested in 
the responses for the gender-neutral image, the androcentrism task produced a single 
categorical variable: female or male choice.  
Ethical Issues 
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Ethical issues and procedures were identical to the previous studies.  
 
Data processing and analysis 
 IRAP data were processed in an identical manner to studies one and two and 
participants were excluded using the same criteria. Five participants were excluded 
on this basis (final n = 39) 
4.2.2 Results 
Androcentrism Task 
Responses for the androcentrism task are in Table 4.1. For the ambiguous 
facial stimulus, responses were nearly evenly split across the sample (i.e., broadly 
equal numbers of participants attributed a female as a male gender). A chi-square 
goodness of fit test found no significant deviation towards either the male or female 
response option, p = .89, and a chi-square test of independence found no significant 
relation between participant gender and the male/female response option, X2 (1, N = 
44) = 1.39, p = .24.  
Table 4.1  
Reponses on the Androcentrism task by Gender  
 Participant gender   
Androcentrism Task  Female  Male  Total  
Selected “Female”   15   8   23   
Selected “Male”   10   11   21   
Total   25   19   44   
  
Modern Sexism Scale 
MS scores for this sample were again somewhat low and skewed to the left 
of the scale (M = 18.6, SD = 5.7; possible range 10-50).  An independent samples t-
test found no difference between male (M = 19.05, SD = 4.99) and female (M = 
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18.24, SD = 6.2) participants, t(42) = -.47, p = .643, though male scores were slightly 
higher.  
IRAP Performance  
 Effects on the gender binary IRAP were similar to previous studies (see 
Figure 4.1 for a graphical depiction and Table 4.2 for means and standard 
deviations). Male and female response patterns did not differ notably, though DIRAP 
scores were slightly more binary-consistent for men. That is, males demonstrated 
more positive scores on the men trial-types and more negative scores on the women 
trial-types.    
Figure 4.1 Mean binary IRAP trial-type scores for female and male participants  
 
 
Figure 4.1. Mean trial-type level DIRAP scores for male and female participants. 
Note: DIRAP scores can range from -2 to +2. Positive scores reflect a “masculine” or 
“not-feminine” response pattern and negative a “feminine” or “not-masculine” 
response pattern.  
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Table 4.2 
Means and standard deviations for the Binary IRAP trial-types 
Trial-Type Gender N Mean  SD 
Men-masculine Female 24 0.23 0.41 
   Male 15 0.45 0.48 
Men-feminine  Female 24 0.15 0.31 
   Male 15 0.21 0.41 
Women-masculine Female 24 -0.02 0.30 
   Male 15 -0.19 0.41 
Women-feminine Female 24 -0.31 0.34 
   Male 15 -0.31 0.40 
 
One sample t-tests were run to assess the significance of the trial-type effects 
against zero (Table 4.3). These were run on the entire sample to minimize the 
number of comparisons, and a Bonferroni correction was applied (reducing the 
acceptable p-value to .00125). As in previous studies, significant men-masculine, 
women-feminine and men-not-feminine effects were found.  
Table 4.3 
One-sample t-test results for IRAP trial-types  
Trial-Type t df p 
Men-masculine 4.397  38  < .001***  
Men-feminine 3.207  38  0.003***  
Women-masculine -1.537  38  0.133  
Women-feminine -5.433  38  < .001***  
Note.  *p < .05, **p < .01Acceptable p-values after Bonferroni correction </= .0125 
Measure and Group Comparisons 
 Gender, Androcentric Bias, and IRAP scores 
A 2x2x4 repeated measures ANOVA was conducted to examine the 
relationship between participant gender (2 levels: male or female), androcentric bias 
(2 levels: male or female assumption), and trial-type level IRAP scores (4 levels). 
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There was no main effect for gender, F(1, 35) = .004, p = .947, or androcentric bias, 
F(1, 35) = 2.27, p = .14, though there was a significant two-way interaction effect 
between androcentric bias and trial type, F(3, 105) = 20.78, p = .014. No other 
significant interaction effects were found (all ps > .4).  
Follow up independent-samples t-tests were run to investigate which trial-
type/s were potentially driving the differences in IRAP effects between those who 
chose the male relative to the female. These analyses revealed a significant 
difference on the men-masculine trial-type only, t(37) = -3.5, p < .001, with scores 
higher for participants who assumed male (M = .523, N = 20) than female (M = .088, 
N = 19). No other significant differences were found on any of the other trial-types 
(all ps > .1), though participants who chose the male had more binary-consistent 
effects on all four. Given the relatively small sample size of this study and the 
number of comparisons being made, however, this effect should be interpreted 
cautiously.   
Gender, Androcentric Bias and Modern Sexism 
A 2x2 ANOVA was conducted to examine any relationship between gender, 
androcentric bias, and scores on the Modern Sexism Scale. There was no main effect 
for gender, F(1, 40) = .106, p = .75, or androcentric bias, F(1, 40) = .89, p = .35.  
Modern Sexism and IRAP Scores  
A Pearson’s r analysis found no significant relationship between overall 
DIRAP effects and MS scores, r(35) = .019, p = .45.   
4.2.3 Summary 
Response patterns on the IRAP were the same as in previous studies, though 
there were no significant gender differences. This will not be discussed here as 
gender differences will be explored in more detail towards the end of this thesis in 
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the chapter devoted to pooled analyses. For the androcentrism task, participants were 
not more likely to assume maleness in the context of gender ambiguity. This is in 
slight contrast to existing research and theory in this area. However, the existing 
research has focused predominantly on attributions of humanity to male/female 
stimuli, or to the relative impact of androcentric cues on mental imagery (Eagly & 
Kite, 1987; Hamilton, 1991; Bailey et al., 2018) or andro/gynocentric response 
options (e.g., Lambdin et al., 2003). As this is the first study to assess androcentric 
bias in the abstract– that is, the tendency to attribute maleness or femaleness to a 
gender-neutral stimulus independently of specific cues or additional information – it 
is difficult to interpret this outcome. However, this task will be replicated in Study 
Seven, which will further inform the conclusions drawn here.   
Concerning the relationship between the measures, it is interesting to note 
that a male choice was associated with binarist effects on the IRAP (specifically 
speedier responding to male-masculine-true), though this did not interact with 
participant gender. Effects are thus broadly similar to the results of the Bailey et al. 
(2018) study, which found no relationship between gender polarization (measured on 
an explicit rating scale) and androcentric bias, although the specific relationship to 
the male-masculine trial-type should be followed up in future studies. There was no 
relationship between explicit sexism and androcentric bias, and this effect also did 
not vary according to participant gender. Again, this analysis was likely 
underpowered because the sample size was low and there were multiple pair-wise 
comparisons, but this issue will be addressed in the following study.    
4.3 Study Seven 
 The previous study tested the theoretical assumption that gender binarization 
is related to a tendency to assume maleness in the context of gender ambiguity (e.g., 
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Bem, 1996). Results on the androcentrism task were not in the expected direction, 
and the relationship between the IRAP and androcentric bias task were weaker than 
expected. Study Seven will expand on these data by (1) replicating the androcentrism 
task to increase the power and confidence in the results obtained, and (2) assessing 
whether androcentric bias is related to effects on other more attitudinally similar 
gender IRAPs. Two novel IRAPs will be included which together measure the extent 
to which participants differentially associate men and women with rationality, 
complexity and logic. One will examine gender-science stereotypes (and thus the 
differential ascription of scientific or reasoning abilities to different gender groups) 
and the other infrahumanisation biases. The significance of both to a study of 
androcentrism – and indeed gender ideology more generally – will be discussed 
below.   
Infrahumanisation  
Labelled the “emotional side of prejudice”, infrahumanisation refers to the 
societal or psychological tendency to view members of a particular social group as 
less or sub-human (Leyens et al., 2000, 2001, 2003). Somewhat distinct from the 
concept of dehumanization, which describes the more explicit stereotyping of social 
groups as animals or objects (e.g., referring to a woman as “it”, or the “Negro-ape” 
metaphor: see Rudman & Mescher, 2012), infrahumanisation describes the subtler 
denial of uniquely human characteristics, abilities or emotions to one social group 
over another (see Demoulin et al., 2002). Uniquely human traits refer here to those 
which distinguish humans from simpler species, and so include higher-order 
cognitive abilities and emotions (e.g., rationality or compassion). In contrast, non-
uniquely human traits would be those shared between humans and other simpler 
mammals or primates (e.g., rudimentary forms of intelligence or basic emotions). 
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The tendency to infrahumanize and deny complex humanity to social groups has 
been demonstrated in numerous contexts. Using basic infrahumanisation paradigms 
in which participants relate in and outgroups with primary (i.e., simpler) or 
secondary (i.e., higher order) emotions, several studies demonstrate the 
pervasiveness of this bias towards outgroups in contexts of race, culture and 
ethnicity (e.g., Cortes, Demoulin, Rodriguez, Rodriguez, & Leyens, 2005; Demoulin 
et al., 2009; Gaunt, 2009; Gaunt, Leyens & Demoulin, 2002; Paladino, Vaes, 
Castano, Demoulin, & Leyens, 2004; Rohmann, Niedenthal, Brauer, Castano, & 
Leyens, 2009). Studies also suggest these biases are relatively automatic, with 
similar effects found on implicit measures such as the IAT (e.g., Boccato, Cortes, 
Demoulin, & Leyens, 2007; Viki et al., 2009). As with androcentrism or other 
seemingly benevolent beliefs, infrahumanisation biases are considered harmful and 
have been shown to increase the likelihood of intergroup conflict and discrimination 
(e.g., Cuddy, Rock, & Norton, 2007; Pereira, Vala, & Leyens, 2009; Vaes, Paladino, 
& Leyens, 2004).  
Gender Infrahumanisation  
While infrahumanisation has predominantly been studied in the context of 
race and ethnicity, there is a rationale for exploring these biases in the context of 
gender. First, if patriarchal societies are indeed androcentric (Bem, 1996, Pilcher & 
Whelehan, 2004), then it is likely that men will be afforded greater humanity and/or 
complexity than women. Second, while not as widely studied as ingroup/outgroup 
biases, some studies suggest that infrahumanisation does occur across high/low 
status groups (e.g., between blue and white-collar jobs; Leyens et al., 2001). As men 
are the higher status group under patriarchy, similar effects may be observed across 
gender categories. Indeed, Fiske et al. (2001) found that infrahumanisation correlated 
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with stereotypes about a group’s reduced competence or status; as competency 
stereotypes have been shown to be gendered (e.g., Eagly & Karau, 2002), this may 
mean women are more likely to be infrahumanised relative to men. Third, there is 
considerable conceptual overlap between the “uniquely human” characteristics and 
traditional masculine-agentic stereotypes (i.e., in terms of the shared rationality, 
logic, and capacity to disregard basic emotions: see Adam, 1995 and Weber, 2005). 
As such, it is possible that some bias towards association these traits with men will 
be found here.  
Some research to date has explored infrahumanisation in the context of 
gender, all using self-report measures. Using the same basic primary/secondary 
emotion attribution paradigm described above, Viki and Abrams (2003) and Gaunt 
(2013) both explored the relationship between sexist beliefs and infrahumanisation. 
Interestingly, these studies reported effects in the opposite direction (i.e., secondary 
emotions were more readily attributed to women than men), though these effects 
were mediated by both gender beliefs and participant gender. Specifically, across 
both papers, male participants high in “hostile sexism” (explicitly negative or hateful 
beliefs about women: see Glick & Fiske, 1995) attributed primary emotions to 
women, while men high in “benevolent sexism” (well-intentioned but patronizing 
beliefs about women) had an increased likelihood of attributing secondary emotions 
to women. No significant effect was found for female participants in either direction, 
though in both studies women scored significantly lower on hostile and benevolent 
sexism.  
No research to date has examined gender infrahumanisation using an implicit 
measure. However, given that research in other contexts suggest these biases are 
relatively automatic (e.g., Viki et al., 2009) combined with the IRAP’s utility in 
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separating out biases at the trial-type level (i.e., its ability to measure men/women-
complex/simple biases simultaneously), an IRAP analysis of gender 
infrahumanisation may prove a useful addition to the literature. Two studies have 
explored gender dehumanization biases using an implicit paradigm, both exploring 
the differential association of men and women with object and animal stimuli. Using 
the IAT, Rudman and Mescher (2012) found that women were more strongly 
associated with inanimate objects than were men. Interestingly, this study also 
revealed a relationship between women-object IAT scores and sexual harassment 
proclivity. Hussey et al. (2015) similarly found associations of women but not men 
with inanimate objects on an IRAP. The current study will use a similar approach but 
instead of animal/object associations, will measure the association of 
primary/secondary emotions with gender groups.   
Considering that studies in this thesis use both male and female samples, it is 
important that the studies can separate out in/outgroup bias from beliefs about gender 
categories. That is, it is important that the study does not merely measure male and 
female participants’ in-group biases, given that this would not be the focus of the 
current thesis. According to Gaunt (2013), while prejudice in many intergroup 
contexts is determined by group membership (i.e., White vs. Black racial difference, 
etc.), gender dynamics are fundamentally different. Building on the claims made in 
Ambivalent Sexism Theory that both women and men may exhibit gender prejudice 
due to having access to the same mainstream gender ideology and information (Glick 
& Fiske, 2001), Gaunt suggests it is a person’s core gender beliefs and not their 
group membership per se that is more relevant to an analysis of gender 
infrahumanisation. As such, it is possible that both men and women would attribute 
less complex humanity to women, and that this may be influenced or mediated by 
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gender binary biases. Misogyny, sexism and traditional gender beliefs are typically 
higher in men than women (see Russell & Trigg, 2004), so the interaction between 
infrahumanisation biases and participant gender would still be important to measure.  
Gender-Science Biases  
Given the broader focus in this chapter on gendered associations of complex 
humanity, it may also be interesting to explore gender biases related to scientific 
ability. According to a review by Leyens et al. (2001), intelligence is one of the three 
most cited characteristics associated with humanity (along with secondary emotions 
and language). While intelligence is of course a multi-faceted construct, theoretical 
and lay definitions of intellectual ability do overlap considerably with abilities 
associated with scientific inquiry (i.e., the capacity to reason, learn, problem solve 
and adapt to a changing environment; Neisser et al., 1996; Sternberg, 1981), and 
STEM careers are generally rated among the careers requiring the highest IQ 
(Richardson & Norgate, 2015). As such, the differential association of men and 
women with science careers may represent a useful proxy assessment of their 
perceived capacity for complex or higher-order reasoning ability.  
Gender-science stereotypes are well-established in the literature and have 
been documented across a series of cultural contexts. A recent study of more than 
350,000 participants across 66 nations, for example, found significant “scientist-as-
male” stereotypes in all contexts, and particularly those with low representation of 
women in science (Miller, Eagly, & Linn, 2015). Another study by Smyth and Nosek 
(2015) found significant male-favouring science stereotypes among a sample of over 
176,000 college graduates, with effects again significantly higher in male-dominated 
and STEM disciplines. Content analyses of scientist depictions in textbooks, 
advertisements and online image searches similarly note a bias towards a male 
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representative (Pew Research Centre, 2018; Potter & Rosser, 1992; Barbercheck, 
2001), while a recent meta-analysis of studies employing the “draw-a-scientist” 
paradigm showed both children’s and adults’ sketches of a prototypical scientist are 
significantly more likely to be male (Miller, Nolla, Eagly & Uttal, 2018). The 
Gender-Science IAT available online at ProjectImplicit, for example, has been 
completed over 500,000 times (Zitelny, Shalom & Bar-Anan, 2017). Using common 
careers associated with STEM and the arts (e.g., Biology vs. English), this IAT has 
reliably documented a bias towards associating women with arts/humanities and men 
with science/math (Kessels, Rau, & Hannover, 2006; Lane, Goh, & Driver-Linn, 
2012; Nosek, Banaji, & Greenwald, 2002; Nosek et al., 2007; Nosek & Smyth, 
2011). While the IRAP has not to date been used in this context, it may have certain 
procedural advantages to the IAT. Specifically, given that it can assess biases at the 
trial-type level, it may provide further insight into whether the effects are driven by 
men-science biases, women-arts biases, or both. 
As with other gender beliefs discussed in this thesis (e.g., leadership 
stereotypes), gender-science stereotypes are believed to originate early in life from 
our broader gender ideologies (e.g., Bian, Leslie & Cimpian, 2017). Miller, Nolla, 
Eagly and Uttal (2018), for instance, recently extended Eagly’s Social Role Theory 
to gender-science stereotypes, suggesting that assumptions of greater scientific 
ability in men are due in large part to the communality-agency gender role 
distinction. According to these authors, this differentiation means there is a cultural 
congruity between masculine agency and scientific ability, meaning that men seem 
more naturally suited to STEM careers. Indeed, a recent study by Carli and 
colleagues explored the relationship between gender, communality/agency 
stereotypes and the stereotypes associated with a successful scientist. As would be 
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expected, this study found that agentic traits were significantly more likely to be 
ascribed to both men and scientists (but not women), while communal traits were 
associated with women (but not men or scientists: Carli, Alawa, Lee, Zhao & Kim, 
2016). In keeping with the findings thus far in this thesis, however, female 
participants also perceived more similarity between women and scientists than male 
participants and they also rated women as significantly more agentic. This study thus 
points to the relevance of gender-science stereotypes to our broader gender ideology, 
and the way in which communality-agency and participant gender mediate gender-
science stereotypes.  
Current Study  
The goal of the current study is to further assess the centrality of men within 
a binarist gender system. Using the same androcentric bias task as Study Six, the 
current study will examine the relationship of androcentrism to other implicit gender 
biases. Two IRAPs will be employed: the first will assess gendered associations of 
simple and complex emotions, and the second gender-science stereotypes. Across 
both IRAPs, it is hypothesised participants will more readily associate men with 
more “uniquely human” characteristics (operationalized here as complex/secondary 
emotions and scientific ability). As in previous studies, weaker effects are expected 
for the role-incongruent trial-types for women relative to men (i.e., on the women-
complex or women-science trial-types). Concerning the relationship between 
measures, gender theory would suggest that effects on these IRAPs would be related 
to a tendency to assume maleness when presented with gender ambiguity (i.e., 
androcentric bias: Bem, 1993; Bailey et al., 2018). However, this is only a tentative 
and exploratory hypothesis based on the absence of any IRAP-androcentrism 
relationship in the previous study.  
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4.3.1 Method 
Participants 
Fifty-nine White Irish undergraduate students aged between 19 and 26 
participated in this study (30 identified as female, 29 as male; Mage = 20.51). 
Sampling, recruitment methods and inclusion criteria were the same as the previous 
study.  
Procedure 
The experimental sequence including instructions and debriefing information 
were identical to previous studies, with one exception. As with all IRAPs, the 
infrahumanisation IRAP required the presentation of stimulus category labels in the 
pre-block rule and instruction screens. While there are potentially multiple category 
labels that could have been used, the current study employed the labels “complex 
emotions” and “simple emotions”. This was because other theoretically meaningful 
labels (e.g., primary/secondary emotions, more/less human, etc.) were deemed 
unlikely to form an intuitive or natural stimulus category for participants. However, 
as the “complex” and “simple” emotions were also potentially weak categories, 
participants were provided with a stimulus reference sheet prior to the study 
(Appendix 9), similar to the masculine/feminine trait reference sheet used in Chapter 
Three. Participants were instructed to learn the stimulus classes and to only start 
once they felt comfortable, and could consult the sheet between blocks if needed. 
The task structure (including the response options and block structure) of the IRAP 
was identical to previous. The order of the tasks was as follows: androcentric bias 
task, two IRAPs (the order was counterbalanced across participants), and self-report 
measure of sexism.  
Materials 
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Androcentric Bias Task 
The measure of androcentric bias was identical to study four.  
IRAPs 
Two separate IRAPs were employed in this study: one for infrahumanisation 
biases (men-complex/women-simple) and one for gender-science biases (men-
science/women-arts). Stimuli for the infrahumanisation IRAP were obtained from 
lists of primary and secondary emotions in Demoulin et al. (2009; see Table 4.4). As 
in Demoulin et al., stimuli were matched for valence and broad meaning across the 
two categories (i.e., “Contempt” with “Anger”, and so on). For the gender-science 
IRAP, the arts and science subject categories were identical to those used in the 
ProjectImplicit gender-science IAT. This was accessed via the ProjectImplicit  
website (www.projectimplicit.org) in September 2015.  
Table 4.4 
 
Stimulus categories for the infrahumanisation and gender-science IRAP 
 
Infrahumanisation IRAP 
Label 
1: 
Men 
Label 
2: 
Women 
Target 1: 
Complex 
emotions 
Target 2:  
Simple 
emotions 
Rule A Rule B 
Men 
feel 
Women 
feel  
Apprehension 
Contempt 
Pride 
Disappointment 
 
Fear 
Anger 
Happiness 
Sadness 
 
Please 
respond 
as if men 
feel 
complex 
emotions 
and 
women 
feel 
simple 
emotions 
Please 
respond 
as if 
women 
feel 
complex 
emotions 
and men 
feel 
simple 
emotions 
Gender-Science IRAP 
Label 1: 
Men 
Label 2: 
Women 
Target 1: 
Science 
subjects 
Target 2:  
Arts  
subjects 
Rule A Rule B 
Men do 
 
Women do Biology 
Physics 
Philosophy 
Arts 
Please 
respond as 
Please 
respond 
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Chemistry 
Maths 
Engineering 
Literature 
English 
Music 
if men do 
science 
subjects 
and 
women do 
arts 
subjects 
as if 
women do 
science 
subjects 
and men 
do arts 
subjects 
 
Modern Sexism Scale. 
The version of the MS in this study was identical to previous studies.   
Ethical Issues 
Ethical issues and procedures were identical to the previous studies.  
 
Data processing and analysis 
 Data were processed in an identical manner to studies one and two and 
participants were excluded using the same criteria. Four participants were excluded 
from the infrahumanisation IRAP (final n = 56) and two from the gender-science 
IRAP (final n = 58) on this basis.   
4.3.2 Results 
Androcentric Bias 
 As evidenced by the figures in Table 4.5, a noticeably larger proportion of 
participants attributed a female gender to the gender-ambiguous face. A chi-square 
goodness-of-fit test assuming a test value of .5 (i.e., a 50/50 response split) indicated 
the distribution was significantly skewed towards assuming female (p < .001). A chi-
square test of independence found no significant relation between participant gender 
and the male/female response option, X2 (1, N = 59) = 1.61, p = .448. 
Table 4.5 
Reponses on the Androcentrism task by Gender  
 Participant Gender  
Androcentrism task Female Male Total 
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Selected “Female” 21 22 43 
Selected “Male” 9 7 16 
 
 
Modern Sexism Scale 
Sexism scores were slightly higher than previous studies but were again 
skewed to the left of the scale (M = 20.51, SD = 6.52). An independent samples t-test 
found no significant difference between males (M = 21.52, SD = 5.74) and females 
(M = 19.53, SD = 7.15), t(57) = -1.17, p = .25. 
IRAP Performance 
Infrahumanisation IRAP 
Effects on the infrahumanisation IRAP do not seem particularly pronounced 
in either a men-complex/women-simple or women-complex/men-simple direction 
(see Figure 4.2). Mean DIRAP scores are positive for both the men-complex and 
women-complex trial-types, indicating that participants were faster to respond “true” 
relative to “false” for both men-complex and women-complex stimulus pairings. 
Bonferroni-corrected one-sample t-tests for the entire sample revealed significant 
effects on the women-complex trial-type only (see Table 4.7). These analyses again 
assumed a test value of 0. The only notable gender differences in responses seem to 
be on the men-simple trial-type, with stronger effects for female over male 
participants.   
Figure 4.2 Mean infrahumanisation IRAP trial-type scores for female and male 
participants  
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Figure 4.2. Note: positive scores reflect a “complex” or “not-simple” response 
pattern and negative a “simple” or “not-complex” response pattern.  
 
Table 4.6 
Means and standard deviations for the Infrahumanisation IRAP 
Trial-Type Gender Mean SD N 
Men-Complex Female 0.09 0.33 27 
   Male 0.11 0.38 29 
Men-Simple  Female 0.10 0.27 27 
   Male -0.13 0.29 29 
Women-Complex Female 0.16 0.39 27 
   Male 0.16 0.37 29 
Women-Simple Female 0.08 0.32 27 
   Male 0.06 0.36 29 
 
Table 4.7 
One-sample t-test results for the Infrahumanisation IRAP 
 t df p 
Men-complex 2.118  55  0.039*  
Men-simple -0.425  55  0.673  
Women-complex 3.183  55  0.002**  
Women-simple 1.469  55  0.148  
Note.  *p < .05, **p < .01. Acceptable p-values after Bonferroni correction </= .0125 
Gender-Science IRAP 
 The response pattern on the gender-science IRAP was somewhat surprising: 
there were significant men-science and men-not-arts biases as expected; however, 
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there were also significant women-science effects and no significant women-arts 
effects (see Table 4.8).  
Figure 4.3 Mean gender-science IRAP trial-type scores for female and male 
participants  
 
 
Figure 4.3. Note: positive scores reflect a “science” or “not-arts” response pattern 
and negative an “arts” or “not-science” response pattern.  
 
Table 4.8 
Means and standard deviations for the Gender-Science IRAP 
Trial-Type Gender Mean SD N 
Men-Science Female 0.36 0.34 30 
 Male 0.45 0.37 28 
Men-Arts Female 0.20 0.31 30 
 Male 0.10 0.35 28 
Women-Science Female 0.23 0.44 30 
 Male 0.12 0.34 28 
Women-Arts  Female 0.11 0.34 30 
 Male 0.01 0.40 28 
 
Table 4.9 
One-sample t-test results for the Gender-Science IRAP  
 t df p 
Men-science 8.665  57  < .001*** 
Men-arts 3.452  57  0.001***  
Women-science 3.412  57  0.001***  
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Women-arts 1.265  57  0.211  
Note.  *p < .05, **p < .01. Acceptable p-values after Bonferroni correction </= .0125 
Measure/Group Comparisons 
 Gender, Androcentric Bias and IRAP Performance 
The relationship between gender, androcentric bias and IRAP performance 
was assessed using 2x2x4 repeated measures ANOVAs (one for each IRAP). For the 
infrahumanisation IRAP (n = 56), no significant main effect was found for either 
gender, F(1, 52) = .95, p =  .34, or androcentric bias, F(1, 52) = .99, p = .33, and no 
significant two- or three-way interaction effects were found (all ps > .4). There were 
also no significant group differences on the gender-science IRAP (n = 58) between 
either males and females, F(1, 54) = 2.19, p = .15, or participants who assumed 
maleness relative to femaleness, F(1, 54) = .19, p = .66, and no significant 
interaction effects (all ps < .6).  A Pearson’s r correlation on overall DIRAP scores 
found no significant relationship between IRAPs (r = .057, p = .678).  
Gender, Androcentric Bias and Modern Sexism 
A 2x2 ANOVA was conducted to examine any differences in MS scores by 
androcentric bias or participant gender. Analyses found no significant main effect for 
gender, F(1, 54) = 1.14, p = .29 but a significant effect for androcentric bias F(2, 54) 
= 5.15, p = .009 with a medium effect size (η² = .149). A significant interaction 
effect was also found between androcentric bias and gender F(1, 54) = 3.95, p = .05 
but the effect size was small (η² = .057). A review of the descriptive statistics 
suggests sexism scores were higher among those who assumed maleness; however, 
this was particularly strong for female participants (see Table 4.9), indicating that 
more sexist women were particularly likely to choose the male response option. The 
small number of participants in this cell (9) and the high variance in responses 
among this group should be noted however.  
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Table 4.10 
Modern Sexism Means and SDs by Gender and Androcentric Task Preference 
Gender Androcentrism Task Mean SD N 
Female Assumed Female 17.24 4.43 21 
 Assumed Male 24.89 9.48 9 
Male Assumed Female 21.14 6.07 22 
 Assumed Male 21.50 3.79 6 
Note. Modern Sexism scores range from 10-50, with higher scores reflective of more 
sexist beliefs.  
 
IRAP Performance and Modern Sexism  
Spearman’s Rho correlations were conducted to examine the relationships 
between self-reported sexism and overall DIRAP scores for both IRAPs. The non-
parametric alternative was used here as scores for the MS were non-normally 
distributed for this sample. These analyses revealed a weak positive correlation 
between the MS and gender-science IRAP, r = .239, p =.035. No other significant 
correlations were found, though it should be noted that there was a very weak 
negative relationship between infrahumanisation scores and self-reported sexism.  
4.3.3 Summary 
 Effects on the infrahumanisation IRAP were not as expected. Complex traits 
were attributed more readily to women rather than men, though overall the effects on 
the IRAP were weak and significant effects were only found on the women-complex 
trial-type. Effects on the male-complex trial-type were significant (although not after 
a Bonferroni correction) and were comparably weaker than the women-complex 
effects. For the gender-science IRAP, effects were more consistent with existing 
theory and research in this area but still surprising: significant men-science and men-
not-arts biases were observed as expected. However, there were also significant 
women-science biases found and no significant women-arts biases. While somewhat 
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inconsistent with gender theory in this area, these data do cohere with the results of 
other studies (i.e., neutral or reversed effects for the trial-type involving women and 
the stereotypically masculine set of attributes or traits).  
 Responses on the androcentrism task were both unexpected and inconsistent 
with the results of the previous study. There was a significant gynocentric response 
pattern, with nearly three quarters of participants (72.8%) selecting the female 
response option. No gender differences were found in responses.  
 Concerning the relationships between measures, effects varied across 
analyses. There was no relationship between IRAPs and effects on either did not 
vary depending on participant gender or responses on the androcentrism task. 
Modern Sexism did weakly correlate with scores on the gender-science IRAP 
however, and these scores also varied depending on participant gender and 
androcentric bias. Specifically, scores were higher for participants who selected the 
male response option, and particularly when those participants were female.  
4.4 Discussion 
IRAP Performance 
 Effects on the gender binary IRAP were identical to those observed in the 
previous chapter. There were significant men-masculine, men-not-feminine, and 
women-feminine biases found, and again no significant women-not-masculine bias. 
As the significance of these effects was discussed in the last chapter and will be 
reviewed again in the General Discussion, this section will just focus on the two 
novel IRAPs in Study Seven.  
Infrahumanisation IRAP 
The first of these IRAPs explored implicit gender infrahumanisation biases, 
or the gendered associating of women and men with primary and secondary 
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emotions. Infrahumanisation is a well-documented phenomenon describing the 
tendency to deny complex or uniquely human characteristics to members of a 
particular social group (Leyens et al., 2000). Studies indicate this form of “emotional 
prejudice” is common between members of different racial, cultural and ethnic 
groups (Cortes, Demoulin, Rodriguez, Rodriguez, & Leyens, 2005; Demoulin et al., 
2009; Gaunt, 2009; Gaunt, Leyens & Demoulin, 2002;), as well as between groups 
of high and low status (Levens et al., 2003). However, in the current study, effects 
were generally weak and in the unexpected direction, with significant biases found 
only on the “women-complex” trial-type.  
As only a small number of studies have investigated infrahumanisation in the 
context of gender, it is somewhat difficult to contextualise the current findings. 
However, the absence of any significant or expected effects on this IRAP could be 
explained in a few ways. First, it could be that these biases are simply not present in 
the current sample or population, and that infrahumanisation is not a component of 
normative gender beliefs. Previous studies have identified a societal tendency to 
objectify or dehumanize women (i.e., attribute animalistic or inhumane attributes to 
them: Hussey et al., 2015; Rudman & Mescher, 2012); however, it is possible that 
the denial of complex or secondary emotions to women is not a feature of gender 
prejudice. The previous research in this area only found infrahumanisation biases 
among males high in hostile sexism (Abrams, 2003; Gaunt, 2013), and indeed the 
Gaunt paper found a reversed effect in men high in benevolent (i.e., well-
intentioned) sexism. Though there was no relationship between sexism, gender and 
IRAP performance in this study, future research could investigate this further by 
employing the same sexism measures used in the previous studies.  
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Another explanation for the effects on this IRAP could be the specific 
category labels used (i.e., “simple” and “complex”). It is possible that these labels 
did not adequately represent the individual exemplars, or that the stimuli together did 
not form a coherent category outside of the IRAP. This could explain the high 
variance in responses and overall weak effects, as the task may have made less 
overall sense (relative to other IRAPs in this thesis). As discussed in Chapter Two, 
research suggests inappropriate or incoherent category labels can confound effects 
on implicit measures (Fazio & Olsen, 2003; Steffens et al., 2006), and so this may 
have been a factor here. The weak or unexpected effects could also have been due to 
the gendered connotations for individual exemplars. For example, “Anger” (used 
here as a primary/simple emotion) has been shown to be more readily associated 
with men than women (e.g., Brescoll & Uhlmann, 2001). Similarly, “complexity” – 
and indeed emotionality more generally – is more coherent with the overall feminine 
stereotype (Broverman et al., 1990; Eagly & Karau, 2002; Koenig, 2018). As such, it 
could be that the category labels and individual exemplars used here interacted in 
unexpected ways with traditional gender stereotypes and influenced the overall 
results.  
 Gender-Science IRAP  
For the gender-science IRAP, effects on the male trial-types were consistent 
with the hypothesis and existing research in this area. As in previous explicit and 
implicit research, participants in this study showed a significant bias towards 
associating men with science (i.e., responding quicker to men-science-true than men-
science-false) and against associating men with arts/humanities (i.e., responding 
quicker to men-arts-false than men-arts-true). This effect is significant because this 
role congruity between men, agency and science has been widely problematized as 
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contributing to the gender discrimination experienced by women in STEM (Carli et 
al., 2016). Research suggests that such stereotypes significantly impede female 
scientists’ career prospects and success, and significantly reduce their likelihood of 
being hired, promoted or funded (see Reuben, Sapienza & Zingala, 2014 for a 
comprehensive review). Moreover, studies indicate women in science experience 
gender discrimination and harassment at above-average rates (Smyth & Nosek, 
2018), which has been shown to mediate academic participation and a willingness to 
pursue or remain in STEM careers (see Lane, Goh & Driver-Linn, 2012). A recent 
study of women in undergraduate STEM courses, for instance, found that a 
significant percentage had experienced sexual harassment (61%) and gender bias 
(78%) while on their course of study, and that this significantly influenced their 
desire to pursue a scientific career (Leaper & Starr, 2018). Given that longitudinal 
and cross-cultural studies find no significant or reliable gender differences in 
scientific/mathematical ability (see Halpern, 2007 for a review of this literature), 
understanding the ideological barriers to women’s progress is particularly important 
and the current data adds to the literature in an Irish context.   
 It is important to note, however, that this study also found a significant 
women-science bias and no significant effect in either direction on the women-arts 
trial-type. Recent research into gender-science stereotypes suggests the increasing 
representation of women in science is changing beliefs about women’s scientific 
abilities (Miller et al., 2018). Given that Ireland has implemented a range of 
initiatives to increase the number of women in STEM in recent years (see SFI, 
2018), these data could evidence changing societal attitudes around female gender 
roles. Another related explanation for the women-science effects could be the 
makeup of the current sample. Research in this area suggests that gender-science 
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stereotypes vary depending on the level of education and discipline of the sample 
employed, with stereotypes weaker among female scientists or in cultural contexts 
where women are more equally represented in STEM fields (e.g., Miller et al., 2015; 
Nosek & Smyth, 2016). While information about participants’ educational 
background and field of study was not collected here, the majority of participants 
were recruited from the Maynooth University undergraduate community which 
comprises both Arts/Humanities and Science programmes. Regardless of the 
potential reasons for these effects, the ability to separate out scores at the trial-type 
level allowed for this analysis of both women-science and men-science biases (as 
opposed to an overall men-science/women-arts bias, as produced by the gender-
science IAT: e.g., Zingala et al., 2017). As such, these data provide a novel 
contribution to this literature and a useful methodology for researchers in this area.   
Androcentric Bias 
Across the two studies, there was an overall skew towards attributing a 
female over a male gender to the neutral stimulus. The first study in this chapter 
found no evidence of either androcentric or gynocentric bias (23 out of 44 selected 
“female”), while the second study had a significant pro-female response pattern (43 
participants out of 59). As with the absence of infrahumanisation biases, this pattern 
of responses could have been due to a genuine absence of androcentric bias among 
participants. Because this is the first empirical assessment of androcentric bias in an 
Irish sample, however, this explanation would require corroboration using larger 
samples and alternative methods of measurement (e.g., multiple assessments of 
androcentric tendencies or biases). The results obtained here could also have been 
due to the abstract way in which androcentrism was assessed. Previous research on 
androcentric bias examined the influence of particular variables (e.g., sex-typed 
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language or masculine generics, etc.) on the likelihood of imagining a male over a 
female person (see Bailey et al., 2018). The current studies forced a male or female 
choice, and the directness of this question without any additional information may 
have fostered a knee-jerk female response option (as was potentially observed in the 
pro-female hiring preferences in Chapters One and Two). Again, this is conjecture 
and would require a more focused investigation in future research.  
Responses may have additionally been influenced by the particular facial 
stimulus employed in the task. All images including the composite, gender-neutral 
face were selected from a dataset created by a group of Australian researchers 
(Rhodes et al., 2000; 2011). Although these images were piloted for gender ratings 
among similar samples used in the main studies (Australian adults), facial 
recognition has been shown to vary considerably across cultural contexts (e.g., 
Dailey et al., 2010; Elfenbein et al., 2007), and as such may have been interpreted 
differently by Irish participants. Future research may benefit from piloting the 
stimuli using a comparable sample, or using an alternative paradigm that does not 
rely on facial stimuli. For example, studies could present participants with a written 
description of a person and ask them to imagine if that person was female or male.    
Relationship between IRAP Scores and Androcentric Bias 
Generally, the relationship between androcentric bias and IRAP performance 
was weak. For the gender-binary IRAP, there was a significant androcentric 
bias/trial-type interaction effect, with scores on the men-masculine trial-type higher 
among those who attributed a male gender. While this effect should be interpreted 
cautiously due to small sample size, the number of statistical comparisons that were 
made, and the issues discussed above with the androcentrism task, results are 
somewhat coherent with theories of androcentrism. Bem (1993) and Butler (2002), 
 
 
 175 
for example, both argue that androcentrism is a key feature of binary gender systems 
which partly maintains the patriarchal gender order. It is therefore interesting and 
significant that a relationship was found between these measures, although there is 
no existing theoretical reason the variance should be driven by the men-masculine 
trial-type. Future research could perhaps explore this in more detail and with a 
broader range of measures (e.g., other explicit measures of gender beliefs, alternative 
formats for assessing androcentric bias, etc.), and chase the specific trial-type effects 
with a larger sample.  
There were no significant main or interaction effects for androcentric bias 
and either IRAP in study five, indicating that neither infrahumanisation or gender-
science biases are related to androcentric preference. Due to the weakness of the 
infrahumanisation biases and the unexpected pattern of responses on this IRAP, it is 
likely that gender infrahumanisation is generally not a feature of normative gender 
beliefs (as discussed above). As such, it would not be expected to be related to other 
types of gender prejudice such as androcentrism. The absence of any relationship 
between androcentric and gender-science biases is surprising, however, given that 
gender-science stereotypes are known to correlate with other forms of sexist or 
discriminatory attitudes (e.g., Miller et al., 2015). Future research could investigate 
this in more detail, again potentially using a broader range of androcentrism 
measures and paradigms.    
Role of Explicit Sexism  
While there was no relationship between explicit sexism and androcentric 
bias in the first study, significant main and interaction effects were found in study 
five. MS scores were higher for those who selected the male response option, and 
this effect interacted with participant gender (with scores especially higher for 
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female participants who selected male). While the interaction between this bias, 
gender beliefs, and participant gender is novel in the literature, it can be explained by 
Ambivalent Sexism Theory (Glick & Fiske, 2000). As mentioned previously, Gaunt 
(2013) proposes that a tendency to consider men more uniquely human is likely to be 
related to a person’s broader gender beliefs (rather than their specific gender group 
membership per se). That is, as both men and women are exposed to the same 
gender stereotype content and hegemonic gender ideology, it would not be atypical 
for women high in sexism to behave in a discriminatory manner. This should again 
be chased in future studies using a larger range of measures.  
Conclusions 
 Results from this chapter provided a range of novel findings and contributed 
to the growing literature on “human-as-male” bias, which has received little 
empirical attention to date. While the two newly developed IRAPs produced 
unexpected results, each added to our broader understanding of gender beliefs in an 
Irish context. Specifically, these studies suggested that that gender binary beliefs 
may play a role in androcentric bias, and also that infrahumanisation may not in fact 
be a common feature of gender beliefs. These results also provided some 
methodological insights into the IRAP (e.g., around the significance of category 
labels and individual stimulus selection), and also attested to the IRAP’s general 
utility in separating out gender biases at the trial-type level. For example, the 
women-science and men-science biases observed in Study Seven provided new 
information about the content of implicit gender-science stereotypes, and identified 
some areas for future investigation.    
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Chapter 5 
Binary Biases and Sexual Harassment 
Proclivity 
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5.1 Introduction 
Chapters Three and Four demonstrated the IRAP’s utility in measuring 
gender-as-binary biases. Across five studies, participants completed a range of 
gender IRAPs as well as tasks assessing their gender beliefs and propensity to 
prioritize or centralize men or masculinity. The current (and final) experimental 
chapter in this thesis will examine the role of the binary in another form of gender-
based discrimination: a proclivity to engage in sexually coercive, harassing or 
predatory behaviours. Understanding sexual aggression has been a unifying goal of 
feminist research and activism for decades. Since the onset of the second wave, 
feminists have conceptualised sexual aggression as a cornerstone of patriarchy, and 
one which is fundamentally rooted in a traditional binarist and masculine ideology 
(Brownmiller, 1975; Dworkin, 1974; Groth & Birnbaum, 1979). It would thus be 
interesting and theoretically relevant to explore the relationship of binary biases to 
sexually aggressive behaviours, and specifically a person’s proclivity towards sexual 
harassment.  
The two studies in this chapter will examine the relationship between implicit 
binary biases and sexual harassment proclivity in young, heterosexual Irish men. 
Sexual harassment proclivity was selected as a useful starting point over other forms 
of sexually aggressive behaviours given that (a) it would have raised more serious 
ethical and methodological concerns to ask participants about their personal histories 
of coercive or harassing behaviours (see Strang & Peterson, 2017), and (b) sexual 
harassment has been more widely studied in young adult samples than other forms of 
sexual violence, and thus there was a broader range of validated measures to choose 
from (see Testa, 2015 for a review). The first study in this chapter (Study Eight) will 
employ the same gender binary IRAP as previous studies. This study will also 
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include a new IRAP for gender identity biases measuring the relative extent to which 
participants associate themselves with traditionally masculine or feminine traits. The 
identity IRAP is included as a way to examine, first, if the IRAP has utility in 
measuring identity biases and, second, if such biases are related to other 
discriminatory or harmful tendencies. Study Nine will also measure sexual 
harassment proclivity, but will instead examine whether it is related to implicit 
infrahumanisation biases. This study will use the same infrahumanisation IRAP as 
the previous chapter.  
5.2 Study Eight 
Sexual Harassment 
Before reviewing the literature on sexual harassment proclivity and its 
measurement, it is necessary to give a brief overview of the significance and scale of 
the issue. The term sexual harassment was coined by feminists in the 1970s to make 
visible the culture of sexual coercion, exploitation, and violence experienced by 
women within the workforce (Brownmiller, 1999; MacKinnon, 1979; Rowe, 1973). 
Since then, the term has evolved somewhat and now generally refers to any 
“unwelcome (as opposed to involuntary) sexual advances, requests for sexual 
favours, and other verbal or physical conduct of a sexual nature.” (UN, 2015). While 
few national surveys have been conducted (in Ireland or elsewhere), the most recent 
European statistics estimate that 55% of women have experienced it at least once 
since the age of 15 (Eurobarometer, 2016). Though most widely studied in 
organisational settings, harassment has been shown to be widespread across 
numerous social contexts, including the street, school and university, nightclubs and 
bars, and the home (for comprehensive reviews, see the Eurobarometer, 2016 report 
and also Paludi & Paludi, 2003; Sbraga & O’Donohue, 2000).  
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As with other forms of bullying and discrimination, sexual harassment is 
associated with an array of negative consequences. These include an increased risk 
of mental health problems such as depression, anxiety, or post-traumatic stress 
disorders, as well as frequent feelings of shame, demotivation, helplessness, and a 
desire to socially withdraw (see Willness, Steel & Lee, 2017 for a meta-analysis). 
Victims of harassment can also experience many physical health issues (mostly 
related to prolonged stress), including gastrointestinal problems, disrupted sleep and 
impaired cognitive function (Campbell, Greeson, Bybee & Raja, 2008; Leidig, 
1992). In addition to the effects on the individual, sexually hostile cultures and 
environments have significant consequences for society at large. These include costs 
to organisations (e.g., because of prolonged absences and sick leave, or the loss of 
skilled workers due to victims leaving the organisation), as well as the costs to the 
state and healthcare providers (Shaw, Hegewisch & Hess, 2018). It is therefore 
considerably important to better understand harassment at an individual and societal 
level.  
Attempts to explain sexual harassment have followed a similar trajectory as 
explanations for other forms of gender-based discrimination. Early models tended to 
normalise such behaviours as a natural and relatively harmless feature of male-
female “mating” behaviour (see McPhail, 2016). Though this interpretation is still 
prevalent in evolutionary models of sexuality (Jonason et al., 2008; 2009), feminist 
critiques have interrogated this sort of theorizing (i.e., that harassment or assault is 
just over-aggressive sexual desire; see Berdahl, 2007). Instead, generally speaking 
they would tend to position harassment within a broader framework of gender-based 
violence or patriarchal power structures. According to Unger (1979) and Byers 
(1996), for instance, normative harassment should be conceptualization as the logical 
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consequence of heteronormative socialization practices, and specifically of 
conditioning men to be sexually virile, dominant, and assertive and women to be 
sexually pure, subservient, and passive. Numerous theoretical approaches now exist 
based on this core premise, which model harassment in terms of gendered power 
imbalances or abuses (Tangri & Hayes, 1997). These include social or sex role 
“spillover” accounts, which propose that sexual harassment is simply socio-sexual 
behaviour playing out in a work or social setting (Gutek, 1985; Gutek, Cohen, & 
Konrad, 1990; Gutek & Morasch, 1982), as well as situational or organisational 
power theories, which view sexual harassment as a manifestation of economic and 
societal male dominance (Evans, 1978; Farley, 1978; MacKinnon, 1979; Nieva & 
Gutek, 1981; Zalk, 1990).  
While any individual instance of sexual harassment is likely the result of 
various personal, situational, and socio-cultural factors, research generally supports 
socialisation-based over essentialist explanations (McPhail, 2016; Skaine, 1996). 
The most persuasive evidence comes from the fact that sexual harassment is a 
significantly gendered problem, which appears to function in much the same way as 
other forms of societal gendered power abuses. For example, as with other types of 
discrimination based around gender-status hierarchies (e.g., workplace bias), men are 
significantly more likely to perpetrate harassment and women are significantly more 
likely to experience it (Bastian, Lancaster & Reyst, 1996; Sanders, 2008). Moreover, 
as would be expected in a power-based dynamic, men are more likely than women to 
disregard or ignore the severity of the issue. For instance, studies show that men are 
significantly more likely to view harassment as harmless (e.g., as flirting or “banter”; 
DeSouza & Solberg, 2004; Russell & Trigg, 2004), question or discount its negative 
effects (Quinn, 2002), and apportion blame on the victim if a case is brought (De 
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Judicibus & McCabe, 2001; Kenig & Ryan 1986; Jensen & Gutek 1982). 
Socialisation or power-based explanations can also better explain why non-binary 
individuals, gay or bisexual men, and women in positions of power (e.g., female 
managers or politicians) seem to be particular targets for sexual and gender-based 
harassment (Berdahl, 2007; Dubois et al., 1998; Foote & Goodman-Delahunty, 1999; 
McLaughlin, Uggen & Blackstone, 2012), as opposed to just sexually “viable”, 
attractive, and traditionally feminine women. According to Franke (2007), what 
makes sexual harassment a gendered abuse of power is not that the conduct is sexual, 
but that it is being used to enforce and perpetuate binary norms. She posits, “the 
discriminatory wrong of sexual harassment…lies in its power as a regulatory 
practice that feminizes women and masculinizes men. That renders women sexual 
objects and men sexual subjects” (p. 691).    
In addition to reinforcing binary roles more generally, harassment appears to 
serve a specific purpose in regulating hegemonic, traditional masculinity. According 
to Quinn (2002), sexual harassment is just one of the many ways in which 
masculinity is reproduced or “done” in a social context, and is simply part of men’s 
broader socialised tendency to objectify and sexualise women in the public sphere. 
Research tends to support the idea that harassment is a form of gender performance, 
showing for instance that sexual harassment is significantly more likely to occur in 
male-dominated settings and in front of other men (e.g., by groups of men on the 
street, or in historically male-dominated work contexts: Berdahl, 2007; Pryor, Giedd 
& Williams, 1995; Stamarksi & Son Hing, 2015). Moreover, research indicates that 
men who more strongly endorse gender role distinctions and a traditional masculine 
gender identification are significantly more likely than other men to sexually harass, 
and indeed to report an enhanced sense of male identity after doing so (Dall’Ara & 
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Maass, 1999; Maass et al., 2003). Others have found that men may be particularly 
likely to harass if they feel their masculinity or status is under threat, such as in 
contexts where they have a female superior and other instances where they feel 
subordinate to a woman (Burgess & Borgida, 1999; Fiske & Stevens, 1993).  
Measuring Sexual Harassment Proclivity 
As with sexual violence more generally, most research into sexual 
harassment has focused on understanding the scale and nature of victimisation. 
Comparably few paradigms exist for studying a person’s proclivity and/or history of 
perpetration, due in large part to the obvious difficulty identifying large enough 
samples of perpetrators (see Strang & Peterson, 2017 and Pina, Gannon & Saunders, 
2009 for reviews of this issue). Of the research that has been conducted, most has 
focused on either men’s tolerance of sexual harassment (i.e., the extent to which the 
evaluate an instance of harassment as normal or acceptable: e.g., Riley, Lott, 
Cadwell & De Luca, 1992; Russell & Trigg, 2004) or their self-reported tendency to 
behave in a hostile, predatory, or coercive manner when in a position of power (e.g., 
Dall’Ara & Maass, 1999; Maass et al., 2003). A small number of questionnaires have 
been developed for assessing proclivity, namely the Sexual Harassment Proclivities 
Scale (SHP: Bingham & Burleson, 1996), which measures a person’s views about 
harassment as well as their likelihood of engaging in harassing behaviours, and the 
Likelihood to Sexually Harass Scale (LSH: Pryor, 1987). The LSH is by far the most 
widely used and assesses participants’ self-reported likelihood of behaving in a 
harassing manner, if they could be assured they would not face any repercussions 
(i.e., penalties, job losses, etc.).  
Studies of proclivity suggest that harassment is closely related to other 
problematic gender behaviours and beliefs. Studies using the LSH, for instance, have 
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found it correlates with more traditional and sexist gender views, authoritarian 
beliefs, a rejection of feminism, and an increased tolerance of interpersonal violence 
against women (Barak, Fisher, Belfry, & Lashambe, 1999; Bartling & Eisenman, 
1993; Begany & Milburn, 2002; Malamuth & Dean, 1991; Pryor, 1987; Ward, 
Hudson, Johnston, & Marshall 1997). Similarly, a tolerance of sexual harassment has 
been shown to predict an endorsement of rape myths, sexually hostile or adversarial 
attitudes, and a history of sexual aggression (Begany & Milburn, 2002; Pryor, 1987; 
Riley, Lott, Cadwell & De Luca, 1992). More recently, researchers identified a 
positive correlation between harassment proclivity and the so-called “Dark Triad” 
traits (i.e., narcissism, psychopathy, and Machiavellianism: Ziegler-Hill, Besser, 
Morag & Campbell, 2016), a tendency to deceive or exploit others (Lee, Gizzarone 
& Ashton, 2003), and belittle women in social settings (Siebler et al., 2008). While 
very few studies have explored the role of implicit biases in harassment, the one 
study that did (Rudman & Mescher, 2012) found that implicit dehumanization biases 
were associated with a significantly increased likelihood of harassing. Together, 
these data thus support feminist socio-cultural models of rape, and more broadly the 
argument that harassment participates in and indeed arises from conservative, 
binarist, and misogynistic ideologies.   
Measuring Masculine Identity  
Masculine gender identity has been most commonly measured using self-
report techniques such as widely used Bem Sex Role Inventory (Bem,1974), the 
Masculine Behaviours Scale (Snell, 2013), and the Personal Attributes Questionnaire 
(Spence, Helmreich & Stapp, 1973). Generally, these measures assess the extent to 
which a person identifies with stereotypically masculine or feminine traits, roles or 
abilities, and are thus assessments of how well a person adheres to a pre-defined 
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gender role. Newer measures have tended to combine assessments of masculine 
identity orientations and masculine ideologies, focusing broadly on the extent to 
which a person both endorses and adheres to traditional masculine values. These 
include measures such as the Masculine Gender Role Stress Scale (Eisler, 1987) and 
Gender Role Conflict Scale (O’Neill et al., 1986), as well as the more recently 
developed “hypermasculinity” inventories (e.g., the Hypermasculine Values 
Questionnaire: Archer, 2010 or the Conformity to Masculine Norms Inventory: 
Mahalik, 2005). Implicit measures have not been used to date to examine gender 
identity in adults, although one study did use the IAT to compare identity biases (i.e., 
me/not me with male/female) across cis and transgender children (Olsen, Key & 
Eaton, 2015).  
While relatively few studies have directly examined the role of masculinity in 
harassment proclivity, the few that have suggest these ideologies and beliefs 
participate to some degree in harassing behaviours. Powell (1986), for example, 
found that BSRI scores significantly influenced male (but not female) participants’ 
definitions of harassment, with higher masculinity scores associated with labelling 
fewer behaviours as harmful or problematic. Russell and Trigg (2004) similarly 
found that both a masculine identification (on the PAQ) and conservative gender 
ideology (measured using the Ambivalent Sexism Inventory) increased tolerance of 
harassment, while De Judicibus and McCabe (2004) found a positive association 
between masculine identification and a likelihood to assign blame to the victim over 
the perpetrator. Discourse analyses have also examined how harassment may 
function as way for young men to display their masculinity (Quinn, 2002), and also 
how men may rationalize harassing behaviours as normative features of male gender 
roles (Robinson, 2006). It is also worth mentioning the review of masculinity 
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ideologies and sexual aggression conducted by Murnen and colleagues in 2002. This 
meta-analysis found a reliable and robust role for masculinity ideologies in men’s 
tolerance of, propensity towards, and histories of engaging in sexually violent 
behaviours. Though not directly focused on harassment, it is logical to extrapolate 
here given that many feminists view harassment as the lower end of a broader sexual 
violence continuum (e.g. Brownmiller, 1975; see also McPhail, 2016 for a recent 
review).  
Current Study  
This chapter aims to add to the literature on sexual harassment proclivity and 
examine whether this tendency is related to automatic gender biases in a sample of 
young Irish men. Building on the literature reviewed above, this study will 
specifically focus on the role of implicit binary gender ideologies and masculine 
identities in harassment proclivity, neither of which have been examined to date. 
Two IRAPs will be used for this purpose: (1) the gender binary IRAP from previous 
studies, and (2) a new gender identity IRAP measuring participants’ associations 
between themselves and stereotypically feminine or masculine traits. For the binary 
IRAP, the same pattern of results observed in previous studies is expected here (i.e., 
participants are expected to relate women with feminine but not masculine traits, and 
men with masculine but not feminine traits). As the identity IRAP is the first implicit 
measure of its kind, no particular pattern of results is expected here, although it is 
tentatively expected that participants will associate themselves more with masculine 
than feminine traits. Sexual harassment proclivity will be measured using an existing 
validated questionnaire, and sexism will again be assessed using the Modern Sexism 
Scale. Concerning the relationships between measures, it is tentatively hypothesised 
that more binary-consistent biases and identifications will be associated with an 
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increased propensity to harass. A relationship is also expected between self-reported 
sexism and harassment.  
5.2.1 Method 
Participants 
 Fifty White Irish male undergraduate students aged between 18 and 23 
participated in this study (Mage=21.4). All participants self-identified as heterosexual. 
Sampling, recruitment methods and inclusion criteria were the same as the previous 
study, with one additional exclusion criterion: no women could participate. The 
sample was restricted to males for a number of reasons: first, as the aim was to 
examine the potential role of gender-binarist and identification relations in sexual 
harassment proclivity and not to examine gender differences in propensity, it seemed 
prudent to keep gender constant. Second, sexual harassment is typically perpetrated 
by men against women (e.g., Eurobarometer, 2016) so exploring males’ propensity 
was a more logical starting point. Third, gender identification and construction 
appears to vary across men and women (see Smiler, 2006) and thus self-gender 
relations on the IRAP could be difficult to compare. Last, given that the majority of 
previous research has focused on the role of masculinity in sexual aggression (e.g., 
Murnen et al., 2002), there is comparably less rationale for exploring the role of 
feminine gender identification.  
Materials  
Likelihood to Sexually Harass Scale (LSH) 
 The LSH (Pryor, 1987, 1998: Appendix 10) assesses an individual’s 
propensity for sexual harassment and coercion. It consists of 10 separate paragraph-
length vignettes in which the respondent is asked to imagine they are in a position of 
power (e.g., a company manager or college professor) over an attractive subordinate 
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female. Following each scenario, the participant is presented with three questions 
asking whether they would be likely to show preferential bias for such a woman. 
Subscale A does not specify a contingency for this preferential bias (e.g., “Would 
you let her carry out a project for extra credit (e.g. write a paper)?”), subscale B 
specifies that it is in return for sexual favours (e.g., “Assuming that you are very 
secure in your job and the university has always tolerated professors who make 
passes at students, would you offer the student a chance to earn extra credit in return 
for sexual favours?”), and subscale C specifies that it is in return for going on a date 
(e.g., “Given the same assumptions as in the question above, would you ask her to 
join you for dinner to discuss the possible extra credit assignments?”). Items are 
scored on a 5-point Likert scale ranging from 1 (Not at all likely) to 5 (Very likely), 
with higher scores representative of a greater propensity for harassment or 
exploitation. Scores for each subscale range from 10-50  
 Gender Binary and Gender Identity IRAPs 
 The gender binary IRAP was identical to the one employed in previous 
experiments. The gender identity IRAP employed the same target stimuli as the 
binary IRAP, but used “I am” and “Other men are” in place of the label stimuli (see 
Table 5.1). As mentioned in Chapter One, gender identity is a complex, multi-
faceted, and contextual phenomenon, so the measure developed here is not intended 
to be fully reflective of an individual’s gender identity. However, with regards to 
sexual harassment and aggression, research suggests that the extent which an 
individual identifies as masculine and, importantly, not-feminine may be of relevance 
(see Murnen et al., 2002 for a meta-analysis of the role of masculinity in sexual 
aggression). As the IRAP allows for a brief assessment of an individual’s fluencies 
with confirming self-masculine and self-feminine statements, it could be considered 
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a measure of relative masculine–feminine identification. “Other men” was used for 
the opposing category rather than “Women” or the more general “Others” because 
research shows that gender identities are constructed relative to others of the same 
gender (i.e., women define themselves relative to other women, and men to other 
men: see Wodak, 1997).   
Table 5.1 
Stimuli used in the gender binary and gender identity IRAPs 
Label 1: 
Men 
Label 2: 
Women 
Target 1: 
Masculine 
traits 
Target 2: 
Feminine 
traits 
Rule A Rule B 
Gender Binary IRAP 
Men are Women 
are 
Witty Nurturing Please respond 
as if men have 
more 
stereotypically 
masculine 
traits and 
women more 
stereotypically 
feminine traits 
 
Please respond 
as if women 
have more 
stereotypically 
masculine 
traits and men 
more 
stereotypically 
feminine traits 
 
Charismatic Gentle 
Competitive Affectionate 
Decisive Sensitive 
 
Gender Identity IRAP  
I am Other 
men are 
Witty Nurturing Please respond 
as if I have 
more 
stereotypically 
masculine 
traits and other 
men have more 
stereotypically 
feminine traits 
Please respond 
as if other men 
have more 
stereotypically 
masculine 
traits and I 
have more 
stereotypically 
feminine traits 
Charismatic Gentle 
Competitive Affectionate 
Decisive Sensitive 
 
 Modern Sexism Scale (MS)  
 The same 10-item version of the MS scale from previous experiments was 
used here.  
Procedure 
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The experimental procedures were identical to previous studies. The order of 
the tasks in this experiment was as follows: Likelihood to Sexually Harass Scale, 
two IRAPs (presented in a counter-balanced order), and Modern Sexism Scale.  
Ethical Issues  
Ethical issues and procedures were identical to previous studies, though 
particular care was taken during the debriefing to stress that no diagnoses or 
judgments would me made based on individual responses to specific tasks. 
Participants were informed that we were only interested in group-level analyses and 
overall comparisons between the measures. 
Data processing and analysis 
Data were processed in an identical manner to previous studies and 
participants were excluded using the same criteria. One participant was excluded 
from the binary (final n = 49) and three from the identity IRAP (final n = 47) on this 
basis.  
5.2.2 Results 
Self-Report Measures  
 Sexism scores were similar to previous studies (Table 5.2). LSH scores were 
somewhat varied across the three subscales: for subscale A (preferential treatment 
with no specified contingency), scores were skewed to the right of the scale with 
lower variation, suggesting moderate-to-high propensity for specialist treatment. 
Scores for the B (preference in exchange for sexual favours) and C (preference in 
exchange for a date) subscales were left-skewed and more varied, suggesting lower 
relative propensity for more explicitly harassing behaviours. While no normed scores 
or cut-off values exist for LSH scores, interpretation is guided by the 
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recommendations in the original Pryor articles (1987, 1988) and more recent 
research using this measure (e.g. Rudman & Mescher, 2012).  
Table 5.2 
 
Descriptive Statistics for the MS and three LSH subscales  
   MS  LSH_A  LSH_B  LSH_C  
Mean   24.00   29.24   17.38   21.44   
SD   6.357   4.326   7.656   8.811   
Note. Scores for the MS and all LSH subscales range from 10 to 50, with higher 
scores reflecting higher sexism and greater propensity for sexual harassment, 
respectively.  
 
IRAPs  
Descriptive statistics for both IRAPs can be found in Table 5.3 (and also 
graphed in Figures 5.1 and 5.2). Bonferroni-corrected one-sample t-tests were 
conducted to explore the significance of the effects produced for each IRAP trial-
type against zero (Table 5.3). For the gender binary IRAP, significant biases were 
found on the men-masculine, men-feminine, and women-feminine trial-types, 
corresponding to men-are-masculine, men-are-not-feminine, and women-are-
feminine biases respectively. For the gender identity IRAP, significant effects were 
found on three of four trial types and near significant effects on the fourth (other men 
are masculine). However, the response patterns here were somewhat unexpected – 
significant I-am-masculine and I-am-feminine biases were found, in addition to 
significant other men-are not-feminine and near-significant other men-are-masculine 
effects.  
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Figure 5.1 Mean IRAP trial-type scores for the gender binary IRAP 
Gender Binary IRAP 
 
Figure 5.1. Mean scores on the gender binary IRAP. Note: positive scores reflect a 
“masculine” or “not-feminine” response pattern and negative a “feminine” or “not-
masculine” response pattern.  
 
Figure 5.2 Mean IRAP trial-type scores for the gender identity IRAP 
Gender Identity IRAP 
 
Figure 5.2. Mean scores on the gender identity IRAP. Note: positive scores reflect a 
“self-feminine” or “others-masculine” response pattern.  
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Table 5.3 
Descriptive statistics and one-sample t-test results for IRAP trial-types  
Gender Binary IRAP (n = 49) M SD t df p 
Men-Masculine 0.48 0.33 10.34 48.00 < .001*** 
Women-Feminine 0.29 0.31 6.71 48.00 < .001*** 
Women-Feminine -0.07 0.35 -1.44 48.00 0.16 
Women-Masculine -0.25 0.32 -5.34 48.00 < .001*** 
Gender Identity IRAP (n = 47) M SD t df p 
Self-Masculine -0.27 0.35 -5.38 46.00 < .001*** 
Self-Feminine 0.19 0.37 3.61 46.00 < .001*** 
Other men-Masculine -0.09 0.40 -1.62 46.00 0.11 
Other men-Feminine -0.12 0.39 -2.14 46.00 0.04 
Note.  *p < .05, **p < .01. Acceptable p-values after Bonferroni correction </= 
.00625.  
 
Measure Comparisons 
Correlation analyses were conducted between all measures (Table 5.4). As in 
previous chapters, overall DIRAP scores were used for these analyses to minimize the 
number of comparisons and risk of a Type 1 error. Disregarding the correlations 
between the LSH subscales (as would be expected), positive correlations found were 
between the two IRAPs (r = .285, p = .046) and between the MS and LSH_A (r 
= .240, p = .046) and B subscales (r = .350, p = .006).  A small negative correlation 
was also found between the identity IRAP and the LSH C subscale (r = -.291, p 
= .043). 
 
 
 195 
  
Table 5.4 
 
Correlations between IRAPs, LSH subscales and MS 
  
      Binary IRAP  Identity IRAP  LSH_A LSH_B  LSH_C  MS  
Binary IRAP   
Pearson's r   —   0.285*    0.179   -0.065   -0.098   0.120   
p-value   —     0.046   0.109   0.672   0.747   0.206   
Identity IRAP   
Pearson's r       —   0.159   -0.032   -0.291  * -0.069   
p-value       —   0.143   0.583   0.043   0.676   
LSH_A   
Pearson's r           —   0.448  ***  0.513  ***  0.240  *  
p-value           —   < .001   < .001   0.046   
LSH_B   
Pearson's r               —   0.545  ***  0.350  **  
p-value               —   < .001   0.006   
LSH_C   
Pearson's r                   —   0.050   
p-value                   —   0.365   
MS   
Pearson's r                       —   
p-value                       —   
 
Note . all tests one-tailed. * p < .05, ** p < .01, *** p < .001, one-tailed. Positive scores on the Binary IRAP reflect a “men-masculine/women-
feminine” response bias while positive scores on the Identity IRAP reflect a “self-feminine/other men-masculine” response bias. Scores on the 
Modern Sexism scale range from 10-50, with higher scores representing more sexist beliefs. Scores for each LSH subscale range from 10-50, with 
higher scores representing a greater propensity to sexually harass.  
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5.2.3 Summary 
Significant biases were found on both IRAPs, though not always in the 
expected direction. For the binary IRAP, participants ascribed stereotypically 
masculine traits to men (but not women) and stereotypically feminine traits to 
women (but not men). This was similar to previous experiments. On the identity 
IRAP, however, masculine traits were ascribed to both the self and other men but 
feminine traits were only ascribed to the self. One possible interpretation for this 
pattern is the inherently relativistic nature of the IRAP block structure, given that 
participants are responding to themselves as masculine insofar as they are 
responding to other men as feminine. Alternatively, it could suggest greater 
flexibility with one’s own gender than with the broader gender category as a whole. 
This will be discussed in more detail later in the chapter. 
Concerning the relationships between measures, there was no relationship 
between the binary IRAP and sexual harassment proclivity (as measured by the 
LSH). However, there was a small negative correlation between the identity IRAP 
and the LSH C subscale (preferential treatment in exchange for a date). As a positive 
score on this IRAP reflects an “other men masculine/self-feminine feminine bias” a 
negative correlation in fact means harassment propensity was associated with 
stronger self-masculine effects. A small positive correlation was also found between 
the two IRAPs, suggesting gender identity may be related to the tendency to binarise 
gender. Again, given how the scores are interpreted, a positive correlation here 
means that binary-consistent gender stereotypes (i.e., men-masculine/women-
feminine) were associated with a tendency to associate the self with feminine and 
other men with masculine traits. Lastly, as in previous research on harassment 
proclivity, a positive relationship was found between self-reported sexism and a 
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propensity to sexually harass (on two of the three subscales). Again these effects will 
be discussed later.  
5.3 Study Nine  
As mentioned previously, there is a paucity of literature concerning the 
relationship between implicit gender biases and harassment proclivity. While no 
previous studies could be identified that examined implicit binary or identity biases 
in this context, two studies have explored the relationship between implicit 
dehumanization and a propensity for harassment. Rudman and Mescher (2012) 
tested the theoretical alignment of gender dehumanization and violence against 
women across two studies using IATs. The first found that men who associated 
women with primitive constructs (e.g., instinct, nature) had higher scores on the LSH 
and also reported more negative attitudes towards female rape victims. The second 
study found that implicit women-animal biases (e.g., between women and words like 
paw, snout, animal) predicted harassment proclivity, as well as scores on a rape-
behaviour analogue measure. Hussey and colleagues replicated the findings of the 
Rudman and Mescher study in an Irish context, though this study used IRAPs in 
place of IATs (Hussey et al., 2015).  
The current study aims to build on this by exploring whether harassment 
propensity is associated with the related construct of infrahumanisation. Using the 
same infrahumanisation IRAP from the previous chapter, this study will explore 
whether assumptions of complexity in men and simplicity in women are related to 
sexual harassment proclivity (on the LSH). A second aim of this study is to assess 
whether the response pattern from Study Seven replicates. In the previous chapter, 
gender-infrahumanisation biases were found in the opposite direction than expected. 
Rather than associating men with complexity and women with simplicity, 
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participants associated both women and men with complex emotions, and effects 
were actually stronger for women than men. While some reasons for this were 
discussed in the last chapter (e.g., that the stimulus labels may have influenced 
effects, etc.) a replication will help inform the conclusions drawn.   
5.3.1 Method 
Participants 
Forty-one White Irish male undergraduate students aged between 18 and 27 
participated in this study (Mage=20.63). All participation was voluntary and no 
remuneration was offered. Sampling, recruitment and inclusion criteria were the 
same as previous studies.   
Materials  
 Self-Report Scales 
 The versions of the LSH and MS used here were identical to the previous 
experiment.  
Infrahumanisation IRAP 
The stimuli for the Infrahumanisation IRAP were identical to Study Seven. 
Procedure 
The procedure was identical to previous experiments, though participants 
were again provided with a reference sheet outlining the stimuli belong to the 
categories “complex” and “simple”, as in Study Seven. The order of the tasks was as 
follows: Likelihood to Sexually Harass Scale, IRAP, Modern Sexism Scale.  
Ethical Issues 
Ethical issues and procedures were identical to the previous study.   
Data processing and analysis 
 
 
 199 
Data were processed in an identical manner to previous studies and 
participants were excluded using the same criteria. Six participants were excluded 
from the infrahumanisation IRAP on this basis (final n = 35).   
5.3.2 Results 
Self-Report Measures 
Table 5.5 presents the descriptive statistics for the MS and LSH by subscale. 
Scores on the MS were slightly higher than previous studies and were skewed more 
towards the higher end of the scale. On the LSH, scores were relatively low for the B 
and C subscales (preference in exchange for sexual favours or a date), but moderate 
for the A subscale (no contingency for preferential treatment). Scores for all 
subscales had similar levels of variance. 
Table 5.5    
Descriptive statistics for the LSH and MS  
   LSH A LSH B LSH C MS  
Mean   27.35   13.15   17.43   28.05   
SD  6.927   5.921   6.441   2.987   
Note. Scores on each scale have a possible range of 10-50, with higher scores 
reflecting greater sexism/propensity for sexual harassment.  
 
Infrahumanisation IRAP 
The response pattern on the Infrahumanisation IRAP was similar to Study 
Seven: effects were positive for both the men-complex and women-complex trial-
types (indicative of both men-are-complex and women-are-complex biases), 
negative for the men-simple trial-type (indicative of a men-are-simple bias), and 
very marginally positive for the women-simple trial-type (indicative of a women-are 
not-simple bias; see Table 5.6). Bonferroni-corrected one-sample t-tests were 
conducted to explore the significance of the effects produced for each IRAP trial-
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type against zero. Of the four, only effects on the men-complex trial-type were 
significant.   
Figure 5.3 Mean IRAP trial-type scores for the infrahumanisation IRAP 
 
 
Figure 5.3. Mean scores on the infrahumanisation IRAP. Note: positive scores reflect 
a “complex” or “not-simple” response pattern.  
 
Table 5.6 
 
Descriptive statistics and one-sample t-tests for IRAP trial-types.  
 
 M SD t df p 
Men-complex 0.22 0.34 3.8 34 <.001*** 
Men-simple -0.04 0.31 -.68 34 .501 
Women-complex 0.10 0.31 1.82 34 .078 
Women-simple 0.00 0.31 .009 34 .993 
Note.  *p < .05, **p < .01. Acceptable p-values after Bonferroni correction </= .0125 
Measure Comparisons 
 Given that this study used only a single IRAP and thus fewer comparisons 
were being made, correlation analyses were run on the individual trial-type scores 
rather than overall D scores (Table 5.7). Again disregarding the inter-correlations 
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between effects on IRAP trial types or LSH subscales, significant correlations were 
only found between the men-complex trial type and the LSH_A subscale (r = -.575, 
p = <.001) and the men-complex trial and the MS (r = -.367, p = <.03). Interestingly, 
the direction of this relationship was negative for both of these correlations, and 
indeed for all involving the two male trial-types. Though these effects should be 
interpreted tentatively given the relatively small sample size and the number of 
correlations being run, this suggests that higher harassment proclivity may actually 
be associated with men-not-complex biases. This will be elaborated on in the 
discussion below.   
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Table 5.7 
 
Correlations between the IRAP, LSH and MS  
      Men-complex  Men-simple  Women-complex  Women-simple  LSH A LSH B LSH C MS  
Men-complex   
Pearson's r   —   0.024   -0.103   -0.187   -0.575  ***  -0.124   -0.130   -0.367  *  
p-value   —   0.892   0.558   0.282   < .001   0.476   0.457   0.030   
Men-simple   
Pearson's r       —   -0.507  **  -0.040   -0.004   -0.100   0.064   0.100   
p-value       —   0.002   0.821   0.982   0.569   0.716   0.569   
Women-complex   
Pearson's r           —   0.152   0.081   0.049   0.103   -0.132   
p-value           —   0.384   0.643   0.779   0.558   0.450   
Women-simple   
Pearson's r               —   0.051   -0.006   -0.136   -0.010   
p-value               —   0.771   0.973   0.434   0.954   
LSH_A   
Pearson's r                   —   0.178   0.102   0.189   
p-value                   —   0.273   0.532   0.243   
LSH_B   
Pearson's r                       —   0.649  ***  0.239   
p-value                       —   < .001   0.138   
LSH_C   
Pearson's r                           —   -0.028   
p-value                           —   0.865   
MS   
Pearson's r                               —   
p-value                               —    
* p < .05, ** p < .01, *** p < .001  
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5.4 Discussion 
IRAP Effects  
Participants in this chapter completed three IRAPs: one for gender binary 
biases, one for gender identity biases, and another for gender infrahumanisation 
biases. Effects on the binary IRAP were identical to previous chapters and so will not 
be reviewed again here (but see Chapter 7). For the infrahumanisation IRAP, effects 
were generally similar to the previous study, though the men-complex biases were 
more pronounced in the current sample. Significant women-complex biases were 
also found in this sample but were less significant than the effects on the men-
complex trial type. The conclusions drawn in the last chapter thus seem appropriate: 
infrahumanisation does not appear to be a particularly salient or pronounced feature 
of gender prejudice. At least it does not appear to be a feature at the automatic level, 
when measured using the current methodology and specific stimuli or category 
labels (i.e., complex and simple). Future research could investigate these conclusions 
in more detail in a number of ways; these recommendations will be outlined in the 
General Discussion.  
Gender Identity IRAP  
For the gender identity IRAP, significant biases were found on three of the 
four trial types: self-masculine, self-feminine, and other men-masculine. While the 
self-feminine effects were not expected, these data do cohere somewhat with existing 
research on gender self-concept and identity. Previous research using trait rating 
scales or androgyny questionnaires suggests people may be more flexible with their 
own gender identity than their gender stereotypes about the typical man or women. 
That is, while they may rate certain traits as more stereotypically female or male, 
they tend to define themselves using a mix of both female and male attributes (e.g., 
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Bem, 1988; Coleman & Hong, 2007; Oswald & Lindstedt; 2006; Twenge, 1997). 
Studies also show that identity may vary within individuals depending on the 
context. A repeated-measures study by Smith, Noll and Bryant (1999), for example, 
found that scores on the Bem Sex Role Inventory changed significantly depending 
on where the measure was administered (school, home, work, social interactions 
with same-sex friends, social interactions with other-gender friends, and situations 
where they did not know anyone). It is thus possible that the scores here reflect 
participants’ own flexible identities or gender self-concepts. However, as this was the 
first study of its kind, this explanation would need to be substantiated with more 
research (potentially using a wider range of identity measures).  
Effects could also be due to the specific stimulus categories used in the IRAP 
(i.e., “I am” versus “other men are”). Previous research using both the IRAP and IAT 
suggests that bias scores may change depending on the contrast categories employed 
(see Hussey et al., 2015). To date, the only other assessment of implicit gender 
identity was carried out with children and used the categories “Me” and “Not me” 
with male and female words (Smith et al., 1999). These categories were 
inappropriate for the current research for two reasons: first, the version of the IRAP 
used in this thesis employs natural language statements and responding to “not me-
masculine-true/false” would not have made sense in this context. Second, as 
mentioned, the literature on identity constructions suggests that identity is relational 
– both to the “opposite” gender (women in this case) and to others within the 
category (other men: e.g., Bem, 1993). While this study assessed a person’s 
automatic identity biases relative to other men, it’s possible that the contrast category 
influenced results given that participants were required to rate themselves as 
feminine insofar as other men were masculine and vice versa. As such, it could have 
 
 
 205 
unintentionally functioned as a simultaneous assessment of gender stereotypes (for 
other men) and gender identity. This could explain the significant self-feminine 
biases observed here, though future research would need to examine this more 
directly (e.g., by comparing effects across IRAPs using different contrast categories). 
Another way to circumvent this issue could be to use an implicit measure that does 
not require a contrast category, such as the Single Category IAT (SC-IAT: Karpinski 
& Steinman, 2006). This would allow for an assessment of a person’s relative 
masculine-feminine identification but would not require it to be measured against a 
specific category.  
Relationship between the Binary and Identity IRAPs  
A small positive correlation was found between the gender binary and 
identity IRAPs in Study Eight. While previous research using self-reports has found 
a relationship between gender stereotypes and self-concept (e.g., Olsen et al., 2015), 
typically, these have found that more traditional stereotypes are associated with a 
more pronounced gender identity (i.e., more masculine identity in men, and more 
feminine identity in women). In the current study, however, stereotype-consistent 
gender binary biases were associated with a tendency for men to associate 
themselves with feminine traits and other men with masculine traits. Again, this 
could have been due to the specific stimulus categories used, or it could be because 
of the specific identity and stereotype beliefs in the current sample. It is difficult to 
draw concrete conclusions about this finding in the absence of other information, but 
future research could assess this by including a broader range of assessments of 
identity and gender-related beliefs.  
Sexual Harassment Proclivity  
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Mean scores on the three LSH subscales were similar to previous studies of 
young adult samples in both a North American (e.g., Lee et al., 2003; Rudman & 
Mescher, 2012) and Irish context (Hussey et al., 2015). Effects were highest for the A 
subscale (preferential treatment), then the C subscale (preferential treatment in 
exchange for a date), and lastly the B subscale (preferential treatment in exchange 
for sexual favours). While the only scores that could be considered mid-to-high 
across the two studies was the A subscale, all of the subscales included in the LSH 
have been found to correlate with discriminatory or conservative gender beliefs (see 
Pryor et al., 1995). That said, it is encouraging and worth noting that the means for 
the other more severe forms of quid-pro-quo harassment (i.e., harassment in 
exchange for dating or sexual favours) were low.  
Relationship between IRAP Scores and Sexual Harassment Proclivity 
While no relationship was found between the binary IRAP and harassment 
proclivity, a small correlation was found between the identity IRAP and the LSH_C 
subscale. Specifically, these analyses found a self-masculine/other men-feminine 
bias was associated with an increased tendency to harass. This finding coheres with 
existing theoretical and empirical research in this area suggesting masculinity plays a 
role in sexual aggression (e.g., Murnen et al., 2002; Quinn, 2002), and more 
generally with performative theories of masculinity (e.g., Connell, 2005; Smiler et 
al., 2015). It also provides support for the IRAP as a measure, and indeed for 
analysing self-masculinity biases at the level of automatic cognition. Given the 
number of analyses that were run and the size of the correlation, however, this effect 
should only be considered a tentative and preliminary finding.  
In Study Nine, a significant correlation was found between LSH scores and 
effects on the men-complex trial type. Specifically, men-not-complex biases were 
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associated here with an increased propensity to engage in coercion or harassment. 
The two previous studies to date which explored the relationship between 
harassment and implicit gender biases found a positive relationship between LSH 
and dehumanisation scores (Hussey et al., 2015; Rudman & Mescher, 2012). It is 
thus interesting that a relationship was found here, although again the effect was in 
the opposite direction than expected. However, as discussed in the previous chapter, 
it is possible that “complex” has more feminine than masculine connotations. As 
such, the infrahumanisation IRAP may still be tapping into stereotypes, though in a 
different way. This interpretation would require substantiation in a larger sample and 
using a broader range of gender stereotype measures and assessments.  
Conclusions  
The current chapter was an assessment of automatic gender binary, identity, 
and infrahumanisation biases and their relationship to sexual harassment proclivity. 
It provided some preliminary evidence to suggest that masculine gender identities 
play a role in harassment, in addition to counter-intuitive men-not-complex 
assumptions. Somewhat contrary to feminist theorising and literature, gender-as-
binary beliefs were unrelated to a propensity for sexual aggression (at least in the 
current sample and using the current methodology). More generally, studies in this 
chapter informed the conclusions drawn about the gender binary and 
infrahumanisation IRAPs, and provided some novel insights into the use of the IRAP 
for measuring gender identity.  
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Chapter 6 
Pooled Analyses  
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6.1 Introduction 
As mentioned in the General Introduction, IRAP studies typically have a 
sample size of between 30-50 (Vahey et al., 2015), and one of the aims of this thesis 
was to generate a comparably larger IRAP dataset by pooling the gender binary 
IRAP from different studies. While this combined data set notionally allows for 
several theoretically meaningful analyses to be carried out (e.g., investigations 
comparing different IRAP scoring metrics and algorithms, explorations of response 
distributions, block/IRAP order effects, and so on), this chapter will restrict its focus 
to a small number of questions relevant to the current thesis. The first will be a 
pooled analysis of the gender binary IRAP dataset. The enhanced statistical power 
from pooling the data should better inform the conclusions drawn about this thesis, 
specifically around the significance of the trial type effects or gender differences. As 
the Modern Sexism Scale was administered in all studies, this analysis will also 
inform conclusions about the relationship between self-reported sexism and 
automatic binary biases.  
The second analysis will explore the IRAP’s measurement invariance across 
female and male participants. Measurement invariance (also called measurement 
equivalence) broadly refers to a test’s ability to measure the same underlying 
construct (e.g., gender bias) across different groups or different times (Putnick, 
2016). A measure is considered invariant when it is interpreted and responded to in 
the same way regardless of the time or population being sampled (e.g., men, women, 
older adults, groups from different cultural backgrounds, etc.). This investigation 
was considered appropriate as it would provide more insight into gender differences 
above and beyond a pooled ANOVA. Specifically, this analysis would inform 
arguments made earlier in this thesis that men and women may navigate the IRAP 
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differently, potentially due to the different interpretations of the stimulus categories 
and the “desirable masculine” category in particular.  
6.2 Analysis One: 
Pooled Analysis of gender binary IRAP data 
Data and Inclusion Criteria  
Gender binary IRAP data were pooled from Studies Three, Four, Five, Six 
and Eight, leading to a combined data set of 228 after exclusions (i.e., based on 
failing one or more pairs of practice blocks). While the binary IRAP from Study 
Three was slightly different (it used the words “men” and “women” while the others 
used “men are” and “women are”), this was not considered so significant a 
difference that it merited exclusion. Analysis One will involve tests for IRAP effects 
at the trial-type level and gender differences, in addition to a correlation analysis 
with the MS. As the sample size has increased, these correlations will be run on the 
individual trial-types as well as the overall DIRAP scores. Given that each experiment 
included a different domain-specific assessment (i.e., the hiring task, androcentric 
bias task, or LSH) and this was always administered before the IRAPs, this analysis 
will also explore any differences based on study.  
6.2.1 Results 
Trial Type Effects 
 As evidenced by the data in Table 6.1 and Figure 6.1, the direction and 
magnitude of trial-type effects did not change notably from the individual 
experiments: participants associated men with stereotypically masculine traits and 
women with stereotypically feminine traits. There was a bias against associating men 
with feminine traits, while effects on the women-masculine trial type were very close 
to zero. Effects were more pronounced (i.e., were larger in a more binary-consistent 
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direction) for male than female participants on all trial types except the women-
feminine trial type. This suggests an own-group bias of sorts on the role-congruent 
trial types related to participants’ own gender (i.e., the men-masculine trial types for 
male participants and the women-feminine trial types for female participants).  
Table 6.1 
 
Descriptive statistics for binary IRAP trial types by participant gender  
  
Trial Type  Gender  Mean     SD  N  
Men-masculine   Female   0.22  0.37  101   
    Male   0.44  0.38  128   
Men-feminine   Female   0.07  0.33  101   
    Male   0.22  0.35  128   
Women-masculine   Female         7.228e -4   0.33  101   
    Male   -0.05  0.36  128   
Women-feminine   Female   -0.28  0.35  101   
    Male   -0.18  0.35  128   
 
 
Figure 6.1. Mean DIRAP scores by trial type.  
 
One sample t-tests were run on the pooled data set to examine the 
significance of these effects at the trial type level (Table 6.2). For consistency and 
comparison, these analyses were run on the entire sample rather than split by gender. 
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The effects followed an identical pattern to the individual studies: significant effects 
were found on the men-masculine, women-feminine and men-feminine trial types. 
These correspond to men-are-masculine, women-are-feminine, men-are not-
feminine biases respectively. No significant effects were found for the women-
masculine trial type, indicating there no particular bias in either a role-congruent or 
incongruent direction.   
Table 6.2 
 
One sample t-test results  
  
Trial Type t  df  p  Cohen's d  
Men-masculine   13.365   228   < .001   0.883   
Men-feminine   6.763   228   < .001   0.447   
Women-masculine   -1.189   228   0.236   -0.079   
Women-feminine   -9.621   228   < .001   -0.636   
 
Gender Differences 
A mixed between-within 2x4 ANOVA was carried out to investigate gender 
differences in the overall sample. This analysis found significant differences across 
male and female participants, F (1, 227) = 22.86, p <.001, with a medium effect size 
(η² = .09). Follow-up independent samples t-tests were conducted to identify the 
specific trial-types driving this effect. After a Bonferroni correction was applied 
(bringing the acceptable p value cut-off to .0125), significant differences were found 
on the men trial types only (i.e., men-masculine and men-feminine) with male 
participants displaying significantly larger men-masculine and men-not-feminine 
biases (see Table 6.3). Effect sizes (calculated using Cohen’s d) for both were in the 
medium range.  
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Table 6.3 
 
Independent Samples T-Test results comparing trial-type scores by gender  
         t  df  p  Cohen's d  
Men-masculine   -4.38  227.0   < .001   -0.58  
Men-feminine   -3.38  227.0   < .001   -0.45  
Women-masculine   1.09  227.0   0.279   0.14  
Women-feminine   -2.08  227.0   0.039   -0.28  
 
Study Differences  
 A separate 4x5 ANOVA was run to investigate any differences based on 
study; that is, any differences potentially caused by the preceding domain-specific 
task (i.e., Likelihood to Sexually Harass scale, androcentric bias task, or hiring 
preference task). This analysis found a significant difference based on study, F (4, 
224) = 3.049, p = .018, with a small-to-medium effect size (η² = .052). A significant 
study-trial type interaction effect was also found here, F (12, 672) = 1.196, p = .022, 
though the effect size was small (η² = .052). As evidenced by Table 6.4, means were 
highest on all trial types for Studies Six (using the androcentric bias task) and Eight 
(using the Likelihood to Sexually Harass scale). Means for the other studies did not 
vary reliably across studies (see Table 6.4). While these results will be discussed in 
more detail in the next chapter, they suggest that IRAP effects were at least partially 
influenced by the preceding domain-specific tasks. However, is important to note 
that effects likely interact with participant gender, given that study Eight used male 
participants only. Analysing by gender and conducting follow-up tests would not be 
appropriate here as it would (a) require removing Study Eight from the analysis, and 
(b) conducting multiple 2x5 follow up ANOVAs per trial type. This would 
substantially reduce the statistical power of the analysis and increase the risk of a 
Type 1 error. As such, it is sufficient at this stage to descriptively note that there are 
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differences based on study type, and that these should be reviewed later and followed 
up in future studies.  
Table 6.4 
 
Descriptive statistics for IRAP trial types by study number  
  
Trial type  Study  Mean  SD  N  
Men-masculine   Eight   0.48  0.33  49   
    Five   0.40  0.33  37   
    Four   0.30  0.39  60   
    Six   0.31  0.44  39   
    Three   0.24  0.42  44   
Men-feminine   Eight   0.29  0.31  49   
    Five   0.12  0.32  37   
    Four   0.14  0.39  60   
    Six   0.18  0.34  39   
    Three   0.04  0.33  44   
Women-masculine   Eight   -0.07  0.35  49   
    Five   -0.01  0.32  37   
    Four   0.03  0.31  60   
    Six   -0.09  0.35  39   
    Three   -0.01  0.40  44   
Women-feminine   Eight   -0.25  0.32  49   
    Five   -0.11  0.29  37   
    Four   -0.22  0.36  60   
    Six   -0.31  0.36  39   
    Three   -0.21  0.40  44   
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Relationship between IRAP scores and Modern Sexism 
 Spearman’s rho correlations were conducted to investigate the relationship between IRAP performance and self-reported sexism. 
The non-parametric alternative was used here because MS scores were not normally distributed. These analyses found no significant 
relationship between any of the four trial types and MS scores (see Table 6.5).  
Table 6.5 
 
Correlations between the MS and four binary IRAP trial types 
  
      Men-masculine  Men-feminine  Women-masculine  Women-feminine  Modern Sexism Scale  
Men-masculine   
Spearman's rho   —                   
p-value   —                   
Men-feminine   Spearman's rho  
 0.332  ***  —               
p-value   < .001   —               
Women-masculine   
Spearman's rho   -0.132  *  -0.215  **  —           
p-value   0.046   0.001   —           
Women-feminine   Spearman's rho  
 -0.181  **  -0.171  **  0.276  ***  —       
p-value   0.006   0.009   < .001   —       
Modern Sexism Scale   
Spearman's rho   0.019   0.084   -0.067   0.004   —   
p-value   0.777   0.205   0.311   0.958   —    
* p < .05, ** p < .01, *** p < .001  
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6.3 Analysis Two: 
Assessing the IRAP’s Measurement Invariance Between Female and Male 
Participants 
Analysis Two aims to apply measurement invariance to the pooled IRAP data 
set to further inform the interpretation of IRAP effects and, specifically, the observed 
gender differences. As mentioned, measurement invariance refers to a measure’s 
ability to assess the same underlying construct in the same way across different 
populations or contexts. Measurement invariance has most frequently been applied 
to questionnaire or other self-report data, usually to examine whether validated 
scales are appropriate for a specific population or investigate whether a scale may be 
used in a repeated-measures or longitudinal design (see Flake, Pek, & Hehman, 
2017). While measurement invariance has not been examined in the context of 
implicit measures to date, such an approach may provide useful and important 
insights into both the IRAP and its interpretation. For example, the IRAP could fail 
to meet measurement invariance if certain stimulus categories had different 
meanings or salience for men versus women (e.g., due to differences in 
socialisation). This could mean men and women approach the completion of the task 
in an importantly different way, differentially pay attention to some trial types more 
than others, or some other unforeseen ways.  
It is important to note that passing or failing measurement invariance would 
not undermine the observation that men and women differ in their IRAP 
performances (as seen in previous studies and in the pooled analysis); rather it helps 
guide the interpretation of these differences. For example, it would elucidate whether 
these effects are due to differences in a latent variable that is being assessed in the 
same way between the groups (e.g., differential automatic binary biases between 
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groups), or differences in the way men and women experience, interpret, or produce 
behaviour within the IRAP (e.g., differential meanings or salience of words, or how 
differences in how attention directed within the task).  
Component Tests 
Testing for measurement invariance is done using a Confirmatory Factor 
Analysis (CFA) framework. CFA is an extension of regression modelling, where one 
assesses whether multiple observed indicator variables (often individual self-report 
items, or IRAP trial types in this case) can be said to collectively measure an 
indirectly observed or latent variable (e.g., Implicit Gender Bias). Measurement 
invariance involves fitting increasingly constrained models to the same data and 
checking goodness of fit, where each level of constraint represents the test of a 
specific assumption. It typically involves three component tests: configural 
invariance, metric invariance, and scalar invariance (Putnick & Bornstein, 2016; van 
de Schoot, Lugtig, & Hox, 2012; Vandenberg & Lance, 2000). These tests are 
hierarchical: if one test is failed the next test does not need to be run, as 
measurement invariance has not been met. The nature of these three tests will be 
described first, followed by a description of the specific statistics used to assess 
model within these tests. 
Configural invariance involves fitting the same measurement model to each 
group that is being tested for measurement invariance. In this case, this means fitting 
separate CFA models to the men and women subsamples. The base model assumes a 
single latent variable (e.g., “Implicit Gender Bias”), and that this latent variable is 
formed by four observed variables, the IRAP trial types (i.e., men-masculine, men-
feminine, women-masculine, and women-feminine). This model was selected 
because it formalizes that which the analyses in the previous chapters implicitly rely 
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on (e.g., by examining differences between the IRAP trial types between genders, 
and by correlating the overall DIRAP score with other variables). Configural 
invariance therefore tests the assumption that the same base measurement model can 
be said to fit in both samples. Failure to find configural invariance can be interpreted 
loosely as the possibility that men and women interpret the IRAP differently as they 
complete it (e.g., attribute differential meanings or salience to words, follow its 
instructions differently, or pay attention to different features of the task).  
Testing for metric invariance involves fitting a more constrained model to the 
whole dataset. Specifically, it tests the additional assumption that each indicator (in 
this case trial type) is an equally good measure of the latent variable, and therefore 
that no trial types (or items were this a self-report measure) are redundant in driving 
inter-individual or intergroup differences. Technically speaking, this is done by 
forcing the factor loadings for all indicators to be equivalent. Failure to find metric 
invariance can be interpreted loosely as the possibility that the IRAP trial types are a 
better measure of Implicit Gender Bias in one gender than the other. That is, any 
differences in IRAP scores may be due to differences in quality of measurement 
rather than differences in the underlying thing being measured. 
Finally, testing for scalar invariance involves fitting an even more 
constrained model to the whole dataset. Specifically, it tests the additional 
assumption that the indicators link the observed and latent variables in the same way. 
For example, for all indicators, whether a DIRAP score of 0.30 on two different trial-
types can be said to represent a comparable degree of bias, and therefore allow for a 
common interpretation. This is done by forcing both the factor loadings and also the 
intercepts to be equivalent. Failure to find scalar invariance can be interpreted 
loosely as the possibility that the IRAP trial types are interpreted on a different scale 
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between the groups. That is, the same IRAP DIRAP scores in men versus women may 
refer to different levels of underlying Implicit Gender Bias. This is another form of 
differences in quality of measurement rather than differences in the underlying thing 
being measured. 
Should all tests be passed, measurement invariance is said to be met. More 
technically, this means that correlations between the measure and with external 
variables can be interpreted in a comparable manner between the invariant 
subgroups.  
Assessment of Model Fit 
Unlike null hypothesis significance testing, which relies on a narrow range of 
statistics (e.g., p values) and cut-off values (e.g., alpha = 0.05) to make conclusions, 
the fit of a CFA model to the data can be assessed using a wide variety of both 
different statistics and cut-off values. This has led to great degree of heterogeneity in 
the methods used to assess measurement invariance. Contemporary 
recommendations are that multiple fit metrics should be reported for completeness, 
and a subset of these should be employed for decision-making (see Putnick & 
Bornstein, 2016; Vandenberg & Lance, 2000 for reviews and recommendations). 
The following indices were therefore calculated and reported: measures of absolute 
fit: Chi squared tests and Root Mean Square of the Residual (RMSR); measure of 
relative fit: the Tucker Lewis Fit Index (TLI); and noncentrality indices: 
Comparative Fit Index (CLI) and the Root Mean Square Error of Approximation 
(RMSEA and its 95% CIs). For the sake of decision making, metrics and cut-off  
criteria were selected on the basis of the recommendations of commonly cited 
simulation studies (Chen, 2007; see also Hu & Bentler, 1999). Specifically, 
configural fit was assessed using RMSEA ≤ 0.06 and CFI ≥ .95. Metric and scalar 
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invariance were assessed by assessing the change-in-fit between models (i.e., 
between configural and metric, metric and scalar) meeting both ΔCFI > -.01 and 
ΔRMSEA < .015. This use of a two-metric decision making strategy is consistent 
with Hu and Bentler’s (1999) recommendations on minimizing combined false 
positive and false negative rates, and is now the current modal reporting practice 
according to a recent review (Putnick & Bornstein, 2016).  
6.3.1 Results 
As measurement invariance cannot be conducted in JASP (which was used 
for all previous analyses), it was conducted using R and specifically the packages 
lavaan and semTools (Jorgensen et al., 2018; Rosseel, 2012). Configural, metric, and 
scalar tests were fit to the data using the parameter constraints described above. 
Results of each test can be found in Table 6.6, and the CFA configural model plots 
for the men and women subsamples can be found in Figure 6.2. Results 
demonstrated that the configural model found good fit in female participants but bad 
fit in male participants. As such, the IRAP in the current sample was found not to 
meet measurement invariance. While there is technically no need to run the tests for 
metric and scalar invariance, they are reported for completeness.  
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Figure 6.2. Plot of the CFA configural models fit within male and female 
participants.  
 
 
 
Figure 6.2. Plot of the CFA configural models fit within male (upper panel) and 
female participants (lower panel). IGB refers to the latent variable (Implicit Gender 
Bias) and squares refer to the IRAP trial types. Lines between them refer to the 
relative factor loadings. Curved lines refer to the associated error terms. Differences 
in factor loads can be seen between the panels, which contribute to measurement 
invariance between the samples
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Table 6.6  
Results of the measurement invariance tests. 
          95% CI      
Test Subset Parameters χ2 df p SRMR TLI CFI RMSEA lower upper ΔSRMR ΔTLI ΔCFI ΔRMSEA Decision 
Configural  Men 8 5.73   2 .057 0.05 0.78 0.93 0.13 0.00 0.27 - - - - Fail 
 
Women 8 0.16   2 .921 0.01 1.16 1.00 0.00 0.00 0.08 - - - - Pass 
 
All 24 5.90   4 .207 0.03 0.93 0.98 0.07 0.00 0.19 - - - - - 
Metric All 21 8.64   7 .280 0.05 0.97 0.98 0.05 0.00 0.14 0.02 0.03 0.00 -0.02 Pass 
Scalar All 18 27.72 10 .002 0.09 0.75 0.79 0.14 0.08 0.20 0.04 -0.22 -0.19 0.09 Fail 
Notes: Good configural fit refers to meeting both of Root Mean Square Error of Approximation (RMSEA) ≤ 0.06 and Comparative Fit Index (CFI) ≥ 
0.95; good metric and scalar fit refers to meeting ΔRMSEA < .015 and ΔCFI > -0.01. The configural model using all participants is included only to 
calculate change in fit metrics for metric and scalar invariance: no decision making is done on the basis of this model. 
SRMR = Standardised Root Mean Square residual. TLI = Tucker Lewis Index.  
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6.4 Results Summaries 
Pooled Analyses 
 Analysis One substantially informed the findings and interpretations of the 
current thesis. First, it demonstrated that automatic binary biases were indeed large 
and significant for the overall sample. In so doing, this analysis attested to the 
IRAP’s utility in measuring the binary at the level of automatic cognition. Second, it 
shed light on the inconsistent gender differences observed throughout this thesis and 
also the specific trial types driving these effects. Third, the pooled analysis showed 
that the IRAP may be susceptible to seemingly extraneous influences within specific 
studies (i.e., the tasks presented prior to completing the IRAP). Lastly, it 
demonstrated that automatic binary biases were unrelated to self-reported sexist 
beliefs, or at least those captured on the Modern Sexism Scale. Each of these 
findings will be discussed in the next chapter.  
Measurement Invariance 
The absence of measurement invariance suggests that differences between 
men and women on the observed variable (the DIRAP scores) should not be 
interpreted as reflecting differences in an overarching latent variable (Implicit 
Gender Bias). Instead, differences in IRAP scores might be attributable to one or 
more of several things, for example differences in the meaning of the word stimuli 
employed within the task, differential salience of/attention to the stimuli within the 
task, differences in strategies to complete the task, or differences in how they 
interpret or follow the instructions. Some evidence for differential meaning or 
salience can be found in the differential factor loadings between men and women 
(see Figure 6.2). Specifically, the strongest factor load for men was the men-
feminine trial type. This indicates that inter-individual differences in responding on 
this particular trial type were driving the IRAP effect for men. In contrast, the 
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strongest factor load for women was the men-masculine trial type. This indicates that 
inter-individual differences in responding on this particular trial type were driving 
the IRAP effect for women. This could potentially be the result of the fact that 
women rated these traits as significantly less masculine than men did, though this 
will be reviewed in the next chapter. The absence of measurement invariance also 
has important implications for the broader use of the IRAP, and indeed other popular 
implicit measures. This will again be discussed in the next chapter, but in brief it 
suggests that the effects captured by the IRAP may not be generalisable across 
populations and may be more susceptible than previously thought to the effects of 
stimulus categories or exemplars.   
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Chapter 7 
General Discussion  
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7.1 Summary of the Findings from this Thesis 
The central goal of this thesis was to examine and measure the social 
construction of gender-as-binary. It aimed to add to the growing literature into 
binarist beliefs and attitudes and, specifically, explore whether such biases would be 
readily demonstrated on an implicit measure. Using the IRAP methodology, this 
work examined the extent to which young Irish adults differentially associated 
women and men with distinct sets of traits, attributes, and abilities. Studies in this 
thesis primarily looked at the binarization of gender according to traditionally 
feminine and masculine attributes, but a small number of other gender-related 
concepts were also assessed (specifically competency, uniquely human emotions, 
scientific ability, and identity). A second aim of this thesis was to assess the role of 
the binary in inequality. To this end, each study included a measure of self-reported 
sexism (the Modern Sexism Scale) as well as one other measure relating to either 
gendered hiring preferences, androcentric bias, or sexual harassment proclivity. A 
final aim of this work was to gather a larger-than-average IRAP dataset for a pooled 
analysis. This was done to both inform the conclusions drawn throughout this thesis 
(i.e., about the effects and the IRAP’s utility in this context), and also to allow for a 
more detailed investigation of gender differences. Accordingly, across five studies, 
over 229 participants completed the gender binary IRAP. This is the largest IRAP 
data set in the literature to date. Before discussing the significance of the results in 
light of the above aims, the findings from each chapter will each be summarised in 
turn.  
Chapter Two 
The aim of Chapter Two was to identify gender stimuli for use in different 
IRAPs and measures throughout this thesis. Generally speaking, the field of implicit 
testing has struggled with stimulus selection, despite the large body of research 
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showing how stimuli may influence and/or confound results (e.g., Bluemke & Friese, 
2004; Gast & Rothermund, 2010; Mitchell et al., 2003). No standardised selection 
guidelines or criteria exist in the literature, and the vast majority of studies have used 
ad hoc methods when choosing stimulus categories, labels, and exemplars (see 
Steffens et al., 2008). Therefore, to ensure the stimulus categories in this thesis were 
adequately clear, familiar, and representative of the overarching constructs (i.e., 
masculinity and femininity), the first two focused entirely on selecting exemplars for 
the core masculinity and femininity stimulus categories. Across two separate studies 
(one pilot and one larger replication) a sample of participants rated 60 personality 
traits in terms of their gender and their desirability ratings in women and men. Once 
this dataset of trait ratings was generated, four distinct stimulus categories were 
selected by a team of researchers: “Desirable Feminine”; “Desirable Masculine”; 
“Undesirable Feminine”; and “Undesirable Masculine”. Analyses showed these were 
(a) sufficiently different to one another in both valence and gender, and (b) 
significantly gendered (i.e., the masculine categories were more masculine than 
feminine, and vice versa). While male and female participants did not differ in their 
ratings for most of the categories, they did differ significantly in the “Desirable 
Masculine” category, with women evaluating these traits as more gender-neutral 
than men. This was noted as an interesting finding, but also important caveat for 
future IRAP analyses (discussed in more detail later).  
A second and more general aim of this chapter was to examine explicit 
gender trait ratings in a contemporary Irish sample. Across the two studies, ratings 
were consistent with existing literature into gender trait stereotypes: masculinity was 
associated with independence, assertiveness, and aggression (i.e., traits associated 
with agency) and femininity was associated with nurture, care, and helplessness (i.e., 
traits related to communion: Broverman, Vogel, Broverman, Clarkson, & 
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Rosenkrantz, 1994; Eagly & Karau, 2002; Newport, 2001; Gaucher, Friesen, & Kay, 
2011; Madera, Hebl, & Martin, 2009; Moscatelli, Ellemers, Menegatti, & Rubini, 
2016; Rudman, Moss-Racusin, Phelan, & Nauts, 2012; Spence & Buckner, 2000; 
Williams & Best, 1990). As has also been found in previous research, results showed 
a gender-valence interaction (or a “women-are-wonderful” effect) with the feminine 
traits considerably more positively valenced than the masculine (Broverman et al., 
1994; Eagly & Karau, 2002; Newport, 2001; Rudman et al., 2012; Spence & 
Buckner, 2000). One unexpected and novel finding, however, was the asymmetry in 
the number of highly masculine and highly feminine traits in the dataset. While 
several traits were rated as highly feminine, only a handful had a mean rating 
towards the low, masculine end of the scale. Though not hypothesised, this finding 
coheres with feminist arguments around the androcentric structure of the binary, and 
specifically the tendency to equate masculine and human stereotypes and/or or 
evaluate femininity as the more gender-specific “other” under patriarchy (Bem, 
1993; Hegarty et al., 2018; Hyde, 1984). Put simply, these data provided evidence 
that femininity may be more gendered than masculinity, at least based on the traits 
included here.  
Chapter Two lastly sought to examine the implicit societal overlap between 
masculinity and competency stereotypes by assessing participants’ hypothetical 
hiring preferences between men, women, stereotypically masculine, and 
stereotypically feminine individuals. To this end, a brief hiring preference measure 
was developed and piloted that employed the same masculine and feminine stimulus 
categories outlined above. Results were broadly consistent with existing research 
into occupational gender bias (e.g., Carli et al., 1995; Ealy et al., 2000; Eagly & 
Wood, 2016; Heilman et al., 1989, 1995; Phelan & Rudman, 2010): While the 
majority of participants did not express a preference for hiring a man over a woman, 
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nearly 90% of the sample elected to hire the witty, decisive, charismatic, and 
assertive individual. This person was not explicitly referred to as agentic or 
stereotypically masculine; however, as mentioned, analyses showed these traits were 
rated as significantly more masculine than feminine. As such, these data provide 
clear evidence for a link between men, masculinity, agency, and occupational 
success in an Irish context, which had not been examined to date.  
Chapter Three 
Chapter Three expanded on these findings by examining, first, the 
automaticity of binarist men-masculine and women-feminine associations, and 
second, the relationship between these biases and occupational preferences. While 
previous research had used the IAT to measure overall men-masculine/women-
feminine biases (or men-agentic/women-communal biases: e.g., Rudman & 
Kilianski, 2000), this chapter represented the first to use the IRAP in this domain, 
and thus the first to separate automatic gender biases at the trial type level. Using the 
stimuli obtained in the previous chapter, Studies Three, Four and Five investigated 
the strength of both role-congruent and role-incongruent biases (i.e., the extent to 
which both women and men are automatically associated with both masculine and 
feminine traits). Response patterns were the same across all three studies, with 
significant effects found on the men-masculine, women-feminine, and men-feminine 
trial types. These corresponded to men-are-masculine, women-are-feminine, and 
men-are not-feminine biases respectively. No significant biases were found on the 
women-masculine trial type in either direction. These data thus cohere with existing 
research showing that women and men tend to be differentially associated with 
feminine-communal and masculine-agentic traits (e.g., Carnes et al., 2015; Rudman 
& Kilianski, 200; Rudman & Glick, 2001). However, they also provided novel 
insights into the relevance and strength of role-incongruent biases to the construction 
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of gender. Specifically, while these data suggest that women are defined more by 
their role-congruent attributes (i.e., their femininity), men seem almost equally 
defined by their masculinity and indeed their “not-femininity”. These effects were 
replicated several times throughout this thesis, and will be discussed in more detail 
later.  
In addition to the core gender binary IRAP, Chapter Three examined the 
impact of a small number of theoretically-relevant procedural modifications on 
IRAP effects. Building on research suggesting trait valence influences outcomes on 
implicit measures (e.g., Bluemke & Friese, 2004; Rudman, 2000), Study Three 
compared effects across two IRAPs: one containing the desirable or positively 
valenced traits and the other the undesirable or negatively valenced traits. No 
significant differences were found, suggesting binary biases (at least those measured 
by the IRAP) are not affected by the valence of the stimuli employed. The next study 
(Study Four) investigated the theoretical claim that gender stereotypes are 
simultaneously descriptive and prescriptive by manipulating the relational terms 
used to connect the stimulus pairs on-screen. The first employed descriptive terms 
(i.e., men and women are masculine/feminine) and the second prescriptive terms 
(i.e., men and women should be masculine/feminine). Again, no significant 
differences were found, which could either support the claim above or indicate that 
the IRAP is less sensitive to relational qualifiers than has been previously claimed 
(Barnes-Holmes et al., 2010).   
The final aim of Chapter Three was to investigate the role of the binary in 
gender inequality, and specifically in an occupational context. Several contemporary 
models of inequality suggest that women’s discrimination arises not because of 
explicitly negative views about women or their competence, but rather because of (a) 
the implicit overlap between male, masculine, agentic, and competent traits; and (b) 
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the denial of these same traits to women (Eagly & Karau, 2002; Koenig et al., 2011). 
To test this claim, studies in this chapter compared IRAP results and performance to 
responses on different hiring preference measures. Using the same single-item hiring 
task from the previous chapter, Study Three found that the traits associated with men 
on the IRAP were evaluated as more hireable by the vast majority of the sample. As 
such, they demonstrated that the hireable (i.e., masculine) traits were readily ascribed 
to men and not women. Studies Four expanded on this by employing a multi-item 
hiring task and examining the relationship of binary biases to overall gender 
preferences. Across both, binary biases were positively correlated with a tendency to 
hire the agentic individual. Study Five additionally assessed the automaticity of 
gender-competency biases by investigating the extent to which feminine and 
masculine traits were associated with competent and incompetent traits on an IRAP. 
Similar to other studies on gender-competency biases, significant masculine-
competent and masculine-not-incompetent biases were found. Interestingly, 
however, there were no feminine-incompetent effects. Overall, these data thus 
provide clear evidence that (i) men but not women are associated with traditional 
masculine and agentic attributes; (ii) agentic attributes are evaluated as considerably 
more hireable and desirable in an occupational context; and (iii) the extent to which 
a person binarises gender (i.e., differentially associates women and men with 
communal and agentic attributes) increases their preferences for agentic individuals 
in an occupational setting. While no correlations were found in any study between 
self-reported sexism and IRAP performance, these data shed light on the broader and 
subtler relationship between the binary and male dominance and/or supremacy in 
certain contexts.   
Chapter Four 
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Chapter Four expanded on the previous studies by assessing the relationship 
of the binary to another theoretically-significant construct: androcentric bias. 
Feminist theory has long proposed that society has a tendency to equate maleness 
and humanity, and indeed the results from Chapter Two supported this (i.e., by 
suggesting that male traits are not as strongly “gendered” as female traits). Studies in 
this chapter built on this claim and previous data in a few different ways. First, they 
examined participants’ tendencies to assume maleness when presented with an 
ambiguous stimulus (i.e., they tested the default male hypothesis: Smith & Zaraté, 
1992). Using a task that was developed based on previous androcentric bias 
measures (e.g. Bailey et al., 2018), Studies Six and Seven assessed whether 
participants would attribute a male gender to a gender-neutral facial stimulus. 
Contrary to existing research, however, no evidence of androcentric bias was found 
in either study, and in fact a slight gynocentric response pattern emerged. While 
analyses suggested there may be a relationship between androcentric and binary 
biases (and specifically men-masculine biases), effect sizes were small and the 
sample size for this study was relatively low. There was, however, a relationship 
between self-reported sexism and androcentric bias, but again the effect size was 
small.   
In addition to the explicit measure of androcentrism, studies in Chapter Four 
also examined “human-as-male” bias at the automatic level. Using two separate 
IRAPs, Study Five examined the extent to which men and women were differentially 
associated with two sets of “uniquely human” attributes: (1) complex emotions and 
(2) scientific ability. The denial of complex emotions to one social group over 
another is called infrahumanisation, and has been most widely studied in the context 
of race and ethnicity (Cortes et al., 2005; Demoulin et al., 2009; Gaunt, 2009; Gaunt 
et al., 2002). Though a small number of studies using self-report methods have 
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suggested it may also occur in the context of gender (Bearman et al., 2009; Gaunt, 
2013), the infrahumanisation IRAP used here found no evidence that men were more 
readily associated with emotional complexity. Rather, both women-complex and 
men-complex biases were found and indeed the women-complex biases were 
stronger. For the gender-science IRAP, results did show a bias towards associating 
men but with science and not arts (in keeping with existing research: see Miller et 
al., 2018). However, this study also found a significant bias towards associating 
women with science, which was unexpected. Overall, therefore, studies in Chapter 
Four provided weak evidence that androcentrism is a normative feature of gender 
beliefs, at least in the current population.   
Chapter Five 
The final IRAP chapter in this thesis examined in the binary in the context of 
sexually coercive and aggressive behaviours. Along with workplace or economic 
gender equality, sexual violence is one of the most widely discussed issues in 
contemporary feminism (see McPhail, 2016). Since the 1970s, feminists have 
conceptualised rape and other forms of sexual aggression as a key manifestation of 
masculine dominance, and one which both reflects and reifies our binary patriarchal 
gender system (Brownmiller, 1975; MacKinnon, 1979). Chapter Five sought to 
investigate this empirically by assessing the relationship between gender-related 
biases and a proclivity to engage in sexual harassment in samples of young 
heterosexual Irish men. The first study in this chapter (Study Eight) built on research 
suggesting a link between gender normative beliefs and masculine gender identities 
(see Murnen et al., 2002) by including two IRAPs: one for gender binary biases and 
another for gender identity biases (i.e., self-masculine or self-feminine associations). 
Contrary to what was expected, results found no relationship between scores on the 
harassment propensity measure and the gender binary IRAP. However, there was a 
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relationship between gender identity and harassment, with the “self-masculine” trial 
type associated with a higher propensity. This coheres with existing research and 
feminist theorising (e.g. De Judicibus & McCabe, 2001; Quinn, 2002), though there 
are a number of methodological and statistical qualifiers to this finding (i.e., small 
effect size, relatively small sample, etc.).   
The second study in this Chapter (Study Nine) investigated the relationship 
between infrahumanisation biases and harassment proclivity. This study was a partial 
replication of two previous studies showing that implicit dehumanisation of women 
predicts a propensity to engage in harassment (Hussey et al., 2015; Rudman & 
Mescher, 2012), though it examined gendered associations of complexity rather than 
explicit humanity. Using the same infrahumanisation IRAP from Study Seven, this 
study found a significant correlation between propensity scores and effects on the 
men-complex trial type. However, effects were in the opposite direction than 
expected, with men-not-complex biases associated with an increased propensity to 
engage in coercion or harassment. Similar to the previous chapter, therefore, while 
these studies provided interesting insights into the use of the IRAP, these studies do 
not suggest a role of implicit biases in harassment propensity.  
Chapter Six 
One of the aims of this research was to generate a larger-than-average IRAP 
dataset for a pooled analysis. This was in the service of enhancing the statistical 
power of the analyses (i.e., around trial type, gender difference, and measure 
comparison tests), and thus more generally increasing the confidence in the 
conclusions drawn. The primary goal of this work was to examine whether automatic 
binary biases would be readily demonstrated on an implicit measure, and pooling the 
data allowed for a more fine-grained analysis of the effects produced in individual 
studies. Results of the pooled gender binary IRAP dataset (n = 229) showed strong 
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and significant effects on the three trial types mentioned previously (men-masculine, 
men-feminine, and women-feminine) and again an absence of any effect for the 
women-masculine trial type in either direction. Interestingly, results also found a 
significant main effect for Study, suggesting that the IRAP was influenced at least to 
some degree by the study’s context and/or the additional preceding measures (i.e., 
the other IRAPs or domain-specific outcome measure). No relationship was found 
between self-reported sexism and effects on any trial type.  
Pooling the IRAP data also allowed for a deeper and more thorough analysis 
of gender differences in performance. Though not included in the summaries above 
(for brevity), gender differences on the binary IRAP varied considerably throughout 
this thesis. As mentioned in the individual chapters, some found significant finding 
main effects for gender, others found no main effects but some gender interaction 
effects, and others finding no main or interaction effects. Two separate analyses 
were conducted to inform these inconsistencies: the first was a simple pooled 
ANOVA, which did find large and significant gender differences in the data overall. 
Interestingly, these differences seemed to have been driven by effects on the two 
trial types involving men (i.e., the men-masculine and men-feminine trial types). The 
second analysis was a test for measurement invariance across male and female 
participants. Somewhat surprisingly, the IRAP did not meet the criteria for 
measurement invariance in this analysis, meaning that it cannot be said to measure 
the same latent construct (i.e., implicit binary bias) in women and men. While this 
could be due to a number of reasons, the specific factor loadings and the results of 
the explicit trait ratings in Chapter Two suggest this is due to different interpretations 
of the stereotypically masculine traits. This will be discussed in more detail later in 
this chapter.   
7.2 Significance of Findings  
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Gender Binary Measurement  
The most significant contribution of this work was putting forward a new 
measurement tool for gender binary biases. To date, most research into the binary 
has relied on abstract or indirect analytic techniques, such as historical re-
interpretation, cultural critique, or linguistic and discourse analysis (see Gillis & 
Jacobs, 2016 and King, 2016 for reviews of common methods in gender studies). 
Though some questionnaires or self-report measures have been developed to assess 
psychologically-similar constructs (e.g., gender essentialism, heteronormativity, 
etc.), very few measures exist for quantifying the binary at the individual level. The 
current thesis filled this gap by proposing, first, a novel and technical way to 
operationalise the binary (i.e., as the differential association of women and men with 
traditional masculine and feminine traits), and second, conducting an in-depth 
assessment of these automatic associations on a quantitative measure. Results from 
five binary IRAP studies found strong, robust, and reliable biases towards 
associating women (but not men) with stereotypically feminine attributes and men 
(but not women) with stereotypically masculine attributes. In so doing, this work 
adds to the growing and rich literature into the gender binary, introduces a new 
experimental paradigm for quantitative researchers, and adds empirical weight to the 
feminist arguments that the binary is indeed a highly automatic, foundational, and 
axiomatic feature of gender beliefs (e.g., Ridgeway, 2011).  
In addition to providing a new way to operationalise and measure the binary, 
this work also provides novel and interesting insights into the structure of gender 
itself. Most mainstream models of gender acknowledge the relational nature of 
gender categories (e.g., Butler, 1990; West & Zimmerman, 1980), and the broad way 
in which men and women are framed as “complementary opposites” (Jost & Kay, 
2005; Koenig, 2018). Though research to date has generally struggled with 
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demonstrating this empirically, the IRAP’s procedural properties make it ideal for 
assessing this process. Specifically, because the IRAP can be scored at the trial-type 
level, this work could assess the extent to which both men and women are associated 
with both masculine and feminine traits. That is, it can examine the significance of 
both role-congruent and incongruent associations to the overall structure of gender 
roles. Results provide strong evidence that women and men are indeed defined by 
both their role congruent and incongruent attributes (that is, men are defined by their 
masculinity and “not-femininity”, and women by their femininity and “not-
masculinity”). As such, these data support the theoretical argument that male and 
female traits are not merely distinct, but also mutually exclusive. The ability to 
separate biases in this way provides therefore distinguishes the current work from 
existing implicit and explicit studies of gender roles stereotypes (Broverman, Vogel, 
Broverman, Clarkson, & Rosenkrantz, 1994; Eagly & Karau, 2002; Newport, 2001; 
Gaucher, Friesen, & Kay, 2011; Madera, Hebl, & Martin, 2009; Moscatelli, 
Ellemers, Menegatti, & Rubini, 2016; Rudman, Moss-Racusin, Phelan, & Nauts, 
2012; Spence & Buckner, 2000; Williams & Best, 1990) and allows for stronger 
theoretical conclusions about the relational nature of the binary .   
Trial type analyses also shed light on the potentially asymmetrical ways in 
which we may “gender” men relative to women. Across nearly all studies and 
IRAPs, participants demonstrated strong resistance towards associating men with 
traditionally feminine attributes (i.e., strong men-not-feminine biases). However, the 
same was generally not true for women, with results on the women-masculine trial 
tending to show no significant bias in either direction. While this was not explicitly 
hypothesised at the outset, this response pattern does cohere with existing theories of 
gender identity and gender role development. Several researchers have argued that 
masculinity is potentially a more rigid social construct than femininity with more 
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well-defined boundaries (Bem, 1993; Leaper & Friedman, 2007; Thorne, 1993). 
Observational, discourse-analytic, and survey studies have supported this, showing 
for instance that gender-nonconforming behaviour tend to be more severely punished 
in men relative to women, particularly in early life (Adams & Coltrane, 2004; Bem, 
1993; Kimmel & Messner, 2009; Leaper, 2002), and also that men struggle to a 
greater degree with gender role stress than women (Levant et al., 2003; Smiler, 
2006). As discussed previously, the typical explanations for this effect are, first, that 
many of our patriarchal or male-dominated social spheres (such as politics or 
business) place more value on masculine traits, meaning that gender-role deviations 
are more problematic in men than women (see Coltrane & Adams, 2008). The 
second explanation is that women are encouraged to aspire to masculinity (as the 
higher-status category in the gender order), and thus that “progress” tends to 
manifest as women adopting more agentic characteristics (e.g., Smiler, 2006; 
Wetherell, 1998). These results provide tentative support for these explanations, 
though it would be interesting to elaborate on findings with additional measures of 
gender role beliefs, potentially at multiple levels of analysis (e.g., discursive, 
attitudinal, etc.).   
It is also interesting at this point to draw a comparison between implicit and 
explicit assessments of gender trait evaluations. Chapter Two gathered explicit trait 
ratings of various different traits (some stereotypically masculine, some neutral, and 
some stereotypically feminine) and found that, overall, there were very few 
“extreme” ratings in the set (i.e., very few traits with a mean rating close to the low 
or high end of the scale). This was particularly pronounced in the case of the 
masculine trait ratings. On the implicit measures, however, participants 
demonstrated strong and reliable biases towards associating women and men with 
feminine and masculine traits. While the comparisons were between and not within 
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groups (and thus do not allow for concrete conclusions), the differences in the two 
datasets potentially attest to the importance of the relational context on trait 
“gendering”. Specifically, because the IRAP requires participants to gender traits in 
a relational way (i.e., form men-masculine and women-feminine associations at the 
same time) but the explicit scale requires participants to gender traits in the abstract, 
these data provide further support that gender categories are relationally defined 
(e.g., Bem, 1993; Butler, 1990; Harding, 1990).   
Additional IRAPs  
While the effects on the core gender binary IRAP were both strong and 
reliable, it is important to note that response patterns on the other IRAPs varied 
considerably. Throughout this thesis, effects were either weak (e.g., the gender-
competency IRAP) and/or broadly inconsistent with existing research or theory (e.g., 
the infrahumanisation, gender-science, and or identity IRAPs). As discussed in the 
individual chapters, it is likely these inconsistencies were due in part to different 
methodological issues with the individual measures. On the infrahumanisation IRAP, 
for instance, outcomes may have been unintentionally confounded by conflicting 
gendered connotations associated with the individual exemplars, or indeed the 
overarching category labels (e.g., “angry men” or “complicated women”). Similarly, 
the contrast category chosen for the identity IRAP (other men) may have influenced 
outcomes, while the competency IRAP may have been too complicated for 
participants to interpret in a quick or intuitive way. Another possible explanation is 
that the stimulus categories used in the gender-competency and infrahumanisation 
IRAPs were too weak (i.e. they did not form a strong enough category to use as 
stimulus labels). In both of these studies, reference sheets were given to participants 
to clarify the label stimuli (masculine/feminine and complex/simple traits) but this 
may not have been sufficient to coalesce the categories. Indeed, it may have 
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influenced results in an unknown way. Though these IRAPs were all included in the 
service of exploratory, secondary or supplementary research questions (and thus do 
not undermine the significance of the overall findings too strongly), these data 
further attest to the importance of careful stimulus and category selection (Nosek, 
2007; Steffens et al., 2008). In addition, they demonstrate the benefits of piloting, 
replicating and validating newly developed implicit measures (see also Levin, 2007).  
Outside of the methodological issues, the absence of theoretically-consistent 
biases on these IRAPs may also be due to the nature of the beliefs or attitudinal 
constructs themselves. As mentioned in the General Introduction, implicit measures 
are generally only seen as appropriate for biases that are highly automatic as opposed 
to those which are more complicated and/or elaborated (Fazio & Olsen, 2003; 
Greenwald et al.,2002). While the gender binary seems to be a particularly well-
entrenched and normative feature of gender cognition, it is possible that the others 
are too subtle for an implicit assessment and/or less readily demonstrated under 
conditions of automaticity. Identity, for instance, may require a more detailed 
assessment paradigm that can properly account for the many contextual, personal, 
and ideological factors that make up a person’s gender self-concept (Van Anders, 
2015). Similarly, while the overlap between masculine traits and competency may be 
evidenced on self-report measures such as the hiring task employed in this thesis, 
gender role-competency biases may be too complex or contextual for an implicit 
measure. This explanation is of course conjecture and would require a more focused 
investigation, and perhaps a more direct comparison of implicit and explicit 
measures of the same construct. Overall, however, results support the theory of 
automaticity in the context of social cognition (Bargh, 1994; Gawronski, 2013), and 
more generally the argument that different types of attitudes may require different 
types of measures (De Houwer, 2001; Hughes et al., 2011).  
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Gender Differences in Binary Biases 
The next finding that has significant implications for the literature concerns 
the gender differences. While differences in male and female performances varied 
across individual studies, the pooled analysis in Chapter Six found large and 
significant differences on the binary IRAP, with men showing more binary-
consistent effects on nearly all trial-types (women had higher scores on the women-
feminine trial-type). A face value interpretation of this finding is that women and 
men simply differ in terms of the underlying construct being measured (i.e., binary 
biases), and thus that men have stronger automatic biases in the context of gender. 
This interpretation would be consistent with the broader body of literature around 
explicit and implicit gender beliefs, and the reliable finding that men hold more 
sexist, traditional, and gender-normative views than women (see Russell & Trigg, 
2004). As the IRAP failed measurement invariance, however, these differences 
should not be attributed to genuine variation in the latent variable. Rather, they 
appear to result from differences in how women and men navigate, respond to, or 
interpret the task. While measurement invariance analyses cannot provide definitive 
causes for why different groups may complete a measure in the same way (Flake et 
al., 2017), the likely explanation here is differing interpretations of the stimuli used 
in the measure.  
To elaborate, based on the results from the trait rating scale in Chapter Two 
and the confirmatory factor analysis in Chapter Six, the logical explanation would be 
that women and men differentially evaluate or “gender” the masculine-agentic traits. 
As mentioned previously, research conducted over the past few decades suggests 
women’s stereotypes have been gradually moving in a more androgynous and/or 
agentic direction (Brewster & Padavic, 2000; Cotter et al., 2011; Eagly & Karau, 
2002; Miller et al., 2018). In the IRAP, therefore, if these traits were not gendered in 
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the same way by female and male participants, then the entire structure and format of 
the task would have been different for these two groups. For instance, if the feminine 
traits were in fact the more gendered attributes for women, then they may have 
formed a more salient or coherent category. As such, they may have unintentionally 
paid greater attention to the feminine trial types over the others, thus influencing 
reaction times and potentially overall effects. A related possibility is that women had 
slower relative reaction times to the men-masculine pairings during the binary-
consistent IRAP blocks (i.e., the blocks where they associated men with masculine 
and women with feminine), given that these traits were not seen as strongly male. 
These are just two possible explanations, however, and would require a more 
focused analysis in order to be substantiated.  
It is important to note, of course, that the lack of measurement invariance 
may not specific to the gender binary IRAP. That is, it may be a more general issue 
with the IRAP or indeed implicit measures more generally. Research shows that men 
and women often in terms of their performances on cognitive and behavioural tasks 
(see Richardson, 2013 for a comprehensive review), and that they may occasionally 
use different strategies when navigating through psychological paradigms (e.g., 
generate different mental rules or heuristics, engage in more or less proactive 
behaviours, etc.: see Scheuringer, Wittig & Pletzer, 2017). While no other 
measurement invariance analyses of implicit measures could be found in the 
literature for a direct comparison, studies of questionnaire data suggest variance 
across gender groups is common (e.g., Nien & Duda, 2008; Levant et al., 2013). 
Ambivalent Sexism Theory (Glick & Fiske, 2001) do recommend treating gender as 
a mediator and not a moderator of gender beliefs, and indeed results here support this 
explanation, and indeed perhaps changing how gender is analysed in psychological 
experiments. This is of course a much broader issue than could be meaningfully 
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discussed here, but generally the issue of gender variance in measure development 
requires addressing (Flake et al., 2017; Hatlevik et al., 2017).  
The IRAP Methodology  
Though analysing the IRAP’s methodological features and properties was not 
a goal of this work, results do inform our understanding of the measure and its use in 
social psychological research. The most significant contribution was elucidating the 
role of stimuli, and thus demonstrating the importance of careful stimulus selection 
procedures. Without the explicit trait ratings collected in Chapter Two, for instance, 
it would have been very difficult to interpret the results of the measurement 
invariance analysis or indeed the gender differences more broadly. It also would 
have been difficult to draw strong conclusions about the measure itself and its ability 
to detect role-congruent or role-incongruent gender biases (that is, because the 
attributes could not have been said to meaningfully represent masculine and 
feminine attributes for the populations sampled in later studies). This research 
demonstrates the utility and benefits of both conducting pilot research and following 
clear stimulus selection procedures, and thereby adds support to the arguments made 
elsewhere around the importance of stimuli in implicit measures (Steffens et al., 
2008).  
Results from this thesis also informed our understanding of the IRAP’s 
sensitivity (or lack of sensitivity) to certain procedural modifications. To look first at 
the impact of study context, the pooled analyses found that binary IRAP effects 
differed significantly across the five experiments. This of course could have been 
due to natural variation in the samples, and indeed the unequal gender distribution 
across studies may have influenced outcomes (i.e. Study Eight was a male-only 
sample). Generally speaking, however, the samples were comparable in terms of 
their demographics and self-reported gender beliefs and it is therefore likely that 
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performances were influenced at least in part by the other measures. The domain-
specific measure was always presented before the IRAPs in this thesis, and these 
different measures varied considerably in both content and length. Specifically, the 
brief hiring preference measure was quite opaque in its reference to gender, while 
the longer sexual harassment measure was very clearly about gender-related abuse. 
Though the research into the impact of additional tasks on implicit measures is 
scarce, some studies do suggest they are susceptible to procedural influences or 
primes (e.g., Gawronski, Geschke & Banse, 2003; Payne, Burkley & Stokes, 2008). 
In addition to the domain-specific task, most studies in this thesis also included a 
second IRAP, which may have also influenced results. Though the order of IRAPs 
were always counterbalanced across participants (in keeping with convention: see 
Hussey et al., 2015), this variety would have meant differences in both IRAP 
experience and fatigue across studies. As both are known to influence implicit 
effects, the variation in the number of IRAPs included across studies may have been 
a factor here (see Nosek et al., 2005). Regardless of the source of the effect, future 
research should examine this more directly (e.g., by using a single IRAP in a 
homogenous sample and manipulating the content, length or style or a preceding 
measure).  
Though the IRAP was unexpectedly sensitive to changes in the study’s 
context, it was surprisingly insensitive to other procedural changes made in early 
experiments. Study Three found no differences in IRAP performance depending on 
the valence of the traits used, and analyses also found no differences in the extent to 
which theses biases were associated with scores on other measures (i.e., the sexism 
or hiring preference measure). Similarly, Study Four found no difference depending 
on the relational terms used (i.e., are versus should be), though these IRAPs did 
differ slightly in their relationship to hiring preferences. As mentioned in the 
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individual chapters, the lack of difference across IRAPs could be evidence of the 
simultaneously positive, negative, prescriptive, and descriptive nature of 
contemporary gender roles (Eagly & Karau, 2002; Prentice & Carranaza, 2002; 
Koenig, 2018). Alternatively, it could be that participants are simply responding to 
the most salient information for each of the categories (i.e., “masculine” or 
“feminine”) and ignoring other more sensitive procedural information. This would 
contradict claims made elsewhere in the literature that the IRAP can detect subtle 
stimulus relations (e.g. Barnes-Holmes et al., 2010), though again this is conjecture 
and would require a follow up in a future study.  
This work’s final contribution to our understanding of the IRAP comes from 
the measurement invariance analysis. While the significance of the measurement 
variance to our understanding of gender differences was discussed above, the 
analysis also raises more general questions around the use of the IRAP in social 
psychological research. To put it simply, if a gender IRAP is variant across gender 
groups, then it is highly likely IRAPs in other contexts would be variant as well (i.e., 
race IRAPs for different racial groups, age IRAPs for different age groups, and so 
on). This would have significant consequences for the interpretation of the effect 
(i.e., as indicative of the latent construct or not: see Flake, 2017), but would also 
significantly limit the IRAP’s use in correlational, group comparison, or longitudinal 
designs. According to Putnick & Bornstein (2016), measurement invariance should 
be considered akin to other forms of validity and reliability testing, and should be 
factored into the measure development process. When a measure fails tests for 
invariance, these researchers suggest continually modifying and re-testing different 
items, stimuli, or procedural properties until the measure meets criteria. In our case, 
this may mean returning to the individual stimuli used and working on finding more 
representative exemplars for the individual categories, though future research could 
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also go back and examine the impact of other manipulations (e.g., response rules or 
instructions, etc.).   
The Role of the Binary in Inequality   
The final significant finding of this research concerns the role of the binary in 
inequality. Feminist theorising has long implicated binary ideologies in women’s 
oppression (Bem, 1993; Butler, 1990; Harding, 1990; Kimmel, 2009), but 
experimental work in this area is scarce. The current research thus conducted several 
investigations into the relationship between binary biases and other forms of self-
reported discrimination, bias, and prejudice. Results varied considerably across 
studies and domains, with evidence found in some contexts and not in others. In the 
context of workplace inequality, results from Chapters Two and Three provided 
clear evidence that the binary underpins male dominance in occupational settings. 
Across both implicit and explicit assessments, there was a clear and direct link 
between men, masculine, and hireable traits, and a recurrent resistance towards 
associating these same hireable traits with women. Direct evidence for this 
relationship came from Studies Four and Five, which both found moderate positive 
correlations between binary biases on the IRAP and overall masculine hiring 
preferences. Overall, these findings thus support previous research identifying a link 
between masculine traits and competency or leadership (Eagly & Carli, 2007; 
Koenig et al., 2011; Koenig, 2018) and more broadly the argument that Western 
societies continue to implicitly prioritize masculine values and traits (Broverman, 
Vogel, Broverman, Clarkson, & Rosenkrantz, 1972; Johnson, 2005; Serano, 2009).  
In the other contexts, however, the relationships were either weak, 
underpowered, or in the unexpected direction. With regards to infrahumanisation, 
effects were inconsistent with previous research and there were no meaningful 
relationships between such biases and performances on the IRAP. Similarly, while 
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there were some links between binary biases and sexual harassment proclivity, 
generally speaking the effects were weak and should be interpreted cautiously given 
the number of comparisons. The pooled analysis also found no relationship between 
self-reported sexism and scores any binary IRAP trial-type. Though these effects 
should all be considered tentative given the number of statistical comparisons being 
made in each study and the various methodological issues with individual IRAPs 
(discussed above), it is nonetheless important to note that studies in this thesis 
provided little evidence that the binary underpins inequality. That is, at least at the 
level of belief-belief or belief-behaviour relationships, conclusions would be very 
different at a sociological or cultural level of analysis.  
There are, however, some important methodological caveats to both the 
significant and insignificant results that require addressing. First, the analyses 
throughout this thesis were conducted on the entire sample (i.e., female and male 
participants), but the IRAP failed measurement invariance. When a measure is 
variant, combined analyses are not considered appropriate (Flake, 2017) and this 
calls the above findings and measure comparison conclusions generally into 
question. Second, it should be noted that there is a general debate within the attitude 
literatures regarding the predictive utility of implicit measures, and precisely when 
(or indeed if) implicit and explicit assessments should be expected to correlate 
(Nosek, 2007; Payne et al., 2008). Attitudes are multifaceted constructs that are 
likely subject to a range of personal, situational, and cultural influences (Deaux & 
Snyder, 2012). The current research assessed only one component aspect of gender 
bias at one specific level of analysis, but in reality social attitudes and behaviours 
operate at multiple levels of complexity, awareness, and intentionality (De Houwer, 
2001; Hughes et al., 2011). It could thus be that binary biases (measured in this way) 
are more of a feature or reflection of binarist ideologies, and not necessarily a 
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“stage” in the discrimination process. While not a limitation of the current work as 
such, this debate is a useful reminder to be precise around the language and 
terminology used (i.e., not to conflate an automatic bias with a deliberated and 
elaborated set of beliefs, or indeed with harmful real-world behaviours), and also 
tentative regarding the nature of the relationship that is expected between measures, 
even in theory.     
7.3 Issues for Consideration  
Cultural and Contextual Factors  
While each of the main findings have now been discussed, it is important to 
acknowledge some more general limitations and issues for consideration or follow 
up. Firstly, though this was mentioned briefly in the General Introduction, it is 
important to acknowledge that this thesis worked entirely within a Western 
framework. The roles used here reflect the specific spatial and temporal location of 
the modern West and should thus not be considered reflective of gender categories 
on the whole (see Fausto-Sterling, 2000; and Oakley, 2016 for a more detailed 
review of role differences across cultures and time periods). Also, while it was 
necessary for theoretical and design purposes, this thesis also treated masculinity and 
femininity as homogenous categories when of course they are varied, complex social 
constructs. Radical and third-wave feminists increasingly acknowledge the 
intersectional nature of social categories, and the ways in which different social 
dimensions interact in the context of inequality (Collins, 2015; Crenshaw, 1989; 
Davis, 2008). For example, research into the lived experiences of Black women 
shows that their oppression is more than the simple combined experiences of being 
both Black and a woman. Rather, these individuals can experience entirely unique 
forms of prejudice that neither Black men or White women experience (e.g., hyper-
sexualisation: see Benard, 2016 for a review). This is of course just one example of 
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intersectional prejudice, and there are several dimensions that are known to influence 
and interact with gender evaluations (e.g., class, physical ability, and so on: see 
hooks, 2014). While it would be difficult to bring this level of complexity to bear in 
an implicit assessment, future research should be both conscious of these 
intersections and potentially focused on examining their influence on bias.   
It is also very important to note that this research worked entirely within a 
binary system of knowledge. Participants across all studies identified as either 
female or male, and no studies investigated evaluations or gendered associations 
about non-binary individuals. As reviewed at length in the introduction, non-binary 
individuals experience considerable social prejudice and discrimination (Hegarty et 
al., 2018; Murjan & Bouman, 2015; Van Anders et al., 2017) and it is important that 
research continues to understand and interrogate these biases. Moreover, it is 
essential that researchers themselves take active steps to reach and include 
marginalised groups in their studies, especially when their beliefs and experiences 
would be of relevance to the construct under investigation (as it would have been 
here). As noted by Baeur, Braimoh, Scheim and Dharma (2017), it has become 
increasingly normal to exclude small groups from research or analyses for statistical 
reasons, meaning that over time these groups are essentially erased from 
experimental research. Though it would indeed have been statistically difficult to 
account for smaller non-binary groups in analyses here, one study could have 
directly targeted these individuals and potentially included a third group for analysis. 
The absence of non-binary groups and constructs should thus be considered a 
limitation of this work.  
Lastly, it should be acknowledged that the past five years have seen a 
considerable change in Ireland (and indeed the broader West’s) cultural climate 
around gender issues. In the period since this data were collected, there have been a 
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number of significant social advances around sexual and gender equality, including 
online movements (e.g., the #MeToo, #IBelieveHer, #TimesUp: see Jackson, 2018) 
and significant legislative change (including the Marriage Equality and Reproductive 
Rights referenda). However, there has also been a significant increase in reactionary 
movements (e.g., the Men’s Rights movements, or the more recent “involuntary 
celibate” online communities: Gotell & Dutton, 2016; Jordan, 2016; Schmitz & 
Kazyak, 2016), and a notable (although anecdotal) surge in public displays of 
gender-motivated or anti-women violence (Boyd, 2018; Williams, 2018). This is a 
highly active and labile period for gender rights and discussions, particularly on 
college campuses (Haines, Deaux & Lofaro, 2016), and it is therefore likely that 
attitudes have changed among the samples employed. While future research should 
(and is beginning to) explore the impact of such movements on gender beliefs (e.g., 
Kunst, Bailey, Prendergast & Gundersen, 2018; Swank & Fahs, 2017), this period of 
change should be considered an important caveat when interpreting the 
generalisability of the current results.  
Methodological Factors  
Though the current work examined and/or controlled for the influence of 
some methodological properties on IRAP results (i.e., stimulus gender ratings, 
stimulus valence, relational terms, etc.), the impact of other features was not directly 
assessed. These include, but are not limited to, the influence of: block or IRAP order; 
response rules (both their presence and their phrasing); response key placement; 
stimulus type (i.e., pictorial, symbolic, auditory, or verbal); block number; trial 
number, and so on. This was of course because of both space and time constraints, 
but it should be noted that all of the above factors are modifiable and have been 
shown to occasionally influence outcomes on implicit measures (Fazio & Olsen, 
2013; De Houwer, Teige-Mocigemba, Spruyt & Moors, 2009; Garwonski & De 
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Houwer, 2014; Greenwald, Poehlman, Uhlmann & Banaji, 2009). As such, future 
research should consider examining these variables in more detail, and in the specific 
context of a gender IRAP.  
Another methodological factor to consider is the particular scoring technique 
employed here. In this work, scores were produced using the DIRAP scoring 
algorithms on the metric that is widely used within the IRAP and broader implicit 
measures literature (i.e., mean differences in reaction time: Nosek, 2007). Though 
this was primarily for consistency and ease of comparison with existing work, it 
should be noted that concerns have been raised in the literature around these 
conventions. Researchers have questioned, for instance, whether response latencies 
are capturing all of the necessary information in a measure (e.g., relative to other 
metrics like accuracy or fluency: see Gavin, Roche & Ruiz, 2008). Others have more 
generally questioned whether the mean is an appropriate measure of central tendency 
for implicit measures, given that reaction times are not normally distributed 
(Whelan, 2010). Future research could investigate these claims by systematically 
comparing different metrics and algorithms on some relevant dimension of interest 
(e.g., predictive validity).   
Outside of the IRAP, there are some methodological issues to consider with 
the self-report tasks. Both the androcentrism and hiring preference tasks were 
developed for the purpose of this work, and there may have therefore been any 
number of issues related to their stimuli, format, and scoring. For example, in the 
androcentrism task, running a focus group in advance may have caught that the     
gender-neutral face seemed more feminine than gender-neutral. Similarly, while the 
scoring technique employed in the expanded hiring task (i.e. summing and averaging 
preferences) was logical and allowed for simple analyses, psychometric tests of its 
validity etc. could have led to alternative and more appropriate ways of scoring this 
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measure. Though there was not sufficient time to explore these issues in detail in this 
thesis (though see the individual chapter discussions for a review), such 
investigations would have strengthened the conclusions drawn about these biases.   
Participant Factors  
Lastly, as in any research, it is important to examine generalisability and the 
ways in which participants may have influenced results. Participants in this study 
were predominantly recruited from the Maynooth University student populations and 
as such were significantly more likely to be White, well-educated, and middle class. 
This should of course not be considered representative of the broader Irish 
population, even within that age range, and future research should explore the 
potential impact of demographics on binary biases. This work did also not carry out 
comprehensive assessments of participants’ gender-related beliefs, identities, and 
attitudes, and as such participants may have varied in unforeseen ways across 
different studies. Though it would not have been feasible to assess beliefs in this 
way, doing so would have considerably strengthened the conclusions drawn about 
binary biases and indeed the role of the binary in gender attitudes more broadly. 
Future studies should consider exploring this in more detail.  
It is also worth noting that all of the researchers involved in data collection 
for this thesis were women. The influence of researcher gender on experimental 
outcomes is well documented (see Chapman, Benedict & Schioth, 2018, for a recent 
meta-analysis of these effects). While certain steps were taken to minimize the 
potential impact of researcher gender (e.g. emphasising anonymity, having the 
participants complete the experiment on their own in a cubicle), the fact that the 
research was evidently about gender and inequality issues may have led to social 
desirability biases or other unintended influences on the data.  
7.4 Concluding Remarks  
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In conclusion, the current work was a unique, quantitative, and direct 
assessment of gender binary biases in an Irish context. Across Nine studies and two 
pooled analyses, this work shed light on the social construction of the binary at the 
individual level, and attested to the centrality and automaticity of the binary within 
gender cognition. In so doing, it introduced new measurement tool for those 
interested in gender ideology, and indeed added empirical weight to some central 
and historic feminist arguments. This work also explored the binary in the context of 
three key manifestations of patriarchy – male supremacy, male centrality, and male 
aggression – and provided some evidence that the binary may indeed form the 
foundation of women’s oppression, at least in some settings. Findings from this 
thesis also informed our understanding of the IRAP methodology, and indeed gender 
attitude measurement itself.  
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Appendix 1 
 
Consent Form 
 
In agreeing to participate in this research I understand the following: 
 
This research is being conducted by ________, an undergraduate student at the 
Department of Psychology, Maynooth University, under the supervision of Dr. Carol 
Murphy. It is the responsibility of the student to adhere to professional ethical 
guidelines in their dealings with participants and the collection and handling of data. 
If I have any concerns about participation, I understand that I may refuse to participate 
or withdraw at any stage of my participation. 
 
I have been informed as to the general nature of the study.  I understand that as a 
requirement of participating in the study I will be exposed to a computer-based task 
which will involve the presentation of words related to gender.  I am also happy to 
complete a series of questionnaires that will ask me questions about my attitude to sex 
and gender matters.   
 
All data from the study will be treated confidentially.  My name will not be recorded 
and so my data will not be identified by name at any stage of the data analysis or in 
the final report. The data will be compiled, analysed and submitted in a report to the 
Psychology Department, Maynooth University.  
 
I understand that no clinical judgement can be made of me on the basis of my 
participation or performance during this research and that because this is a group-
based study my own individual responses on the questionnaire and the computer-based 
tasks are of no interest to the researchers.   
  
At the conclusion of my participation, any questions or concerns I have will be fully 
addressed. 
 
I may withdraw from this study at any time and may withdraw my data at the 
conclusion of my participation if I still have concerns. However, I understand that 
once I leave the experiment, I can no longer withdraw my data as it will not be 
identifiable by name. 
 
I am over 18 years of age. 
 
Signed in duplicate 
                       
_____________________Participant 
                      
 ____________________ Researcher 
                      
 ____________________ Date 
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Appendix 2 
Gender and Desirability Ratings Study 1 (n = 40) 
Trait List 
Masculinity-
Femininity Rating 
Desirability in 
Men Rating 
Desirability in 
Women Rating 
Abrasive 2.65 2.08 2.03 
Adaptable 2.95 3.80 3.83 
Affectionate 3.97 3.95 4.25 
Aggressive 2.00 1.78 1.80 
Arrogant 2.18 1.98 1.65 
Artistic 3.48 3.60 3.83 
Athletic 2.08 3.90 3.30 
Bitchy 4.08 1.50 1.65 
Blunt 3.00 2.58 2.63 
Bossy 3.75 1.90 2.00 
Callous 2.60 1.65 1.50 
Capable 2.93 4.08 4.08 
Charismatic 2.60 4.23 4.08 
Communicative 3.55 4.13 4.25 
Compassionate 3.75 4.00 4.23 
Competitive 2.00 3.40 2.90 
Conscientious 3.38 3.50 3.60 
Decisive 2.70 3.95 3.80 
Dependent 3.37 2.53 2.88 
Dishonest 2.80 1.40 1.40 
Dismissive 2.88 1.70 1.65 
Dominant 2.05 2.70 2.45 
Domineering 2.60 2.35 2.13 
Driven 3.15 4.28 3.83 
Emotional 4.17 3.15 3.53 
Empathetic 3.90 3.88 4.00 
Forceful 2.38 2.08 1.83 
Gentle 4.13 3.60 4.10 
Helpful 3.47 4.10 4.03 
Helpless 3.35 1.40 1.93 
Independent 3.00 4.25 4.10 
Inefficient 2.72 1.65 1.80 
Insecure 3.65 1.85 1.78 
Insensitive 2.20 1.83 1.73 
Jealous 3.38 1.90 1.70 
Loyal 3.00 4.48 4.35 
Nurturing 4.25 3.53 4.35 
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Optimistic 3.20 4.10 4.13 
Passive 2.93 2.08 2.53 
Pessimistic 2.93 1.78 1.80 
Polite 3.65 4.13 4.13 
Practical 2.75 4.00 3.73 
Punctual 3.40 3.75 3.78 
Rational 2.85 3.75 3.80 
Secretive 3.28 1.80 1.85 
Self-sufficient 2.80 1.53 1.53 
Selfish 2.82 3.90 3.95 
Sensitive 3.98 3.45 4.08 
Sincere 3.35 4.13 4.40 
Sociable 3.20 4.18 4.13 
Stubborn 2.90 2.23 2.23 
Submissive 3.33 1.98 2.45 
Tactful 3.28 3.48 3.35 
Tactless 2.53 1.75 1.68 
Unemotional 1.88 2.05 1.95 
Unpredictable 3.20 2.65 2.68 
Unreliable 2.60 1.35 1.65 
Vain 3.17 1.78 1.83 
Violent 2.20 1.28 1.33 
Weak 3.40 1.73 2.08 
Witty 2.60 4.30 4.13 
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Appendix 3 
Gender and Desirability Ratings Study 1 (n = 228) 
Trait List Masculinity-
Femininity Rating 
Desirability in 
Men Rating 
Desirability in 
Women Rating 
Abrasive 2.71 1.88 1.89 
Adaptable 3.08 4.16 4.17 
Affectionate 3.75 4.14 4.49 
Aggressive 2.16 1.67 1.56 
Arrogant 2.21 1.63 1.59 
Artistic 3.39 3.61 3.89 
Athletic 2.46 3.92 3.64 
Bitchy 4.02 1.54 1.64 
Blunt 2.59 2.51 2.41 
Bossy 3.51 1.98 1.93 
Callous 2.89 1.73 1.71 
Capable 3.02 4.32 4.28 
Charismatic 2.67 4.27 4.15 
Communicative 3.61 4.32 4.41 
Compassionate 3.71 4.32 4.45 
Competitive 2.50 3.40 3.32 
Conscientious 3.35 3.70 3.73 
Decisive 2.76 4.03 4.02 
Dependent 3.31 2.53 2.63 
Dishonest 2.86 1.32 1.26 
Dismissive 2.74 1.66 1.64 
Dominant 2.32 2.56 2.43 
Domineering 2.64 2.35 2.22 
Driven 3.11 4.33 4.23 
Emotional 3.89 3.24 3.52 
Empathetic 3.65 3.94 4.11 
Forceful 2.29 1.83 1.84 
Gentle 3.86 3.82 4.21 
Helpful 3.24 4.29 4.35 
Helpless 3.25 1.63 1.75 
Independent 3.08 4.22 4.29 
Inefficient 2.78 1.67 1.64 
Insecure 3.57 1.83 1.91 
Insensitive 2.41 1.72 1.61 
Jealous 3.26 1.80 1.81 
Loyal 3.06 4.65 4.68 
Nurturing 4.02 3.74 4.32 
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Optimistic 3.23 4.26 4.31 
Passive 3.14 2.25 2.19 
Pessimistic 2.80 1.73 1.64 
Polite 3.39 4.28 4.46 
Practical 2.83 4.19 3.99 
Punctual 3.17 3.92 3.98 
Rational 2.88 3.93 3.94 
Secretive 3.12 1.71 1.72 
Self-sufficient 3.05 4.21 4.21 
Selfish 3.00 1.48 1.42 
Sensitive 3.80 3.57 3.89 
Sincere 3.15 4.30 4.44 
Sociable 3.13 4.37 4.40 
Stubborn 2.86 2.11 2.08 
Submissive 3.37 2.15 2.20 
Tactful 3.26 3.40 3.46 
Tactless 2.68 2.00 1.97 
Unemotional 2.21 1.86 1.70 
Unpredictable 3.11 2.75 2.76 
Unreliable 2.60 1.30 1.39 
Vain 3.21 1.76 1.85 
Violent 2.21 1.29 1.22 
Weak 3.37 1.86 2.02 
 
Note. Traits were rated on a five-point Likert-Style scale from very masculine (1) to 
very feminine (5). 
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Appendix 4 
Generic IRAP Experimental Protocol  
Protocol 
 
1. Assign participant code based on gender of participant (see counterbalancing 
sheet below). 
2. Predictor task (LSH, human-as-male task, or hiring task) and demographic 
information (age and gender) via Google form  
3. IRAP(s) based on counterbalancing sheet below. 
4. Modern sexism scale via Google form 
 
Counterbalancing 
  
Gender of 
participant 
Participant code 
(NB probably not 
the order in which 
they are run!) 
First IRAP Second IRAP 
Female 1 a b 
Female 2 a b 
Female 3 b a 
Female 4 b a 
Female 5 a b 
Female 6 a b 
Female 7 b a 
Female 8 b a 
Female 9 a b 
Female 10 a b 
Female 11 b a 
Female 12 b a 
Female 13 a b 
Female 14 a b 
Female 15 b a 
Female 16 b a 
Female 17 a b 
Female 18 a b 
Female 19 b a 
Female 20 b a 
Female 21 a b 
Female 22 a b 
Female 23 b a 
Female 24 b a 
Female 25 a b 
Female 26 a b 
Female 27 b a 
Female 28 b a 
Male 29 a b 
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Male 30 a b 
Male 31 b a 
Male 32 b a 
Male 33 a b 
Male 34 a b 
Male 35 b a 
Male 36 b a 
Male 37 a b 
Male 38 a b 
Male 39 b a 
Male 40 b a 
Male 41 a b 
Male 42 a b 
Male 43 b a 
Male 44 b a 
Male 45 a b 
Male 46 a b 
Male 47 b a 
Male 48 b a 
Male 49 a b 
Male 50 a b 
Male 51 b a 
Male 52 b a 
Male 53 a b 
Male 54 a b 
Male 55 b a 
Male 56 b a 
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Appendix 5 
Modern Sexism Scale (Swim et al., 1995) 
Subject: _____ 
Gender: _____ 
Age: ____ 
 
Below are a number of statements measuring your attitudes and beliefs toward 
gender. Please read each statement carefully using the scale below to make your 
choice.  
 
1 2 3 4 5 
Strongly 
disagree Disagree 
Neither agree 
nor disagree Agree 
Strongly 
Agree 
 
 
1 Women are generally not as smart as men 1 2 3 4 5 
2 I would be equally comfortable having a 
woman as a boss as a man.* 
1 2 3 4 5 
3 It is more important to encourage boys than 
to encourage girls to participate in athletics.  
1 2 3 4 5 
4 When both parents are employed and their 
child gets sick at school, the school should 
call the mother rather than the father.  
1 2 3 4 5 
5 Women are just as capable of thinking 
logically as men.* 
1 2 3 4 5 
6 Discrimination against women is no longer a 
problem in Ireland.  
1 2 3 4 5 
7 Women often miss out on good jobs due to 
sexual discrimination.* 
1 2 3 4 5 
8 It is rare to see women treated in a sexist 
manner on television. 
1 2 3 4 5 
9 Over the past few years, the government and 
news media have been showing more 
concern about the treatment of women than 
is warranted by women's actual experiences. 
1 2 3 4 5 
10 It is easy to understand the anger of women’s 
groups in Ireland.* 
1 2 3 4 5 
 
* Item is reverse-scored. Sum items to give an overall score.   
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Appendix 6  
Heteronormativity Attitudes and Beliefs Scale (Habarth, 2015) 
Subject: _____ 
Gender: _____ 
Age: ____ 
 
Below are a number of statements measuring your attitudes and beliefs toward 
gender and sexuality. Please read each statement carefully using the scale below 
to make your choice.  
 
Strongly 
disagree 
Disagree Slightly 
disagree 
Exactly 
neutral 
Slightly 
agree 
Agree Strongly 
agree 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
 
 
Femininity and masculinity are 
determined by biological factors, 
such as genes and hormones, 
before birth. 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
There are only two sexes: male 
and female.  1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
All people are either male or 
female 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
In intimate relationships, women 
and men take on roles according 
to gender for a reason; it’s really 
the best way to have a successful 
relationship 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
In intimate relationships, people 
should act only according to what 
is traditionally expected of their 
gender. 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
Gender is the same thing as sex. 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
It’s perfectly okay for people to 
have intimate relationships with 
people of the same sex. 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
The best way to raise a child is to 
have a mother and a father raise 
the child together. 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
In healthy intimate relationships, 
women may sometimes take on 
stereotypical ‘male’ roles, and 
men may sometimes take on 
stereotypical ‘female’ roles.* 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
Sex is complex; in fact, there 
might even be more than 2 
sexes.* 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
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Gender is a complicated issue, 
and it doesn’t always match up 
with biological sex.* 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
Women and men need not fall 
into stereotypical gender roles 
when in an intimate relationship.* 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
People should partner with 
whomever they choose, regardless 
of sex or gender.* 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
There are particular ways that 
men should act and particular 
ways that women should act in 
relationships. 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
People who say that there are only 
two legitimate genders are 
mistaken. 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
Gender is something we learn 
from society.* 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
 
* Item is reverse-scored. Sum all items (including reverse-scored items) to give 
an overall score.   
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Appendix 7 
This experiment explores how we associate certain personality traits with men and women.   
Specifically, whether our gut reaction is to assume that men and women have different 
personality traits relative to one another.  
We therefore make a distinction between “masculine” personality traits and “feminine” 
personality traits. You will need to learn which list each personality trait fits into in order to 
complete this experiment.  
You might not agree that each of the below traits are either masculine or feminine. That’s 
ok, just try to learn which are places on each list. 
 
Masculine personality traits Feminine personality traits 
Witty 
 
Competitive 
 
Decisive 
 
Charismatic 
Nurturing 
 
Gentle 
 
Sensitive 
 
Affectionate 
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Appendix 8 
Androcentrism Task 
Below you will be presented with a series of faces. For each image, please select 
whether you think the person is male or female.  There is no need to spend too long 
on each item, but do try to be as accurate as possible.    
 
 
1 
 
 
a. Male 
b. Female 
2 
 
 
a. Female 
b. Male 
3 
 
 
a. Female 
b. Male 
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4 
 
 
a. Male 
b. Female 
5 
 
 
a. Female  
b. Male 
6 
 
 
a. Male 
b. Female 
7 
 
c. Male 
d. Female 
 
 
 
 319 
Appendix 9 
This experiment explores how we perceive other people’s emotions, and whether is related 
to gender. 
Specifically, whether our gut reaction is to assume that men and women have more or less 
complex emotional lives than one another.  
We therefore make a distinction between “simple” emotions and “complex” emotions. You 
will need to learn which list each emotion fits into in order to complete this experiment.  
You might not agree that each of the below emotions are either simple or complex. That’s 
ok, just try to learn which are places on each list. 
 
Simple emotions Complex emotions 
Fear 
 
Anger 
 
Happiness 
 
Sadness 
Apprehension 
 
Contempt 
 
Pride 
 
Disappointment 
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Appendix 10 
 
Likelihood to Sexually Harass Scale (Pryor, 1987) 
 
Instructions  
On the sheets that follow you will find 10 brief scenarios that describe 10 different 
interactions between males and females. In each case you will be asked to imagine 
that you are the main male character in the scenario. Then you will be asked to rate 
how likely it is that you would perform each of several different behaviours in the 
described social context. Assume in each scenario that no matter what you choose to 
do, nothing bad would be likely to happen to you as a result of your action. Try to 
answer each question as honestly as you can. Your answers will be completely 
anonymous. No one will ever try to discover your identity, no matter what you say 
on the questionnaire.  
 
Scenario #1  
Imagine that you are an executive in a large corporation. You are 42 years old. Your 
income is above average for people at your job level. You have had numerous job 
offers from other companies. You feel very secure in your job. One day your 
personal secretary decides to quit her job and you have the task of replacing her. The 
personnel department sends several applicants over for you to interview. All seem to 
be equally qualified for the job. One of the applicants, Michelle S., explains during 
her interview that she desperately needs the job. She is 23 years old, single and has 
been job hunting for about a month. You find yourself very attracted to her. She 
looks at you in a way that possibly conveys she is also attracted to you. How likely 
are you to do the following things in this situation?  
a. Would you give her the job over the other applicants? (Circle a number to 
indicate your response.)  
b. Assuming that you are secure enough in your job that no possible reprisals could 
happen to you, would you offer her the job in exchange for sexual favours? (Circle a 
number to indicate your response.)  
c. Assuming that you fear no reprisals on your job, would you ask her to meet you 
later for dinner to discuss her possible employment?  
 
Scenario #2  
Imagine that you are the owner and manager of an expensive restaurant. One day, 
while going over the receipts, you discover that one of the waitresses has made some 
errors in her checks. She has undercharged several customers. The mistake costs you 
$100. In talking to some of the other employees, you find that the particular 
customers involved were friends of the waitress. You call her into your office and 
ask her to explain her behaviour. The waitress confesses to having intentionally 
undercharged her friends. She promises that she will never repeat this dishonest act 
and tells you that she will do anything to keep her job. The waitress is someone you 
have always found particularly attractive. She is a divorcee and about 25 years old. 
How likely are you to do the following things in this situation?  
a. Would you let her keep her job?  
b. Would you let her keep her job in exchange for sexual favours?  
c. Would you ask her to meet you for dinner after work to discuss the problem?  
 
Scenario #3  
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Imagine that you are the manager of a shipping company. One day your supervisor 
asks you to study the possibility of buying several computers for the office. You call 
up several competing companies that sell computers. Each company sends a sales 
representative over to your office who describes the company's products. A 
salesperson from company "A" calls you and asks to come to your office. You agree 
and the next day a very attractive woman shows up. She can offer no real reason for 
buying her company's products over those of the other companies. However, she 
seems very sexy. How likely are you to do the following things in this situation?  
a. Would you recommend her line of computers?  
b. Assuming that you are secure enough in your job that no possible reprisals could 
happen to you, would you agree to recommend her line of computers in exchange for 
sexual favours?  
c. Given the same assumptions as the last question above, would you ask her to meet 
you later for dinner to discuss the choice of computers?  
 
Scenario #4  
Imagine that you are a Hollywood film director. You are casting for a minor role in a 
film you are planning. The role calls for a particularly stunning actress, one with a 
lot of sex appeal. How likely are you to do the following things in this situation?  
a. Would you give the role to the actress whom you personally found sexiest?  
b. Would give the role to an actress who agreed to have sex with you?  
c. Would ask the actress to whom you were most personally attracted to talk with 
you about the role over dinner?  
 
Scenario #5  
Imagine that you are the owner of a modelling agency. Your agency specializes in 
sexy female models used in television commercials. One of your models, Amy T., is 
a particularly ravishing brunette. You stop her after work one day and ask her to 
have dinner with you. She coldly declines your offer and tells you that she would 
like to keep your relationship with her "strictly business." A few months later you 
find that business is slack and you have to lay off some of your employees. You can 
choose to lay off Amy or one of four other women. All are good models, but 
someone has to go. How likely are you to do the following things in this situation?  
a. Would you fire Amy?  
b. Assuming that you are unafraid of possible reprisals, would you offer to let Amy 
keep her job in return for sexual favours?  
c. Would you ask Amy to dinner so that you could talk over her future employment?  
 
Scenario #6  
Imagine that you are a college professor. You are 38 years old. You teach in a large 
midwestern university. You are a full professor with tenure. You are renowned in 
your field (Abnormal Psychology) and have numerous offers for other jobs. One day 
following the return of an examination to a class, a female student stops in your 
office. She tells you that her score is one point away from an "A" and asks you if she 
can do some extra credit project to raise her score. She tells you that she may not 
have a sufficient grade to get into graduate school without the "A." Several other 
students have asked you to do extra credit assignments and you have declined to let 
them. This particular woman is a stunning blonde. She sits in the front row of the 
class every day and always wears short skirts. You find her extremely sexy. How 
likely are you to do the following things in this situation?  
a. Would you let her carry out a project for extra credit (e.g. write a paper)?  
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b. Assuming that you are very secure in your job and the university has always 
tolerated professors who make passes at students, would you offer the student a 
chance to earn extra credit in return for sexual favours?  
c. Given the same assumptions as in the question above, would you ask her to join 
you for dinner to discuss the possible extra credit assignments?  
 
Scenario #7  
Imagine that you are a college student at a large Midwestern university. You are a 
junior who just transferred from another school on the East coast. One night at a bar 
you meet an attractive female student named Rhonda. Rhonda laments to you that 
she is failing a course in English Poetry. She tells you that she has a paper due next 
week on the poet, Shelley, and fears that she will fail since she has not begun to 
write it. You remark that you wrote a paper last year on Shelley at your former 
school. Your paper was given an A+. She asks you if you will let her use your paper 
in her course. She wants to just retype it and put her name on it. How likely are you 
to do the following things in this situation?  
a. Would you let Rhonda use your paper?  
b. Would you let Rhonda use your paper in exchange for sexual favours?  
c. Would you ask Rhonda to come to your apartment to discuss the matter?  
 
Scenario #8  
Imagine that you are the editor for a major publishing company. It is your job to read 
new manuscripts of novels and decide whether they are worthy of publication. You 
receive literally hundreds of manuscripts per week from aspiring novelists. Most of 
them are screened by your subordinates and thrown in the trash. You end up 
accepting about one in a thousand for publication. One night you go to a party. There 
you meet a very attractive woman named Betsy. Betsy tells you that she has written 
a novel and would like to check into getting it published. This is her first novel. She 
is a dental assistant. She asks you to read her novel. How likely are you to do the 
following things in this situation.  
a. Would you agree to read Betsy's novel?  
b. Would you agree to reading Betsy's novel in exchange for sexual favours?  
c. Would you ask Betsy to have dinner with you the next night to discuss your 
reading her novel?  
 
Scenario #9  
Imagine that you are a physician. You go over to the hospital one day to make your 
rounds visiting your patients. In looking over the records of one of your patients, you 
discover that one of the attending nurses on the previous night shift made an error in 
administering drugs to your patient. She gave the wrong dosage of a drug. You 
examine the patient and discover that no harm was actually done. He seems fine. 
However, you realize that the ramifications of the error could have been catastrophic 
under other circumstances. You pull the files and find out who made the error. It 
turns out that a new young nurse named Wendy H. was responsible. You have 
noticed Wendy in some of your visits to the hospital and have thought of asking her 
out to dinner. You realize that she could lose her job if you report this incident. How 
likely are you to do each of the following things?  
a. Would you report Wendy to the hospital administration?  
b. Assuming that you fear no reprisals, would you tell Wendy in private that you will 
not report her if she will have sex with you?  
 
 
 323 
c. Assuming that you fear no reprisals, would you ask Wendy to join you for dinner 
to discuss the incident?  
 
Scenario #10  
Imagine that you are the news director for a local television station. Due to some 
personnel changes you have to replace the anchor woman for the evening news. 
Your policy has always been to promote reporters from within your organization 
when an anchor woman vacancy occurs. There are several female reporters from 
which to choose. All are young, attractive, and apparently qualified for the job. One 
reporter, Loretta W., is someone whom you personally find very sexy. You initially 
hired her, giving her a first break in the TV news business. How likely are you to do 
the following things in this situation?  
a. Would give Loretta the job?  
b. Assuming that you fear no reprisals in your job, would you offer Loretta the job in 
exchange for sexual favours?  
c. Assuming that you fear no reprisals in your job, would you ask her to meet you 
after work for dinner to discuss the job?  
 
 
 
 
